These days, as during the Orange Revolution, the entire nation is riveted to the TV screen. The TV kept silent for so long just to explode with answers leaving ordinary people fully confused yet clarified everything at the upper stratum of the political establishment. “Is that what we fought for?” inquire those who keep wornout strips of orange as a reminder of the days and nights spent on the Maidan. They fought for the right of TV channels, regardless of their owners, to report the news with truth and honor. They fought for the right of politicians such as Oleksandr Zinchenko to be courageous enough to go public with accusations of corruption among the presidential associates. They fought for the right to know why the ppresident makes the decisions he does. They fought for their right to choose their leaders. Their only mistake was to expect the leaders they chose to satisfy the bulk of their desires---and quickly.

We, Ukraine’s journalists, realized that miracles never happen. Yet still we believed. We hoped that the responsibilities assumed by Yushchenko and Tymoshenko would prevail over their personal ambitions. We hoped that cravings for power would not trump efforts to meet the people’s needs.. We hoped that big business representatives from the Our Ukraine party bloc were sincere in declaring the establishment of common rules of play as their primary goal.

What we did not expect was that so soon and bitter would be the disappointment. We did not expect that so frequently would analogies be drawn between this and the previous administration. Despite our knowledge, experience, and the cynicism so characteristic of the journalistic profession, we believed that this would not be the case. We still believe, but this time in ourselves---and in you. It was your eyes we saw so clearly during the first days on the Maidan. It was you who fought not for an extra slice of bread, but rather for the right to be treated as human beings. In you, who are doing a real business, who have had success in life and wanted this success to come to the entire nation, we believe.

Orange Revolutions do not happen every day. Most likely, what we saw on the Maidan will never repeat. But those who are beginning to lose faith in the authorities must not lose faith in themselves. These are the authorities who cannot do without us. But we can do without them---and without vain hopes also. We are proving this---hour-by-hour, day-by-day. If it had not been for you, the authorities would do what they do without looking at anybody or anything. Let us recall how a fairytale was born, a myth destroyed.

Case History in Brief

Since 1999, their paths have been interwoven as tightly as a plait. Leonid Kuchma and his associates made regular attempts to oust Yulia Tymoshenko since her first days as deputy prime minister in Yushchenko’s cabinet. Prime Minister Yushchenko held out for a year (never before had anyone withstood pressure from president Kuchma for so long) before requesting her dismissal from office. Then followed the Ukraine Without Kuchma campaign, with Tymoshenko on the barricades. Kuchma, Pliushch, and Yushchenko issued a joint statement branding the movement as ‘fascist’.

Next were Yushchenko’s dismissal as prime minister and his long hesitation as to whether to transfer to the opposition. Tymoshenko---being entirely confident that the Ukraine, Rise Up! campaign and popular pressure on president Kuchma would bear fruit---does everything in her power to get the ex-premier involved in the fighting. Viktor Andriyovych Yushchenko defies all appeals, effectively choosing for himself an ‘observer status.’ He does not participate in campaign preparations, yet rises to speak on European Square during a nation-wide day of action. His signature under a strong-worded, Tymoshenko-authored, anti-Kuchma statement triggered a repression campaign against the businesses of Yushchenko’s associates. The Yushchenko-Tymoshenko relationships had fully shaped by the start of the presidential campaign 2004. Though allies, he cannot accept her adventurism and radicalism, while she disdains his wavering and conciliation.

It is evident by now how different these two are from one another. Yushchenko is a right-wing liberal, whereas Tymoshenko’s inclinations are entirely leftist. Yushchenko draws to himself as many people as possible to which he may delegate powers and disburden himself. Tymoshenko’s team has remained virtually intact over all the years of her career as a politician, and her firm-handed approach waned only in recent months due to fatigue and confusion. The only thing that tied the two together was ... Leonid Kuchma. This is what underlay their election alliance. Having soberly evaluated her chances of winning the presidential race as poor, Tymoshenko signs a pact on a joint election front with Yushchenko. A secret protocol to the pact contains provisions obliging Yushchenko to appoint her prime minister if the victory will be his. Tymoshenko’s work for Yushchenko’s campaign was fair and effective. Had Kuchma’s strategy to get Tymoshenko’s energy and stamina spearheaded against Yushchenko during the campaign been a success, never would the latter have won the presidency. This is what is evident to all except his associates. If Yushchenko had not won, Tymoshenko would not have taken the premier’s office. This is quite evident also. And so they met their ‘bills of exchange’.

True enough, the account settlement process was not easy: despite the agreement reached, it was Petro Poroshenko whom Viktor Andriyovych on New Year’s Eve assigned the job of forming a new Cabinet of Ministers. “I want you to understand that it would be more comfortable for me to work with Poroshenko as premier, not you. Instead, I would offer you the office of the NSDC (National Security and Defense Council) chief with an enlarged set of powers, and request that you quit your claims to the premier’s office.” This is how Tymoshenko recalled in conversations with allies her discussions with the then ppresident elect. “OK, it’s your privilege to nominate the prime minister. But I am not going to quit that office on my own will. If you consider it possible, then go and violate your own obligations,” she retorted. By virtue of cumulative factors---the Maidan’s demand, “Yulia is Premier;” all the eminent complexities faced by the first post-Kuchma administration; and the presence of the written obligation---Yushchenko, before his first trip to Moscow as ppresident, made up his mind: “I decided, you are the Premier.” This is how this unnatural alliance was prolonged for another eight months. And for all that time, the key word that could describe the status of the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko relationship was ‘distrust.’ This well explains why:

1. Yushchenko forms the cabinet on his own, while only one senior position, that of the SBU (Ukrainian Security Service) chief (Oleksandr Turchynov) had passed to Tymoshenko’s men.

2. The ppresident denies Tymoshenko as prime minister her constitutional right to make other nominations. According to ex-deputy Prime Minister Mykola Tomenko, the ppresident nominated over 50 officials on his own, in violation of the established procedure that gives this authority to the premier.

3. presidential support for cabinet-proposed legislation in parliament was barely palpable. His appearance in the Rada on the voting day for WTO entry legislation is no indication that Yushchenko’s support of the cabinet’s strategic initiatives was well-focused or consistent.

4. The prime minister is strictly recommended to keep away from Naftogaz Ukrainy [oil and natural gas state export/import company].

5. The president gives the office of NSDC chief, with an enlarged set of powers, to Petro Poroshenko. His mission is to counterbalance Tymoshenko, monitor her performance, and create an alternative decision-making center to divide between the cabinet and the NSDC the flow of those seeking support---either political or commercial---from the authorities. president

Zinchenko’s Rotations in Politics

For those who forgot, it was Petro Poroshenko and Mykola Martynenko who suggested that Yushchenko appoint Oleksandr Zinchenko in place of Roman Bezsmertny as his campaign manager. With Martynenko now accusing the ex-state secretary of ‘being ungrateful,’ one can assume that the duet was guided by reasons outside the scope of Yushchenko’s team. As is well known, they expected Zinchenko to contribute a certain amount of organizational and intellectual expertise to the campaign, together with a strengthening of relations with representatives of the Russian establishment.

