The “People’s Power” coalition leader has had ample time to make up his mind vis-a-vis the implementers of his “10 Steps for the People” Action Plan. Given previous agreements about the Socialist Party and Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc’s quotas in the next Cabinet, Viktor Yushchenko should have known what positions his bloc will retain. By this time, he should have made his choice of prime minister, particularly in view of the proximity of the 2006 parliamentary elections that are going to be a milestone in assessing his performance as a president. Under the circumstances, Yushchenko must be well aware that every day matters, as his loss of momentum now threatens to turn into a loss of actual power in 2006. Furthermore, Yushchenko is known as a slow decision-maker: it took him a long time to decide whether he should run for the presidency; it took him a long time to decide whether he should form the “Our Ukraine” bloc and what kind of bloc it should be, and it took him even longer to decide whether he should go into opposition to the Kuchma regime. He is equally slow making personnel decisions: you will remember the long and painful process of replacing Roman Bezsmertny as his campaign manager. As matters stand, Yushchenko cannot afford this style any more. On the one hand, the break he has taken to select a prime minister from the short list enables him to see how scrupulous, or unscrupulous, the candidates are in the means they use to reach their ends. This became especially evident, not only to Yushchenko but to millions of our compatriots as well, after the top candidates appeared in TV talk-shows. On the other hand, the break Yushchenko has taken made some people think they can bring pressure to bear on the president-elect. Thus, Anatoly Kinakh’s Party of Entrepreneurs and Industrialists and Association of Employers is demanding that Yushchenko appoint their leader to the position in question, Yuriy Kostenko’s Ukrainian Popular Party is publicly persuading Yushchenko that their leader is the best choice, and the Socialist Party is sending out press releases featuring Moroz as the only possible prime minister. Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Council suggests Shvets would be the optimal governor, Luhansk representatives opt for Yefremov and so on and so forth. The prime ministerial candidates have got enough time to both present their economic platforms and scathe their opponents.

Today, there are at least three lists of would-be Cabinet members that the authorized and unauthorized politicians and the candidates themselves have compiled, purportedly, on Yushchenko’s commission. At least two hundred MPs have been in touch with various “centres of clout” to get assured they will be nominated as ministers. Some of them will, obviously, be disappointed later, when their ambitions fail to be achieved, which is bad, since the president will need their legislative support in implementing his electoral programme. Amazingly, these lists contain the names of candidates for the posts over which the president has an exclusive authority, such as the Foreign Ministry, Defence Ministry, State Tax Administration, Security Service, prosecutor General’s Office, State Property Fund.

Olexander Zinchenko, Yushchenko’s campaign manager, and Anatoliy Kinakh state that the team is still discussing the future Cabinet’s priorities and operation principles. Isn’t that incredible, given that the priorities should have been established before that campaign was launched on 4 July and the presidential candidate registered his platform with the CEC, while the principles should have been agreed upon before the “Force of People” coalition was announced? Moreover, Yushchenko voiced those principles some time ago: new faces in power, separation of business and public administration, a broad coalition of various political forces, openness and transparency, focus on social programmes, the priority of national interests over personal or corporate ones, etc.

The above statement is an attempt to conceal the team’s inability to reach a compromise. Some observers believe Viktor Yushchenko has taken a break in order to spur his allies to do that on their own accord, and to ascertain the need for his own involvement in the process. That may be true, but it does not explain why Yushchenko, having promised on 5 January to name the prime minister in a few days, has not yet done so. Ideally, right after the re-run of the second round he should have made a statement to the following effect: “I trust the future prime minister X to negotiate the Cabinet composition with our allies according to previously agreed quotas”. However, he did not do that. Instead, the coalition set up a working group, headed by Zinchenko and intended to help the potential candidates come to a consensus. It does not look like they have. Nor does it look like the working group managed to bring the Cabinet forming principles in conformity with those declared by Yushchenko during his campaign.

Olexander Zinchenko and Petro Poroshenko maintain that the new government will not engage in “witch hunting”, which may account for their desire to invite Mykola Azarov into the new Cabinet, or let Sviatoslav Piskun remain Prosecutor General for an indefinite period of time. Yushchenko, however, underscored on several occasions that the key ministers and governors should not represent the old government. Deputy ministers or deputy governors who proved proficient, honest and able to deliver what is expected of them could keep their positions. As for the first persons in central public agencies or regional administrations, the question is why they participated in the vote-rigging by the executive authorities, why they did not resign then, but showed up in the Maidan amongst Yushchenko’s allies after he won.

