There are no “Donetsk men” in the new Cabinet of Ministers. It is clear why the Party of Regions, led by [ex-governor of the Donetsk region and ex-candidate for presidency] Viktor Yanukovych, never wanted to have its representatives in the Yekhanurov government. With the parliamentary election campaign approaching, their absence in the executive government spares the party a good deal of popular criticism. Besides, the absence of visible links between the political leadership and the party allows the latter to score electoral points, criticizing the government. But there are some invisible links.

The Yushchenko-Yanukovych memorandum yielded some tangible results, and very soon, too: [Billionaire and FC Shakhtar President] Rinat Akhmetov returned to Ukraine. He visited the Interior Ministry and answered all the questions that the Minister [Yuri Lutsenko] had long wished to ask him. Judging from the fact that Akhmetov freely departed from Ukraine again, the answers must have been exhaustive.

The Prosecutor General’s Office no longer bothers ex-Prosecutor General Gennadiy Vasiliev, having closed the criminal case against him. Vasiliev even advised his successor Svyatoslav Piskun “to learn law better”: “According to the Criminal Procedural Code, the resolution on instituting criminal prosecution may not be canceled. It may only be suspended for absence of corpus delicti,” Vasiliev said, commenting on Piskun’s decision. Nobody objected. Firstly, because he was right. Secondly, because there were others deserving attention: the new ministers. Many of them are not novices in the government, and that is one more peculiarity of the new Cabinet of Ministers.

The most surprising figure is First Vice-Premier Stanislav Stashevsky. He first appeared in the government building in March 2001 when Viktor Yushchenko, the then Prime Minister, invited him to the post of Fuel and Energy Minister. The appointment followed Sergey Yermilov’s resignation at the peak of conflicts among some key players on the national energy market. The conflicts were largely triggered by [vice-premier for energy] Yulia Tymoshenko, who managed to destroy shadow schemes of earning private capital by profiteering on the deteriorating energy sector. President Kuchma wanted to put out the fire that would have resulted in the sector’s complete collapse. He found a simple solution: he appointed a man “from another street”. Stashevsky was an electrical engineer by trade. At his first press conference, the newly appointed fuel and energy minister was asked what he experience he had in the sector he headed. Stashevsky advised the journalists to imagine how many houses he had built in his long career in construction and how many miles of wires and how many thousands of sockets there were. That was convincing, indeed!

In the 1980s Stashevsky was chief engineer of Kyivelectromontazh [Kyiv Electric Mounting], a company subordinated to the municipal construction department headed by Olexandr Omelchenko. Friendly relationships between Stashevsky and Omelchenko continued after Omelchenko became Kyiv Mayor and appointed Stashevsky his first deputy.

Stashevsky headed the Fuel and Energy Ministry for nine months and no breakthroughs happened in the sector. Instead, there were rumors about his long-standing and close contacts with representatives of the Russian oil company Lukoil, whose positions in Ukraine strengthened considerably after he became Fuel and Energy Minister.

After Yushchenko’s resignation from the post of Prime Minister, the Cabinet was headed by Anatoliy Kinakh and Stashevsky was replaced by Vitaliy Haiduk - a recognized professional. Kyiv Mayor Omelchenko got angry and called the dismissal of “his man” a political move. He did not leave Stashevsky without a job: he appointed him his first deputy, although he already had one. Two months later Stashevsky became the second figure in the political party Yednist, [Ukr. for “unity”] led by Omelchenko.

In 2002 he got an MP mandate and chaired the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs. There were neither positive nor negative comments on his performance in that capacity.

Before appointing Stashevsky First Vice-Premier, President Yushchenko had a meeting with Omelchenko, which means that the latter is still going strong despite all rumors. Prime Minister Yekhanurov did not object, having known Stashevsky since the 1980s, when they both occupied top positions in the municipal construction department. Those who know Yekhanurov well say that he never breaks old ties.

The other vice-premiers were “inherited” from the Tymoshenko government. Roman Bezsmertniy, who was Vice-Premier for Administrative Reform, was reappointed as Vice-Premier for Regional Policy. The step was logical and should have been made immediately after the presidential election campaign, which deepened the ideological, political, and humanitarian split between the western and eastern parts of the country. There should have been a center for managing “patch-up” processes in all areas - from socio-economic to cultural. All ministries have special departments and divisions that deal with inter-regional affairs, but their efficiency is minimal if their efforts are not coordinated by a central body. That is a job for Bezsmertniy and his staff. Besides, it is hardly possible to carry out an administrative-territorial reform during the election race, so it was reasonable to concentrate Bezsmertniy’s efforts on developing a strategy for consolidating the nation, optimizing “center-region” relationships, and looking for solutions to complex and balanced development of different administrative regions. Parallel to his strategic tasks, Bezsmertniy has at least two tactical ones. The first task is to employ so-called “administrative resources” in the election campaign of the pro-presidential People’s Union “Our Ukraine”. Bezsmertniy is the party’s active functionary and high hope. The President has flatly denied the possibility of administrative pressure during the 2006 parliamentary elections, but who trusts his word now? After all, certain initiatives might as well come from local self-governments, and Bezsmertniy, chairing the PUOU council and occupying the post of Vice-Premier for Regional Policy, is the only man in the party who can build a relevant vertical.

The second task is to prepare the ground for a merger between Yushchenko’s and Yanukovych’s parties into an election coalition. So the visible part of Bezsmertniy’s work (like widely advertised national campaigns and programs under the motto “East And West Are One!”) is supposed to prepare the public for a likely alliance between the PUOU and the Party of Regions. If they enter the parliament together and form a coalition, Tymoshenko can give up on her hopes for premiership in the post-election government.