At least, these were the official reasons for the incorporation of Oleksandr Oleksiyovych Zinchenko into Yushchenko’s team. But there were covert reasons as well. By that time, Bezsmertny’s cross-grained, intractable temper was becoming increasingly evident. And the above-mentioned big business representatives from Yushchenko’s inner circle (not only these, though) realized what they would be in for if Bezsmertny moved on from Yushchenko’s campaign headquarters right into the office of the state secretary. By godfathering and ‘taming’ Zinchenko, the two intended to have “their own man” in the ppresident’s office after Yushchenko’s win.

The complaints about ungratefulness being leveled against Zinchenko by ex-allies have much likeliness with the reproaches hurled at Oleksandr Oleksiyovych during his ‘divorce’ from the Social-Democratic Party (united). But this is only one reason why Poroshenko and Martynenko do not command sympathy. Another is that Zinchenko’s adoption as member of Yushchenko’s team was not an act of charity, but rather the purchase of a controlling stake in a potentially profitable enterprise. Now these hopes for high dividends have failed.

At the very beginning, nothing augured such an end to the whole story. Zinchenko, despite largely negative assessments of his performance as head of Yushchenko’s campaign, harbored serious ambitions to the prime minister’s office, about which he told Viktor Andriyovych. Zinchenko, true, was considered among contenders to the post, but only as a third-in-line candidate. These thirds-in-liners are often preferred as ‘compromise figures’ to the battle of giants. Yushchenko seemed to have looked at such a scenario at some point, but Tymoshenko’s stubborn unwillingness to retract from formal agreements had eventually prevailed. As for Zinchenko, he was quite satisfied to take revenge by moving into the office of his former boss [Viktor Medvedchuk] and changing the official title of his position from ‘Head of the presidential Administration’ to ‘State Secretary of Ukraine,’ which left many eyebrows raised.

This innovation by the chief of the presidential chancellery was followed by others. Roman Bezsmertny once tabled before Yushchenko (then presidential candidate) as many as three concepts for reorganizing and restructuring the presidential administration. One of these (incidentally, chosen as basic) provided for liquidating the presidential administration as such and replacing it with a new entity, the ‘Office of the president.’ This called for reducing the ppresident’s staff by almost two-thirds, abolishing the institution of presidential aides, and scrapping legal provisions allowing officials at the office to independently issue orders or decrees. But these all have been effectively ignored by Zinchenko. According to the Provisions of the Presidential Secretariat (which, as hearsay has it, Zinchenko drew up with assistance from Oleksandr Turchynov), the powers of that institution were not reduced, but even further expanded. Yushchenko---who during his campaign promised to downgrade the presidential Administration to just an ‘office for supporting presidential activities’---did not object. He only insisted that the Secretariat’s structure incorporate the presidential office (room), which Oleksandr Tretyakov, the ppresident’s first aide, was appointed to head. Over time, this quasi-organ became overgrown with bureaucrats who eventually outnumbered the staff of the entire Secretariat. Basically, by doing so alone, the ppresident doomed his associates to conflicts and clashes, particularly considering the touchy nature of Zinchenko the ex-state secretary, who had to live with such an evident disregard for his own ambitions.

Over time, Viktor Yushchenko gave more and more powers to his first aide, taking these away from other key figures in his office. Yushchenko has been tied by age-old and very close relationships with Tretyakov, who sheltered the ppresident’s family in his villa during the most dangerous period of the election campaign. Yushchenko put more and more trust in Tretyakov, who becomes the chief sponsor of the presidential family, maintaining their living standards at the level matching Yushchenko’s new status. These are subjective reasons for a cooling in relations between the ppresident and the head of his office. Objective reasons lie in Zinchenko’s work style, which can be described as the simulation of heavy activity with the minimum possible effect. Sound reason emerges for Yushchenko to become discontented with Zinchenko’s performance as state secretary, and also to suspect him of an abuse of the presidential facsimile.

Zinchenko’s managerial capabilities---in the majority opinion of those who worked with him during the presidential campaign---are less than desirable. He has never managed to create a team capable of generating high-quality intellectual products. Pledges by Zinchenko to tap 24-year-old Harvard University graduates for Secretariat jobs only shrugged many shoulders. This would look plausible, indeed, if the ppresident himself were a Harvard University professor. He did not expect out of his office more than just concepts and development strategies for the country, not only the aviation industry. Rumors have it that positions at the Secretariat were not uncommonly given to people who had been either dismissed from their jobs in Kuchma’s pffice or denied employment for incompetentence. Yushchenko was barking up the wrong tree when accusing Tymoshenko’s cabinet of attributing to themselves the authorities’ most sound initiatives. He should have addressed this rebuke to Zinchenko.

Neither did Zinchenko manage to organize an effective circulation of documents. Not infrequently, official letters from the Secretariat reached their designations too late, which prohibited ministries and government agencies from reacting to these as appropriate. Inefficient and poor analytical and reference materials compiled for all kinds of meetings, conferences, and negotiations as well gave rise to unfavorable criticism. Zinchenko tried to handle aircraft building, Ukrainian-Russian relations, national television, and so forth. As a result, he succeeded nowhere, having lost his influence on the ppresident and failing to become a major player in the country’s political arena. True enough, it was well within his capabilities to hold back one or another decree, or lobby for some or other appointment. There are rumors flying that the state secretary did a lot to ensure that the top position at Naftogaz Ukrainy be given to Oleksandr Ivchenko, and also to bar the prime minister from influencing that company. But this took place in the early days of Zinchenko’s tenure. As time passed, he was gradually losing his authority on staffing-related issues. One example is the story of a deputy head of the Customs Service, Salagor, who came into conflict with his immediate boss, Skomarovski. As word has it, Skomarovski was Poroshenko’s man, while Salagor was Zinchenko’s. Therefore, in Salagor’s dismissal, many viewed Zinchenko’s defeat in a battle with the NSDC chief.

For that matter, it should be pointed out that the concept of “Poroshenko’s man” and “Zinchenko’s man” implies different things. If for the former the country’s chief customs officer was a weapon against the Contraband, Stop! campaign, then for Zinchenko the chief customs officer’s deputy was an instrument to sap the NSDC chief’s unharnessed energy and to right injustice. True enough, the state secretary, too, was reportedly abusing office by, for example, attempting to “correct” the performance of law enforcement agencies. Kyiv City Organized Crime Department (KCOCD)---which provided operational support for a criminal investigation against a firm that allegedly defrauded people of large sums---carried out this summer a number of searches on the firm’s premises. As is obvious from a report addressed to the Minister of Home Affairs by the KCOCD acting chief, Police Colonel Geletey, a few days following the operation he received a call from State Secretary Oleksandr Zinchenko. The latter, whom Geletey recognized by voice (he often heard him speaking on the TV and also on the Maidan), began accusing, “loudly and in very strong words,” the police colonel and his subordinates of ‘zakaznyak’ (Russian slang for “acting on somebody’s order, usually unlawful”). Asked what he meant, Zinchenko, Geletey claims, mentioned the same firm where the recent search took place, and strongly advised him “to get his hooks off the honest businessmen and forget them forever.”