Yushchenko seems to realize there is a problem. He also seems to apprehend that many professionals associated with the outgoing authorities can offer their valuable experience and expertise to the new government, and he must be looking for a way to accept this offer without losing face and credibility.

Concurrently, Viktor Yushchenko is facing a challenge of maintaining a “personnel” balance between the government and Parliament. The matter is that the major candidates for ministerial and gubernatorial positions are MPs. More than that, these are the brightest representatives of “our Ukraine”, Yuliya Tymoshanko’s Bloc, the Socialists and the few political forces that gave a helping hand to the “People’s Power” at the final stage of their struggle. Suppose, MPs are appointed to the Cabinet and the Socialist faction loses Lutsenko, Vinsky, Shybko, Nikolayenko, Semeniuk, Yuliya Tymoshenko’s Bloc has to function without Tymoshenko herself and Turchynov, Shevchuk goes from People’s Democratic Party faction, while Poroshenko, Pynzenyk, Rybachuk, Tarasiuk, Kostenko, Martynenko, Tretyakov, Bezssmertny, Filenko, Stetskiv, Morozov, Bilozir, Yekhanurov, Kachur, Chervonenko, Oliynyk and others leave the “OU” faction; who will stay in Parliament to implement the President’s legislative strategy and expedite the coalition’s interests within the Supreme Rada? Besides, on leaving the Rada those politicians will be replaced with second-echelon members of their respective bloc and party lists, who, for the most part, are non-entities to the public at large. Therefore, parliamentarians’ massive migration to the bodies of executive power is bound to enfeeble the legislature, first and foremost, the pro-Yushchenko coalition. The new president should bear this in mind.

Another problem likely to arise in connection with the MPs’ exodus from the Rada is the lack of popular personae to stump in the 2006 campaign. Who will canvass for “Our Ukraine” - Chervoniy, Karmazin, Taniuk or Manchulenko? Will Bilorus and Shkil be the faces of Yuliya Tymoshenko’s Bloc in that election? Can you imagine the Socialists’ campaign without Lutsenko? Should the former MPs go onto the campaign trail to back up their less experienced colleagues, the new opposition will use every possible pretext to accuse the new authorities of resorting to administrative pressure.

So, while shaping his future Cabinet, Yushchenko has to think about the percentage in it of absolutely new figures, with no previous involvement in parliamentarian activities. He also has to think of the percentage of the new-old characters in the government, i.e. the people who served in government at different times of their careers but ended up in the opposition to the regime, as well as of the percentage of very important MPs that can be invited to the Cabinet without causing too much damage to the Rada. The task is onerous, since the new government must be effective, but so must the new parliamentary majority that will have to stand up to the masters of parliamentary intrigues - the Communists, “Regions of Ukraine” and SDPU(o).

Yushchenko can apply different approaches in selecting a prime minister, both with their pros and cons. The first approach is to appoint a strong premier, and the second is to appoint a so-called “technical” prime minister. The candidates from the first category are Petro Poroshenko and Yuliya Tymoshenko. Some experts would, probably, consider Kinakh and Moroz as belonging to the cohort, but Kinakh has already been prime minister, and Moroz will never be the one. So we will briefly consider the two former candidates.

Petro Poroshenko has everything it takes to make a strong and effective prime minister. Comparing him with the previous Ukrainian heads of government, one can say that he, unlike Kuchma, knows what NATO and English are about; unlike Marchuk, he is good at economics; unlike Kinakh, he is independent; and unlike Yushchenko, he is extremely energized and enterprising. As rumour has it, during the campaign he never went to bed before three in the morning and was back in the office by eight. Unlike Pustovoitenko, he can say “no” to his bosses and insist on revising decisions made without his consent; unlike Yanukovych, he is intelligent.

In principle, he understands the Cabinet’s role and objectives, particularly in the light of the 2006 elections. Poroshenko is as vigorous and dynamic as Yuliya Tymoshenko, but he is not so keen on arm-wrestling. He dislikes open conflicts, and avails himself of a much wider range of political levers than charm and vigour.