Vyacheslav Kyrylenko, 37 was Minister of Labor and Social Policy in the Tymoshenko government. Those who regard his promotion to the post of Vice-Premier for Humanitarian Affairs as a tribute to the Ukrainian People’s Party he represents are only partially right. His previous performance is evaluated very positively and he is reputed to be a man of word and deed. Despite his youth and lack executive experience, he is no dabbler. He is not afraid to ask for advice and does his best to correct the mistakes he makes. At the same time, Kyrylenko’s career hinges on the other ministries’ performance: if they fail to replenish the central budget, he is very likely to get caught in the crossfire of criticism and blame. But the young vice-premier has a strong backup in the person of Labor Minister Ivan Sakhan - very experienced and apparently caring little about his career.

Sakhan can hardly be called a devoted reformist, but he is an experienced top manager. He knows the ropes, having outlasted three prime ministers - Valeriy Pustovoitenko, Viktor Yushchenko, and Anatoliy Kinakh - first as First Deputy Labor Minister and then as Labor Minister. Before his latest appointment, Sakhan was Director General of the company Ukrainian Aluminum, which is tied to Oleg Derypasko, a Russian oligarch. So Kyrylenko can rely on Sakhan’s support and advice. But apart from social security, Kyrylenko will have to work on serious problems in the areas of culture and health care. It is important that during the pre-election campaign he refrain from raising the issue of the rehabilitation of OUN and UPA veterans [the Ukrainian People’s Party presses for rehabilitating veterans of the OUN - the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the UPA - the Ukrainian Insurgent Army that fought against both the Nazis and the Bolsheviks in WWII].

There are even younger ministers in the new government. Viktor Bondar, who replaced Yevhen Chervonenko at the post of Transport and Communications Minister, is the youngest - he has not yet turned thirty. His appointment looks to be the most controversial of all. His previous career was connected with data technologies. His educational background is solid: he graduated from the Kharkiv Academy of Law and got a master’s degree in computer science at the Kyiv Polytechnic Institute. He underwent apprenticeship and upgrading in Canada and Europe. Before succeeding Chervonenko, Bondar was his deputy. Observers refer to this fact as proving that Chervonenko still retains his influence on the ministry. Any young manager needs patrons and teachers to guide him up the career ladder. And in exchange he is ready to follow all their recommendations and instructions. Whether this is the case is still unclear but quite possible.

Another young member of the Yekhanurov government is Arseniy Yatsenyuk, the Minister of Economy. He is only one year older than Viktor Bondar but far more experienced in terms of administrative management. His previous position was Odessa Vice-Governor. But his career record has a more impressive entry: in early 2003 he changed the post of Crimean Economy Minister for the post of National Bank Vice-Governor. And when NB Governor Serhiy Tyhypko got engrossed in Yanukovych’s election campaign in mid-2004, Yatsenyuk actually took over. He is reputed as a highly educated intellectual. Experts believe that his experience in heading the country’s central bank and good knowledge of financial markets are good for the country’s economy. He knows a thing or two about inflation and knows the limits of monetary countermeasures. Most probably, he will be on good terms with the Prime Minister, who has a good ear for interesting ideas. And Yatsenyuk has quite a few ideas. The only obscure spot in his biography is a 50-million credit, which Petro Poroshenko, the then opposition activist, obtained from the NB allegedly thanks to Yatsenyuk, the then vice-governor of the central bank. It is unclear which made Yatsenyuk sign the secret order to disburse the credit - reckless courage or mercantile reasons.

There is another neophyte in the government: Pavlo Kachur, the Minister of Construction, Architecture, and Housing-Communal Affairs. His appointment looks rather surprising as he has little experience, if any, in construction, architecture, or communal services. He must have been chosen for his excellent organizational capabilities. He is rumored to be Yushchenko’s protege. He was an active functionary in Yushchenko’s election staff. In spite of the general confusion and poor coordination that marked the campaign, he managed to establish reliable communications between the central HQ and the regional offices. He expected to get a ministerial position right after Yushchenko was elected President. He felt offended when he did not get one, but he never showed it and waited. He could be characterized as a man who never asks for the moon but is always ready to arrange a trip there.

These are the few neophytes. The rest come from the Tymoshenko government. Some of them retained their posts owing to their partisanship rather than professional qualities. If Olexandr Baranivsky, for example, were not a member of the Socialist Party, he would hardly be Agriculture Minister in the Yekhanurov government. Perhaps, the only Socialist in the government who is above criticism for working unprofessionally or lobbying for someone’s interests is the Minister of Education and Science, Stanislav Nikolayenko.

The collective portrait of the Yekhanurov government resembles a plainly and quickly redecorated office. Yushchenko had to sacrifice quite a few figures that had leaned on for the last several years. Now he is on the horns of a dilemma: the outcome of the election or the country’s fate. He has to reckon with both, being aware that the constitutional reform is inevitable. The fact that most ministers in the new government are members of Yushchenko’s party shows that the outcome of the election is important to him. Unlike most observers and politicians, Yushchenko does not regard the Yekhanurov government as an “interim” or “caretaker” one. He pins hopes on these men as the basis of the government that will be formed after the parliamentary elections. Therefore, the Yekhanurov government’s effective work is equally important to him. Of course, there is someone behind each appointment in this government. But it is impossible to suspect any minister of lobbying for anyone’s interests. The next few weeks will certainly show whether they lobby for private business, the pro-presidential political party, or, hopefully, this country’s interests.