By giving the details of that incident, we do not mean to put the finishing touch on the state secretary’s unfavorable portrait. Zinchenko is just a minor offender compared to other members of the presidential team, or (it must be confessed) even the ppresident himself. It is rumored that, when an owner of a mountainous hotel in one of Ukraine’s western regions, was arrested on smuggling charges, a deputy chief officer at the local SBU division received on his cellular phone a call from a man who, having named himself the ppresident of Ukraine, demanded that the arrested be released from custody. Being mentally sane and in his right mind, the officer told him where to get off, because even in his most dreadful dreams he could not imagine this happening. When the ppresident called again, the officer, after realizing WHO was speaking and what may happen to him after what he told the ppresident, fell with a heart attack.

At that, Zincheko is far from unique. No more than a handful of Yushchenko’s associates can boast of any sizeable achievements reached in the areas assigned to them. Still fewer are the bureaucrats who never resorted to so-called “right to rule by telephone” (this implies giving instructions, especially unlawful ones, by telephone, for example to influence court decisions etc). This is primarily true for Zinchenko’s opponents. On the other side of the spectrum is what makes Oleksandr Oleksiyovych really unique: Zinchenko, as was already proved several times, cannot accept what goes against his perception of morals and justice. He, who has never been tied up by any business interests, did not take advantage of his job to avail himself of the opportunity to acquire some. Also noteworthy is the fact that the ex-state secretary, unlike many of his fellow deputies who quit their Rada seats to take government positions, complied with the conflict-of-interest legislation, having abnegated his powers as people’s deputy immediately after transfer to the Presidential Secretariat. His attempt to optimize the organization of the body assigned to him has never ended up with the approval of the above-mentioned Provisions of the Secretariat.

Vladislav Kaskiv, who was recruited by Yushchenko to help draw up a reform concept for the presidential office, describes Zinchenko as a man capable of constructive dialogue and cooperation. The Pora (It’s time!) party leader recalls meeting Zinchenko some day in mid-summer to tell him about his ideas as to restructuring the Secretariat. Zinchenko was anything but pleased by the scheme that did not provide for a weighty enough influence on state policies on the part of the state secretary. But some time later, Zinchenko telephoned Vladislav to tell him that he had “killed the beast in himself.” Public interests have prevailed over private ones.

It took Zinchenko several weeks to finally resign. The big hand he got from journalists at his press conference on Monday was the best proof that his decision was correct. Many more people in this country must have applauded his courageous move while watching the press conference on TV. According to an opinion poll conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, almost 45 percent of Kyiv residents are sure that, by his resignation, Zinchenko wanted to draw the president’s and the general public’s attention to dangerous phenomena and tendencies within the political leadership. Twenty-three percent of respondents believe that Zinchenko wanted to square accounts with Poroshenko. Notably, only 19 percent of respondents regard Zinchenko’s move as an attempt to draw attention to his person on the eve of the election race.

The reason why Zinchenko made his revelatory statements about Petro Poroshenko, Alexander Tretyakov, and Mykola Martynenko (which infuriated Viktor Yushchenko) was the president’s unwillingness to heed his arguments and warnings. Yushchenko either would not believe Zinchenko or did not expect him to be so outspoken. But most Ukrainians did believe what Zinchenko said. In reply to the question: “Which side of the conflict do you trust more?” 51.3 percent of Kyiv residents said, “Zinchenko.” Only 2.5 percent trusted his opponents. Nearly 1.5 percent said they had no complete information about the matter in question and some 7 percent were undecided. Then 37.7 percent of respondents said they trusted neither side.

Only 23.5 percent of Kyiv residents are certain that the Prosecutor General Office and the Interior Ministry are able to objectively investigate the accusations leveled by Zinchenko, 8.1 percent had no answer, and over 68 percent do not believe that an objective investigation is possible because the law enforcement bodies are under pressure. A total of 73.1 percent of respondents are positive that corruption still persists after the change of power in Ukraine, while 20.4 percent note a positive trend toward its reduction. Of course, the predominantly pessimistic public opinion in the capital city may not reflect the general picture in the entire country; Kyiv residents are better informed and are closer (in terms of distance) to the central bodies of government. The same concerns their opinion about the judiciary: 26.9 percent of respondents expect an unbiased trial, should Martynenko and Poroshenko sue Zinchenko for slander. And 45.1 percent of respondents are sure that the verdict would be in favor of the plaintiffs regardless of any argumentations.

As far as trust in the president is concerned, 63.3 percent of Kyiv residents have not changed their attitude to him and every tenth respondent said that their attitude even “changed for the better.” Yushchenko ought to be happy, but for another figure: 27 percent of respondents are deeply disillusioned with him and their attitude to him has changed for the worse.

As to Zinchenko, the rouser of this storm in the presidential domain, an impressive majority of respondents (46.6 percent) praise him for saying aloud what has been known and discussed “in kitchens” for months. Only 4.3 percent called him a traitor who dealt the president a severe blow. Another 6.7 percent called him a windbag who did not present any convincing proofs.

There are few courageous people like Zinchenko among Ukrainian politicians. Having slammed the door now, he has ensured his bright political future. And as for those who stay “indoors,” almost 36 percent of Kyiv residents are sick and tired of incessant conflicts among them. Evidently, such sentiments are typical of the rest of the country.

No Bargaining

After the “staff revolution,” which was catalyzed by Zinchenko’s resignation, two groups are taking shape. The first group, led by Poroshenko, includes Tretyakov, [x-Emergencies Minister] David Zhvania, [ex-Transport Minister] Yevhen Chervonenko, and [Our Ukraine parliamentary faction leader] Mykola Martynenko. The second group, led by Yulia Tymoshenko, includes [ex-SBU Chief] Alexander Turchinov, [ex-Vice Prime Minister] Mykola Tomenko, [ex-Minister of Economy] Sergey Teryokhin, and MP Mikhail Brodsky. It is clear which group the president favors.

The controversies between the presidential staff and the government, which were caused by and expressed in conflicts between Poroshenko and Tymoshenko, swelled from day to day until peaceful negotiations became impossible because of their long-standing mutual distrust, coupled with plenty of clever “advice.” Yushchenko trusted his “well-wishers.” Tymoshenko trusted hers. Yushchenko was told, “She decided to resign two months before the [2006 parliamentary] elections and throw you over. You shouldn’t trust a single word she says.” Tymoshenko was advised, “He won’t nominate you for premiership, no way. If you align with all that company of his, you’ll kill your popularity rating for good.” Yushchenko was told, “She was the one who orchestrated that scandal around your son through an order to the Ukrainska Pravda, and this is only the beginning. She wants to have you totally discredited by next April.” Tymoshenko was told, “He turns a blind eye to all facts of Tretyakov’s, Poroshenko’s, or Chervonenko’s misdeeds. Even if documented proofs lie on his table, he keeps demanding that we stop squaring accounts with our political opponents and stop shadowing his men.”

Yushchenko was told, “Look how she is advertising herself. The Russian and Byelorussian prime ministers don’t thrust themselves forward. They give press conferences twice a year. And she never disappears from TV screens.” Tymoshenko was told, “You can’t tolerate it! They plundered the Naftogaz Ukrainy, they want to buy a majority interest in Rosukrenergo, they stole the Illichivsk port. All this is going to crop up some day. Do you want to get associated with all this?” Yushchenko is told, “She is in cahoots with Privat [financial-industrial group controlled by billionaire Igor Kolomoisky]. They have returned debts to her, and now they’re buying 40 percent of shares in the 1+1 TV channel for the offshore company they and she are running together.” Tymoshenko is told, “You have an illusion that you are fighting against Poroshenko and Pinchuk. You are fighting against him.”