Poroshenko’s contribution toViktor Yushchenko’s campaign was precious. Of course, there were lapses that could be blamed on him personally, such as poor collecting of district commissions’ minutes for the alternative ballot count, insufficient legal support of the campaign entrusted to him, summoning Yushchenko to the CEC premises on the night of the notorious fight… Nevertheless, his activity on the hustings was the most fruitful, which accounts for certain problems he is having at the moment as a prime ministerial candidate. Yushchenko might think that the businessmen who took part in his campaign and the “People’s Power” coalition should have no further obligations to him. They have already done a lot, contributed too much effort and money, suffered too many business losses and forgone benefits. Having got to Parliament as part of Yushchenko’s team, those businessmen have already “repaid all their debts” and resisted the unprecedented pressure of the authorities throughout the campaign. But for the 2006 elections, no one would ever mention mutual commitments again. Poroshenko is one of the most independent players, and Yushchenko must be aware of it. Besides, Poroshenko is commonly known to be on very good terms with [Speaker] Lytvyn, and the tandem of premier Poroshenko and Speaker Lytvyn could limit the new president’s political clout.

Petro Poroshenko seems to belong to those strong politicians who prefer to have dependent, obedient and industrious subordinates. Hence his intention to employ Azarov in the new government: the latter will, undoubtedly, be happy to fulfill Premier Poroshenko’s every order. Hence his lobbying for Zinchenko as a new Secretary of the Council for National Security and Defence (Poroshenko was the first to suggest hiring Zinchenko to manage Yushchenko’s election campaign). Hence the acceptance of Piskun as a new-old Prosecutor General. Hence the desire to invite to the Cabinet as many MPs actively engaged in business as possible.

The new opposition is looking forward to Poroshenko’s appointment to the prime ministerial position. For one thing, it will mean a breach of the principle of separating business and politics, declared by Yushchenko. For another, the opposition-to-be expects Poroshenko to succumb to temptations associated with the premier’s powers. The new opposition is positive that Poroshenko, as well as all other businessmen in Yushchenko’s team likely to get to the government, will rush to remedy the almost mortal financial wounds inflicted on them by Kuchma’s regime in the course of the previous parliamentary and presidential elections. As fellow human beings, we can sympathize with them - the authorities mistreated them, not only violating their rights and freedoms, but very often also breaking the law. Yet millions of people did not vote for their financial rehabilitation. So once the new opposition contrives to stir a public scandal, no matter how insignificant, Yushchenko’s and his team’s ratings could crash.

Of course, the situation is not all black-and-white; it has many shades to it. The businessmen from “Our Ukraine” close to Poroshenko are determined to restore justice in many dubious schemes realized by Akhmetov, Pinchuk, Yaroslavsky, Medvedchuk and some others. The correction of privatization-relating decisions, should it be carried out in strict compliance with the law, can become the new authorities’ trump card. In some sense, it is an economically sound, but double-edged solution. If the new government’s economic policy proves ineffective, which may cost it votes at the parliamentary elections, the redistribution of property belonging to the most odious agents of the old regime, both at the national and at the regional levels, will help mobilize electoral support. It could cause tension between Prime Minister Petro Poroshenko and Speaker Lytvyn, whose faction is currently swelling at the expense of the formerly pro-Kuchma majority. Those MPs will seek the Speaker’s protection, whereas some of Yushchenko’s supporters will pursue the opposite aims. Any alliances of today, including that between Poroshenko and Lytvyn, will have to stand the test of time and joint work, and that is going to be a tough test for them both.

On the other hand, Poroshenko and Lytvyn need each other. They are both interested in preserving their respective posts after the parliamentary elections and, what is more, the constitutional reform implementation. Thus, they have to maintain the existing balance. As for Yushchenko, he will have to find his place in this arrangement, and it is up to him to ensure a principal significance of this place.