Some of those words were absolutely true, some not. And some arguments were deliberately aimed at misinforming and misleading both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. For three days and nights, the sides bandied their rebukes and tried to find a way out of the deadlock. The consultations, negotiations, phone talks, and meetings finally resulted in an option that Yushchenko later called “mild.”

Firstly, the president, for his part, would sack NSDC Secretary Petro Poroshenko, presidential First Aide Alexander Tretyakov, and State Custom Service Chief Mykola Skomarovsky. Tymoshenko, for her part, would sacrifice Vice Prime Minister Mykola Tomenko and Economy Minister Sergey Teryokhin. Besides, the president would sack Tymoshenko’s right-hand-man Alexander Turchinov and find a trustworthy substitute for Prosecutor General Svyatoslav Piskun (who is believed to be loyal to Tymoshenko).

Secondly, Yushchenko would top his party’s election roll and get a 66% representation quota in it. Tymoshenko would get 33% and would have no right to include in it any members of the Reforms and Order Party, the Rukh, Pora, Alexander Zinchenko, Mikhail Brodsky, Alexander Turchinov, or High Court judges. The president would also have the right to veto any candidature included by Tymoshenko in her part of the roll. (Tymoshenko would not have this right). Besides, Tymoshenko would not demand guarantees of her nomination for premiership after the parliamentary elections.

Thirdly, Tymoshenko would hold a joint press conference with Yushchenko and hold Alexander Zinchenko up to shame as a “liar.”

According to Yushchenko’s side, Tymoshenko gave her consent on Wednesday evening, so the president told a press conference that they had “agreed on everything.” But next morning, she changed her mind and broke the agreement. And Tymoshenko, in an interview with The ZN, denied her consent, saying that she was supposed to give her final answer by 9 a.m. Thursday. According to her, she called the president at 8 a.m. and said that she could not accept this option and proposed another. The president chose the “zero option”: he sacked all. As a result, Tymoshenko and her team lost their powers de jure and de facto while Poroshenko and Tretyakov lost theirs de jure only.

Yushchenko’s counselors were for the zero option. Tymoshenko and her counselors were against. The president wavered, feeling that further developments were unpredictable and being aware of his responsibility. It was a hard choice for him and Tymoshenko: they were both concerned about the nation’s fate and their own political future. Now both sides must feel relieved: neither has to pretend or wait for a stab in the back anymore. After all, certainty is always better than uncertainty.

Why Kill the Horse that Lost a Shoe?

So, the president sacked the Cabinet of Ministers in a body, dismissed Petro Poroshenko from the post of National Security and Defense Council secretary, and suspended his first aide Alexander Tretyakov. He also dismissed Security Service Chief Alexander Turchinov, State Custom Service Chief Volodymyr Skomarovsky, and National TV Company president Taras Stetskiv, accepting the latter’s resignation. Prosecutor General Svyatoslav Piskun’s dismissal was supposed to be the next step. But the president, remembering the scandalous story of Piskun’s reinstatement, ordered his lawyers to develop a legally impeccable scheme of dismissal. It would not be an exaggeration to call this the biggest “staff cleanup” in Ukraine’s modern history. Was Yushchenko’s decision correct? Was it morally responsible, politically well weighed, and technically effective?

What does the president of a democratic country do if a high official accuses other high officials, who are close to the president, of corruption? He removes the suspects from office and calls for a comprehensive, independent, and objective investigation. Importantly, the head of state assumes all or some part of personal responsibility.

Yushchenko responded in a different way. He actually fired the whole political elite. Explaining the reasons at a press conference on September 8, Yushchenko said, “Let’s be frank. Neither I nor the other 48 million Ukrainians have been satisfied with these relationships over the past eight months. We must stop this disappointment. We don’t want the ideals of the Orange Revolution to be called into question…”

Let us consider the facts. Firstly, the president admits that for as long as eight months (since Yushchenko took office) relationships among the top leaders have disappointed him and the other 48 million Ukrainians. He calls these people his friends and admits that he brought them to the top and “vested them with enormous powers,” but they did not justify his trust. It would be logical if Yushchenko apologized to voters and said something like “Sorry, I appointed these people and I bear the responsibility for their failure to justify your trust.”

But Yushchenko did not say a word about his blame. Very regrettably, he did not look like the guarantor of his own promises and the constitutional rights vested in him. He looked like a child complaining that other kids have been throwing sand at one another. “The president is not a nursemaid to patch up their quarrels…” He is absolutely right: the president has more important things to do. And if he has to reconcile the people he himself selected, he is a bad president.

Secondly, judging from the president’s words “eight months of conflicts,” these conflicts were nothing new to him. Does it mean that for eight months he had been watching his friends and colleagues flounder in squabbles? Does it mean that he wasted his precious time on the pointless peacemaking mission while disappointment among his voters was growing? Hence, a question arises: why did he have to wait? And when did the president lie: two weeks ago when he sang the praises of his team, or two days ago when he called it “a team of disillusionment”?

Thirdly, Yushchenko may have put up with those conflicts for eight months, hoping that they would settle somehow and thus conserving the problem. But how much longer would he have tolerated it? The formal pretext for the cabinet’s “demolition” was Zinchenko’s revelations. But what if Zinchenko had kept silent? How much longer would Yushchenko have kept playing possum in spite of his and the people’s growing disappointment?

Fourthly, judging from what Yushchenko told the press conference, he does not believe that the people in his entourage are corrupt; he admits to acute and insoluble conflicts within his team; he believes that the accusations of corruption stem from these conflicts; he regards the total replacement of the leadership as the only solution. Does the government’s resignation mean that he places the blame on it for the accusations of corruption? A strange logic, indeed…

Zinchenko, the chief of the presidential chancellery, accused Poroshenko and Tretyakov, the chiefs of the bodies under the president, of abuse of authority, financial machinations, and other misdeeds. If Yushchenko was deeply convinced that his henchmen were innocent, he might as well have stated his conviction and kept them in office. It would have contradicted the philosophy of democracy, but at least it would have made sense. If Yushchenko had reason to believe that the accusations were not groundless, he should have fired Poroshenko and Tretyakov. Instead, Yushchenko accepted Poroshenko’s resignation, suspended (not dismissed) Tretyakov, and sacked the Cabinet of Ministers in a body. Perhaps, this strange move was meant to expose “the real culprits, not the young people under 40, who chose politics as their vocation, hoping to work for the good of the people for decades.”

And fifthly, the president publicly promised an objective investigation of all facts revealed by Zinchenko. What he did immediately afterwards gave rise to serious doubts. Not a single member of the sacked government was ever alleged as “corrupt,” but all the ministers got their walking papers without much ado. Tretyakov, one of the “prime suspects,” was only suspended “for the period of the investigation.” Thus Yushchenko showed everyone (including the investigators) how much he trusted this man.