The new president will have to think over the presently unanswered question if he is a major political force in the country. The Ukrainian political elite have held their breath, waiting. Lytvyn’s faction is growing by day. The Speaker starts every parliamentary session with announcements of MPs’ deserting ex-majority factions. However, they do not hasten to join the winner-factions - “Our Ukraine”, Yuliya Tymoshenko’s Bloc or the Socialists. They either beef up Lytvyn’s faction or the group of unallied MPs watching vigilantly for the future hub of power: Yushchenko, Lytvyn or the Prime Minister? Yushchenko is to answer the question with his decisions and actions. If he continues to move slowly, the lawmakers will line up to join other factions. This game is tough, allowing for no faux pas. The people of Ukraine can appreciate a Vaclav Havel-like president, yet the elite, accustomed to Kuchma’s harshness will not. Therefore, Yushchenko needs a pushy prime minister, capable of maintaining a balance of popular and unpopular decisions and securing the executive power’s efficacy. Poroshenko can cope with the task, provided his pockets are sewn shut. The question is whether Yushchenko will trust him to undertake it.

The above applies to Yuliya Tymoshenko, although Yushchenko’s relations with her are specific in a different way. When entering into an agreement on cooperation in the election campaign, the two leaders also signed a secret protocol. There is no denying its existence. The protocol obligates Yushchenko to nominate Tymoshenko as prime minister, put her name to a vote in the Rada and guarantee a 100 per cent support of his faction “Our Ukraine”. Unless Yushchenko does exactly that, he will break his promise. Strictly speaking, Tymoshenko has not fully met her commitments either. It is true, she worked hard during the campaign, especially before the first round, speaking at five or six rallies a day. She spent weeks on end in the regions, and nonetheless failed to deliver an adequate result in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, of which her bloc was in charge. Some experts argue Viktor Yushchenko has always taken Tymoshenko’s prospects of becoming premier with a grain of salt. Yuliya Tymoshenko, being a wise and experienced politician, has always realized that. Therefore, she used Yushchenko’s election campaign to her best advantage as a public politician. The Maidan was a pinnacle in her self-promotion. Besides, she knows full well about the Kremlin’s cautious, to say the least, attitude to Yushchenko and the ensuing need for the latter to choose a premier acceptable for Moscow, predominantly for the sake of the national economy. Tymoshenko is not such a candidate, not because she cannot cooperate with Moscow, but because Moscow does not want to work with her. We do not know the exact nature of this idiosyncrasy. It could not be the mock criminal action taken by the Russian prosecution against our MP. Yet it is an established fact that the Kremlin cannot stand Yuliya Tymoshenko. According to some sources, when [Speaker] Lytvyn met with Putin last weekend, the Russian President dropped a hint that, although Moscow had no intention to influence the top personnel selection process in Ukraine, if the Ukrainian government got a head who had problems with the Russian law enforcement, Moscow would have to call back their ambassador for indefinitely long consultations and make sure the Ukrainian prime minister and representatives of the Russian law enforcement never crossed paths with each other …

Thus, Moscow is problem number one for Yuliya Tymoshenko. Her number two problem is her autonomy. No one in this country has the slightest doubt that Tymoshenko will always work for her own political result. In the context of the 2006 elections, though, and provided Yushchenko refuses to create his party, she may ally her bloc with “Our Ukraine” again, in which case she should realize that what she does as a premier is a common cause. Then she will be able sensibly to distribute effort and resources in order to cover the whole distance. Her number three problem is her unrestrained energy. Like nuclear power, it can be used to heat houses, or it can explode a bomb. And it is hard to predict in which of the two capacities she will operate tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. Tymoshenko can be a benefit for the country as an effective head of government if the law and mightier players set strict rules of the game. If she is placed in a position allowing her to set those rules at the top of executive power, we can be in for trouble. Sometimes her ideas are exceptionally prudent and practical, but sometimes they are too audacious, to put it mildly.

Notwithstanding the above potential problems, Yushchenko needs Tymoshenko as an ally. She is a strong and daring public politician, a consummate professional, practiced in both commercial activity and public service. She has an unusual mobilizing potential and she will not take “impossible” for an answer. There is practically nothing to make her give in. That is why the old regime’s representatives are afraid of her. However, Tymoshenko was the first to make a reconciliatory step towards them, which helped to ease the panic in the Yushchenko opponents’ camp, on the one hand, and gave Yuliya Tymoshenko a chance to appear on the “Ukraine” Channel and withstand the several-hour siege of a live interview in a hostile environment.