The president said, “Yesterday I appointed a commission. It will collect and analyze all available facts and say whether a person is corrupt or not. I am convinced that it will not find such facts.” So the commission has not started working yet, but the president already knows the result of its work! This is anything but an unbiased statement. Moreover, he called the scandal around the Nikopol Ferroalloy Plant an attempt “to hand the enterprise from one gang over to another.” He did so even without a commission to level such an accusation.

Earlier, the newly inaugurated president declared the arrested suspects the murderers of opposition journalist Georgiy Gongadze, forgetting that he was not a judge. Such peremptory statements cannot be explained by the absence of legal culture. The true reason is the absence of democratic culture. Even those who were skeptical about Yushchenko as a political leader before last year’s presidential race did not notice this vice in him. In spring it became too conspicuous. This is not just regrettable. This is dangerous. In early 2005, the newly elected popular president promised to separate authority from business once and for all. He promised to track the genealogy of every candidate for a top executive position down to the tenth generation. Eight months later he said, “The man who has run some business before… must draw a line between his official functions and the business run by… his wife or son…”

We made such a detailed analysis of everything that the president did or said to try to find his true motives behind this wholesale personnel discharge. We cannot call the mere fact of discharge incorrect. If Yushchenko were right and the governmental bodies were stuck in conflicts, such a purge would be the only way out.

However, we doubt that this was the actual reason, since Yushchenko started speaking about discontent and disappointment with the cabinet’s work after Zinchenko’s statements. Since Yushchenko made it clear what his attitude to every participant of this story was. Since according to the information about the negotiations that Yushchenko had with the cabinet, he would have forgiven the cabinet and never remembered “the disappointment of 48 million” had Tymoshenko not disappointed him and accepted all his conditions.

Should this be true, it would mean the following. Yushchenko’s only motive was an ordinary political benefit but not the ideals of the Maidan (which he, and not he alone, interpreted at his own discretion). Yushchenko never kept it secret from his close circle that he was irritated with the “political chains” received in addition to the victory: constitutional reform and Prime Minister Tymoshenko. Yushchenko and Tymoshenko have never been and will never be brothers-in-arms. They were political allies during the revolution and they became political rivals after it.

Yushchenko gave the impression that he was painfully selecting the lesser of the two evils---Tymoshenko in power or Tymoshenko in the opposition. Zinchenko’s statements (which the president directly related to the political intrigues of the prime minister) speeded up his decision. Yushchenko let Tymoshenko make a choice. If she accepted the president’s conditions, she would cease to exist as an independent and promising political player. If not, the president would realize his long-standing wish to kick Tymoshenko out of power.

What happened revealed Yushchenko’s true wish to create a government of his own liking without burdening himself with democratic conventionalities and political commitments. In these terms, the scandal kicked up by Brodsky and Zinchenko was just to the purpose. It untied Yushchenko’s hands. Thus he made gains from this situation: from now on, he will be able to fill the corridors of the government with his people and eliminate the other’s rules of the game, which was even more important.

The reaction of the head of state, his milieu, and some of the pro-presidential media was surprising: the crisis was preplanned and made-up, Yushchenko was struck a blow, the attempts are made to weaken the country, and democracy is in jeopardy. Let us disagree with this. Strange as it may seem, such scandals are a feature of a democratic society, since they never arise in an undemocratic society in principle. The last ten years are a convincing proof of it. Corruption scandals in Italy, France, Great Britain, Germany, or Israel never gave rise to a doubt about the adherence of these states to the principles of democracy, because they were investigated; those guilty were brought to responsibility and their actions were given an appropriate assessment. In Ukraine, though, the situation may be different.

Cabinet dismissals do not always signify crisis; sometimes they mean the beginning of the settlement of a crisis if the country’s leadership has a clear vision of what is going to be after: catharsis of the government or its apocalypse.

 

The Consequences

Did Ukrainian society win in this situation? We don’t have an answer to that question. If the corruption charges are investigated fairly and in an unbiased way, we may speak about a new era of citizens’ fight with corruption. If the investigation is carried out formally (which we cannot rule out since Prosecutor General Sviatoslav Piskun is sitting in a shaky seat, the SBU is headed by a man close to Martynenko and Poroshenko, and Internal Minister Yuriy Lutsenko---whose paper Grani Plus published an incriminating article about the activities of Poroshenko in Moldova---nevertheless says that he does not have any evidence of violations), hardly there will be a person in village, town, or city with courage enough to call the helpline to report a case of corruption in the governmental bodies (as in the TV commercial).

On the whole, the political situation has become clearer and the political forces on the verge of parliamentary elections have become obvious. Now everyone can choose their political path with a clear idea of the distribution of power in the presidential team, the team of the former prime minister, the team of the speaker, etc.

That part of society, which was irritated by Yulia Tymoshenko, has also won. Many small and medium businesses will sigh with relief. Numerous economists, who could not put up with Tymoshenko’s populism, will relax. Many oligarchs will catch their breath since Tymoshenko was the main promoter of re-privatization. Now the rules of the game between business and government will be more predictable, clearer, and possibly tried.

Yet there is another part of society that will never say “our Yuriy” when speaking of Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov, because after Maidan they said “our Yulia.” For them the government has lost its orange color. For them it will be simply a government with its functions but without a soul. For them the government has become distant and technical.

Today, nobody can say for sure what the future development and the consequences of the president’s decision will be. Our sources in Bankova Street (the presidential administration) say that, during all these days, Viktor Yushchenko has been deep in thought. They say that the president is ready for a change and that he has reformulated his requirements to the people at the key posts. Former Vice Prime Minister for European Integration Oleh Rybachuk is an illustrative example for that. He was fruitless at his previous post without a committee, without a ministry, without real authority, and the deep understanding by the state apparatus of the need for European integration.

Now he takes root at Bankova, which means that the president is not planning to turn the state secretariat into his election headquarters to concentrate the administrative levers of influence. Yushchenko knows that bureaucratic qualities of Rybachuk leave much to be desired: he does not feel right at paperwork and he will probably take a strong deputy to win over the chaos of the presidential office. But Rybachuk is capable of many other things. First, he can resist useless intrigues. Second, he can significantly broaden the sources of presidential information. Third, he can adequately represent the president in confidential negotiations with foreign partners. Fourth, he can ensure intellectual “replenishment” of the president’s decisions by attracting a broad circle of experts and specialists. Fifth, Rybachuk can carry on negotiations with absolutely all political forces having no previous relations, offenses, common earnings, and treacheries.

For some reason, we believe that Oleksandr Tretiakiv will remain at his post. Possibly there will be redistribution of functions between the cabinet and the secretariat of the president. The functions will be distributed, however, not by means of war but through a consensus, because Rybachuk and Tretiakov have a good relationship. In Rybachuk can tell unpleasant things to the president if there is such a need, and he does not belong to any of the political or economic clans. He is the president’s man, who for eight months has stayed in the shadows and who is now in demand again.

Anatoliy Kinakh will possibly become the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, but it is not yet clear if he will have those broad authorities with which the president empowered Poroshenko. First, does Yushchenko want to assign those responsibilities to Kinakh? The answer to this question will indicate the degree of sincerity with which Yushchenko spoke against several centers of influence in the government. After all, current confrontation was caused not only by personalities but by functional-institutional aspect as well.

Second, we remember that, in a week, the Constitutional Court will decide the future of the decree and possibly reduce authorities of the future NSDC secretary. Kinakh is not the worst option for this post: he is well organized, specific, has a good idea of the various spheres of the NSDC work. Kinakh is able to organize the work and to staff the NSDC. However, the membership of the NSDC is quite another matter. It currently includes only Piskun, Maliarenko, Litvyn, and Yushchenko. It is not yet clear whether there will be place for discussion there or whether the NSDC will become a place for “personnel executions.”

Yuriy Yekhanurov, who is nominated for premiership is also a comfortable person. He is well versed in economics, he has not been at conflict with anyone, and he does not have any special political ambitions that could irritate the president. Yekhanurov is not an innovator or generator of ideas, but he is a responsible and careful implementer. Most likely he will have a stable relationship with Yushchenko. President will report the progress of the government; prime minister will take upon himself the failures.

Yekhanurov stands a good chance of parliament’s approval for the prime minister’s post. This will naturally affect the membership of the new cabinet. The president will nominate all the ministers and Yekhanurov will not object to this. Yekhanurov does not have influential foes, but he does not have influential friends either. He has a sober judgment of the tasks he will face, including the adoption of the budget, generating budget revenues and their optimal allocation with the account of the forthcoming parliamentary elections, systematization of governmental programs, creation of four governmental committees headed by vice prime ministers with actual power. He is against active re-privatization and any drastic moves.

In theory, we can hope that the government will work more effectively: Rybachuk will make Yushchenko interested in the work of ministries, intelligence service, and SBU; Kinakh will finally organize the work of the NSDC; and Yekhanurov will work on the economic field. All of the above is only possible if the president made his own conclusions about his own work and his sphere of responsibilities. He does not have to tell about his conclusions, but it soon will be obvious if he made them or not.

If there is an informed opposition, it soon will be known which of the criteria, personal loyalty or professionalism, the president will use to appoint the members of the new government. Will Poroshenko have influence on the president and in which areas? What projects does the president patronize? What criteria does he use when choosing enterprises for re-privatization? Does he still concern himself with the need to control electronic media? How will the budget for the People’s Union Our Ukraine (PUOU) election campaign be formed? Will the party use administrative levers of influence to achieve a better result during the elections?

Under certain conditions and lack of odious actions of Yushchenko’s team, this “zero option” can produce a positive result. However, there is an option in which the country may loose, because the “zero option” chosen by Yushchenko on the verge of the parliamentary elections may mean, in fact, the beginning of an open war between the political groups. Fortunately, this war does not necessarily have to begin, but if it does many and much will be affected. Possible sensational exposures can only undermine this country’s reputation and make the West revise its well-disposed attitude to Ukraine and put a cross through its European aspirations.

Moreover, the success of many political and economic initiatives such as budgeting, privatization, and adjustment of the laws to WTO requirements may appear in jeopardy. It is quite possible that an aggressive anti-presidential majority is formed in the Rada, which will not do this country any good either. And finally, the 2006 parliamentary election campaign may turn into the dirtiest parliamentary campaign in the history of Ukraine.

Was the president aware of those threats? He could not but be. Is he ready to undertake the responsibility for the possible outcomes? It is rather doubtful, judging by the way he commented on his latest political moves.

Iron Fatigue

The exact reaction of Yulia Tymoshenko to the presidential decision is not known. Yet one does not have to be a prophet to guess that she was not happy to learn about her dismissal. She spared no effort to remain at the head of the cabinet as long as possible. She repeatedly stated her loyalty to the president during the last months and many say that she overdid it. The outsiders were surprised at the obedience and submissiveness of this proud woman, who is also a pronounced fighter. We believe there was nothing surprising in this since she learned a common truth that, in politics, a bow can often be a first step toward a rise.

Her supporters thought of Tymoshenko’s obedience differently. Some believed that she was loosing her authority. Others praised her wisdom. Almost everyone believed her political divorce with the president to be inevitable. Yet her admirers believed that Tymoshenko would only win if Yushchenko initiated it. The unbiased observers found her wish to seize the leader’s seat at any price somewhat irrational and did not agree with the pragmatic nature of yesterday’s (and possibly tomorrow’s) oppositionist.

It is very difficult to make an objective judgment of Tymoshenko’s activities as the prime minister, since she had to work with the people appointed by the president and fulfill his promises. The prime minister’s initiatives received rather controversial expert assessments. We can make only two conclusions after a superficial analysis of the first post-revolutionary cabinet. We must admit one obvious achievement of Tymoshenko: in a very short term, she managed to turn a group of randomly chosen people into a team. The cabinet never became a single whole and it could not, yet in critical situations a significant part of its members acted as a team. Many of the ministers dismissed their prejudice against Tymoshenko and many of them became her reliable allies. She was a workaholic and “infected” almost all of her subordinates with her energy.

In short, the cabinet turned out to be much more independent than pessimists predicted. At the same time, Tymoshenko was not the ideal prime minister that optimists expected. Of course, she was entrapped in the president’s promises, dislikes, and his staff, but she consciously took this risk. Was this risk justified in terms of the interests of the state? It is a good question, the answer to which cannot be given in haste. But the fact remains that, in February, many perceived “iron Yulia” as an ideal candidate for the role of the cleaner of Augean stables, but in September their number has significantly decreased.

What course of action will Tymoshenko choose? We are sure that she doesn’t have a clear answer to this question herself. Her behavior will depend on the intensity of further opposition between her and the president. Contrary to what many think of her, Tymoshenko is not a machine; she is a living person, who is rather tired. Strange as it may seem, she is very tired of the opposition and she would gladly avoid the role of a staunch fighter with the regime. If the regime does not make her its target, her relations with Yushchenko may possibly remain in the “cold war” mode in the near future. But Tymoshenko herself does not seem to believe in this.

She knows that the representatives of the new government have consciously left “hooks” in her criminal cases remaining from the old regime. She is aware that these “hooks” may well transform into new criminal cases in the future. She is sure that many in the new government team would like to give her over to the Russian investigators. She doubts that her former brother-in-arms from Maidan, Yuriy Lutsenko, will hesitate to sanction her hand over.

It is likely that she will agree to remain a demonstrative supporter of the president and even join the pro-governmental election bloc in exchange for a pact of “non-aggression”. This will be in case Yushchenko agrees to a coalition not only with Tymoshnko’s Batkivshchyna, but also with Pora, Ukrainian Nationalist Party, National Rukh of Ukraine, and Party Reforms and Order that are also unloved by the president. Such a development is possible but unlikely. Remaining in the presidential election bloc, she runs a risk of loosing her political identity. If the administration leaves her alone for some time, neither foisting friendship on her nor threatening her with war, Tymoshenko will retreat into the shadows and brace up for the election campaign. In the early winter, she could gradually transform from a mild alternative to Yushchenko into a tough, albeit not ruthless, oppositionist to the administration. The former allies could never go to war with each other if both realize their responsibility to the Ukrainian people. Thus they would save the nation from a brutal internecine war with no rules, POWs, and winners.