Yuliya Tymoshenko hopes to become prime minister, but she can also accept another job offer, say, that of the NCSD Secretary. In this case the Council for National Security and Defense can regain the weight and significance it used to have in the times of Volodymyr Horbulin. Yuliya Tymoshenko would thus get a position worthy of her industriousness and drive, sufficient leverage to affect the situation in the country, an opportunity to control the executive power and a direct access to the president.

Those were pluses and minuses associated with strong premiers. Yet we cannot rule out that Yushchenko will opt for the so-called “technical” prime minister, a second-echelon figure, the president’s envoy in the executive power. Some experts come up with the name of Viktor Pynzenyk. He is neither a good manager, nor an independent leader. Many would characterize his economic ideas as arguable, but sound. Viktor Yushchenko, though, may want to ask him a couple of tough questions. First is the monopolization of the “OU” brand by his “Reform and Order” Party. Second is Pynzenyk’s wholehearted support of the constitutional reform, about which Yushchenko himself is lukewarm. Third, Yushchenko will have to work hard to change the public perception of himself and his team in Eastern and Southern Ukraine. He can do that in humanitarian matters. He can also do that in economic terms - if his government is effective. Viktor Pynzenyk, on the contrary, will never be able to improve his public image (like Chubais in Russia). He can work wonders for the common good, but his name will remain synonymous with the economic problems of the early 1990s. Yushchenko should not forget this.

If it comes to appointing a “technical” prime minister, Yushchenko will want a person he can trust. Those are few, particularly amongst well-known politicians. That is why it will be a person without a record of serving in top official positions and a large financial capital, or a burning desire to acquire it, for that matter. Amongst a handful of eligible people is Oleh Rybachuk who headed the NBU International Department under Governor Yushchenko and then managed the office of Prime Minister Yushchenko. He is Vice President of the Black Sea Bank for Trade and Development in Salonika and Member of the Ukrainian Parliament. He was head of presidential candidate Yushchenko’s office during the election campaign. Some sources report that Oleh Rybachuk has already been offered a position of vice prime minister for European integration. Over the last years he, alongside Tarasiuk and Poroshenko, has been conducting international negotiations on Yushchenko’s behalf, establishing contacts with influential politicians throughout the world, and holding briefings for foreign diplomats in Kyiv.

As for his managerial skills, he cannot boast any. To tell the truth, his chief has not served as a role-model in this regard. Of course, Rybachuk is not ready to become a fully-fledged premier, in the conventional sense of the term. But who says conventions cannot be revised? Besides, Oleh Rybachuk, better than anyone else, meets the requirements announced by Yushchenko: he has no business of his own, he does not lead a political party, and he does not represent any clan (either pro-governmental or opposition). He is from the new generation of politicians, easy-going and sociable, he speaks perfect English, he has extensive contacts in Moscow, Warsaw, Brussels and Washington, he is a pet of the press and, most importantly, he enjoys Yushchenko’s confidence.

Should Oleh Rybachuk (or Olexander Zinchenko, who is also being considered as a candidate for “technical” premiership) be nominated for the position, the actual management of the economy and control of the executive power will be concentrated in the hands of several vice prime ministers. In theory, those can include Petro Poroshenko and Yuliya Tymoshenko. The president will have to see to it that the strong vice prime ministers work solely to promote Ukraine’s national interests.

Of course, Viktor Yushchenko should accelerate his decision-making, wisely allocate his scarce cadre to various branches of power, set clear priorities and get down to work. His time is condensed: the budget correction was initially planed for late January - early February; and now it will have to be postponed till March, and may last till April. Regions are waiting for new governors. The new ministers will have to bring themselves abreast of the economic situation, revise the previous decisions, if need be, and start making new ones that will produce positive practical results. In the meantime, the former authorities will recover from their defeat and form a strong opposition to the new government. Hopes that voters pin on Yushchenko and his team are exceedingly great. So are the hopes for the Yushchenko team’s failure that the outgoing officials and their Russian supporters cherish. The team’s success will open up new opportunities, not only for Ukraine, but also for a host of other countries which did not believe, prior to 26 November, that the people could win a battle with the regime. Now they are watching us closely for the outcome of this victory.