Presumably, if the authorities start maltreating Tymoshenko, it will infuriate her and boost her remarkable fearlessness. Yet it is not only the pressure from the president’s office in Bankova Street that could goad her into joining the radical opposition. Many in her entourage prod her into doing so. According to them, the implementation of a political project “Yulia Tymoshenko as a regime fighter” will guarantee her team a success in the parliamentary elections. As for the team, Tymoshenko is hardly capable of controlling it. More than that, it is unclear what Tymoshenko’s team is like and whether it exists at all.

On the one hand, a lot of those who hastened to pledge their allegiance to her yesterday will rush to disengage themselves from her today, and if pressure is brought to bear on the ex-premier they will not hesitate to betray her. On the other, some of those who were generally viewed as her temporary sympathizers could prove devoted allies because of their disillusionment. Not with the Maidan ideals. Not even with Yushchenko himself, but with the way he interprets the Maidan ideals.

As the elections approach, many will see a need for an alternative, for a political haven, and for a leader with charisma, strong will, and perseverance. Tymoshenko will have to reckon with those wishing to or having to stand by her. Yet whether she will be able to bring all those diverse politicians into a cohesive team is still a tossup. It is clear now that she did not encourage Brodsky to make his statement 10 days ago. On the contrary, she tried to dissuade him from it. That he ultimately decided to go ahead and make it testifies that Brosdsky’s respect of Tymoshenko does not mean Tymoshenko’s control of Brodsky, even though the latter has been and still is her team’s player. This is not the case with Olexander Zinchenko whom some reporters have hurriedly ranked among Tymoshenko’s satellites.

The same applies to a dozen of ex-ministers who used to side with Tymoshenko when she headed the government. Few will keep supporting her, while most of them openly admit that they no longer believe in Yushchenko though they do not yet trust Tymoshenko enough. Nor do they know which is better for the country, dogmatic Yushchenko or authoritative Tymoshenko.

Tymoshenko’s key objective for today should be restoring her parliamentary faction’s efficiency. While its leader was away heading the cabinet, the faction grew in numbers but lost alertness and combat capacity. Tymoshenko had neither time nor opportunity to manage her MP squad personally. She will have to work hard to reverse the situation. For one thing, the faction will inevitably lose people now that the bloc leader is not at the top of the state power hierarchy. For another, the situation in the Rada has changed. In 2004, the faction of the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (YTB) was one of the recognized centers of parliamentary influence. Now it has ceased to be the one. Tymoshenko will have to put in a lot of effort to re-establish her faction’s past authority. It would be a particularly trying task for an outsider to parliament, which she now is.

The faction needs allies. Those could be party groups volunteering to run the elections together with Tymoshenko’s bloc, first and foremost, Ukrainian Popular Party and Reforms and Order Party. These two forces, alongside the Pora Party, could partner with the YTB for the 2006 elections. Relevant consultations are underway. The outcomes are yet to be seen, but the former prime minister announced her decision to wage an election campaign independently from the pro-presidential forces.

The YTB faction in the Supreme Rada is likely to launch a campaign for political reform. The president, reportedly, wants to have the constitutional amendments repealed, and Tymoshenko is not going to let it happen. Formerly one of the most ardent opponents to the reduction of presidential powers, she is said to have changed her mind about Ukraine’s future political arrangement. Perhaps her last few months in the cabinet were a revelation, an eye-opening experience urging her to believe the country would benefit from political reform. Perhaps she has come to understand that there can be no fair presidents with such powers, and there can be no unanimity in administrations where everyone strives for spheres of influence.

Perhaps, the reason is different. Tymoshenko could have decided to run for the top position in state power in six months rather than in four years. After all, the post-reform premier’s purview is quite comparable with the pre-reform president’s.

Should any attempts be made to pull back the political reform, they would seriously aggravate the political situation in the country. They would bring about an open confrontation between the president and the Rada. In this case, nothing could be excluded. The response could range from forming a wide platform for an anti-presidential majority in parliament to building an ad hoc coalition of such divergent politicians as Lytvyn, Moroz, Kravchuk, Symonenko, and Tymoshenko, each of them having their own reasons to promote the political reform. At the moment, a political project of this kind (something like Rise, Ukraine! 2) looks unrealistic but it is not impossible. Neither is an institution of impeachment procedures, especially if some of the compromising materials, bound to be made public soon, concern the president directly.

“Zero option” has facilitated the structuring of the new political elite. A probable battle over the political reform will finalize the process. The choices made by the potential sides to the battle will be indicative of which force stands for what and with whom it allies; who is for the president, who is for Yulia, and who is for Ukraine.

An Onlooker’s Perspective

Ukraine’s three strategic partners---USA, Russia, and the EU---have reacted to the latest political developments here promptly but with reserve. Washington, Moscow, and Brussels publicized their respective statements on the day of the Tymoshenko cabinet’s dismissal, which is as good as evidence of the attention the world’s largest powers pay to Ukraine.

Sean McCormack, official representative of the US State Department, said on Thursday that the US was closely following the political events in Ukraine. “Young democracies sometimes change their governments. If such changes are constitutional and peaceful, they are part of the democratic political process. We firmly believe that the Ukrainian people will emerge from these changes ever stronger. This is a process of building a stronger democracy,” commented the State Department representative, emphasizing that the Ukrainian people and their elected leaders should decide what the next Ukrainian government will be like.

At a press conference with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in Berlin, Vladimir Putin---wearing his hat of a democrat that he never forgets to put on for a meeting with his Western colleagues---stated, in compliance with political correctness and in accord with the chancellor’s comment: “We think Ukraine is fully entitled to its own choice,” that he was sure the “Ukrainian people and leaders would find a way to stabilize the situation.” The Russian president said Viktor Yushchenko was in control. Viktor Chernomyrdin, Russian ambassador to Ukraine, approved of the latter’s decisive steps: “The president of Ukraine acted in the best possible way under the circumstances. Viktor Yushchenko showed courage and concern for his country, rather than for several individuals.”

Brussels commented on the Ukrainian situation twice over the last week. On the day following the scandalous press conference by the former state secretary of Ukraine, a European Commission (EC) representative told the Interfax-Ukraine News Agency that the EU trusted the recent events in Ukraine relating to corruption allegations against some officials would not be allowed to disrupt the close cooperation that they enjoy with Ukrainians. The EU expressed hope that “nothing would affect the government’s effort to implement the Action Plan.”. On Thursday, a few hours after the Tymoshenko cabinet was discharged, Emma Udwin, official EC spokesperson, underscored the EU hope that President Viktor Yushchenko would shortly take measures to resolve the governmental crisis. “We hope that he will take rapid action to ensure continuity and to maintain stability,” said the EC spokesperson, stressing that President Yushchenko “won the elections on a platform of commitments to reform, commitments to rooting out corruption, and a clean hands policy. We are confident that these remain the guiding principles of his administration.” .

Our key partners’ comments, no matter how similarly tolerant and untroubled they might sound, could have been made on quite different underlying assumptions. Washington would never sharply criticize Viktor Yushchenko given the wide international media coverage of happy George Bush embracing the heroic leader of the Orange Revolution. So often have top US officials cited Ukraine as a case of “victorious democracy” that it has become a banner under which America fights for the “global triumph of democracy.” It is critical for the US, therefore, that the “Orange Ukraine” succeeds in its reform effort. Many interest groups (both inside and outside the USA) will perceive the new Ukraine’s failure as a chink in the armor of the US foreign policy. Now that the White House ratings are on a decline for its floundering in the face of Hurricane Katrina, the Bush Administration cannot possibly afford any major disappointment in the international arena. Therefore, there are no problems in Ukraine. The new democracy is evolving and building up. “We will focus on the long-term perspective and won’t pay attention to adjustments along the way,” said Kurt Volker, one of the State Department’s high-ranking diplomats, on Thursday. Moreover, he made it clear that given successful democratic and economic transformations, Ukraine would have a chance to access to NATO as soon as 2008, “notwithstanding the current situation.”

Americans seem genuinely unperturbed by last week’s events in Ukraine. They might be content with Petro Poroshenko’s firing as numerous US officials and businesspersons have always complained, in private conversations, about his being uncooperative in addressing imperative issues of bilateral relations, Ukraine’s partnership with NATO, reforming the law enforcement etc, etc, etc. They should not grieve over Tymoshenko’s dismissal, either, since they did not always regard her initiatives as reformist and her management as market-driven. They were worried about the deteriorating investment climate and plummeting economic growth rates in Ukraine. It was one of the messages of Deputy State Secretary D. Freed’s report at the July Congressional hearings on US-Ukrainian relations; it was highlighted in the reports by prominent American think tanks. America should, rather, be apprehensive of Tymoshenko’s possible opposition to President Yushchenko. In one of his interviews, US Ambassador to Ukraine John Herbst voiced concern about a potential rip between Yushchenko’s and Tymoshenko’s teams. Yet the American diplomat also said he was sure no such scenario would come to pass. Americans avail themselves of every opportunity to underline that Ukraine’s experiences of the last few weeks are inherent to democratic development. However, they will probably give the Ukrainian leaders a piece of their mind on the matter (behind closed doors, no doubt), first during Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk’s and, later, President Viktor Yushchenko’s visits to the USA.

As for the Russians, they should have different expectations. The Kremlin wishes the “orange and all other colored experiments” to fail as much as the White House wants the democratic reforms in Ukraine to succeed. It was in Berlin that Putin spoke composedly and good-naturedly about Ukraine. Yet right after Zinchenko’s revelatory press conference, he did not miss his chance to gloat in front of the Western media over the corruption and political in-fighting that reign in Ukraine as in any other post-Soviet state. We told you the new Ukraine was no better than the old one, didn’t we? Why do you think there is more democracy in Ukraine than in Russia? What is all this fuss about? Putin has always done his best to disparage the new Ukrainian administration in Western leaders’ eyes (suffice it to mention the last G-8 meeting). Now he has a wonderful pretext for continuing to do so: not only does Ukraine “pilfer” Russian gas, but it is also riddled with corruption, especially in the midst of the “orange” top officials squabbling over material wealth with the same bitterness and frantic zeal as Kuchma’s cronies did.

Three need be no doubt that Russians will willingly point to this corruption scandal in Ukraine every time our country announces its new foreign policy priorities, comes up with democratic initiatives, or sets up democratic alliances. Just think of all the lies and slander that the Russian media, politicians, and political analysts have disseminated and are disseminating about Georgia and its President Saakashvili.

The Kremlin has another occasion to celebrate: Tymoshenko is no longer prime minister, Turchynov is no longer SBU chief. There is hope that Russian business in Ukraine will feel comfortable again, that the investigation of ROSUKRENERGO Company’s dubious activities will never be completed and its findings will never be made public… Russians do not seem anxious about Poroshenko’s and Tretiakov’s dismissals, even though both were most responsive to Moscow’s requests and interests: President Yushchenko declared he believed those men, had never questioned their integrity, and would remain their friend. Our Eastern neighbors could interpret this declaration as an assurance that the two former top officials would continue to have the president’s ear and have a say in vital decision-making. Beside, Yuriy Yekhanurov as prime minister and Anatoly Kinakh as secretary of the National Security and Defense Council suit Russians perfectly. Before and during his nine-month engagement with Tymoshenko’s cabinet as the first vice prime minister, Kinakh has repeatedly stated his readiness to “cooperate constructively with the Russian Federation”; he has always advocated Ukraine’s participation in the CES. Yekhanurov has gained with the Russians a reputation of a moderate and reasonable politician, prepared to negotiate and meet counterparts halfway. At the same time, Borys Tarasiuk is expected to retain his position of foreign minister, and that could make Russians wince.

Tarasiuk has already promised that Ukraine’s course toward European integration would be unswerving and expressed hope that the new government would have an even better capacity for accelerating the integration processes, in particular the implementation of the Ukraine-EU Action Plan. Tarasiuk discussed the above in a telephone conversation with High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana.

According to our sources, Brussels was deeply troubled with the allegations of corruption in the new Ukrainian administration. Their concern grew by day exasperated with Viktor Yushchenko’s silence. The Europeans wondered why the officials publicly accused of corrupt practices had not resigned of their own free will to avoid discrediting the head of state. European politicians would certainly do so. They referred to the story of incumbent EC Trade Commissioner Mendelssohn, British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s close ally, who was implicated in a scandal several years ago. Unwilling to compromise his national leader’s reputation, he had tendered his resignation before any official investigation results were announced. When the inquiry failed to establish his guilt, Mendelssohn returned to politics and to his EU office.

Therefore Brussels welcomed Yushchenko’s decision to fire high-ranking officials involved in the corruption scandal. The EC official representative Emma Udwin listed the Ukrainian president’s election commitments to extirpating corruption on purpose: the European Union does care about the administration’s anti-corruption effort and watches closely to see if Ukrainian officials’ hands are clean. Combating corruption is a core element of the Ukraine-EU Action Plan. The preliminary assessment of its implementation results will hinge, inter alia, on a thorough investigation of allegations aired by former State Secretary Olexander Zinchenko and on Ukraine top leaders’ further steps.

Brussels is also concerned about Ukraine’s WTO prospects. They know only too well how difficult it was for the government to get the Supreme Rada to adopt even part of the required WTO legislation. Now our European partners are afraid lest MPs, already preoccupied more with the upcoming elections than with the WTO accession, will be further distracted by the governmental crisis. Thus Ukraine might fail to meet the deadline (the end of the year) and, thus, might have to abandon hopes of starting negotiations with the EU on a free trade zone…

Europeans’ opinions about the Tymoshenko government’s discharge vary. Speaking as private individuals, some of them challenge the practicality of sacking the entire cabinet; they think the firings should have been targeted. Others are aligned with President Yushchenko, arguing Tymoshenko had no clear economic program; they blame the dismissed government for populist decisions that caused a slow-down in the country’s economic growth and investments, sent inflation soaring, and stirred the population’s discontent. Some fear that Tymoshenko’s joining the opposition could step up the political crisis, diverting the nation from the necessary reforms. Others, on the contrary, believe Tymoshenko could at last create in Ukraine a true opposition that any democracy requires for development.

There is one thing, however, about which all our interviewees concurred: at some stage, President Yushchenko lost control of the situation within his team and should have intervened much earlier.