It is getting ever more difficult for society, foreign ambassadors, experts and residents to comprehend what is going on in Ukraine and in what direction the country is heading. The war in high places is escalating, inflicting heavy casualties on political figures, reforms, economic priorities and everyday interests of people in the street.

The political deal that Viktor Yushchenko and Rinat Akhmetov struck behind the scenes of the National Unity Pact has failed. Both politicians have been caught in a trap: notwithstanding all the leverage available to both of them, neither can ease the tension between their opposing parties. People, and the situation at large, are slipping out of their control. When reaching an agreement, Akhmetov hoped for stability in the country as a prerequisite for increasing business capitalization; Yushchenko looked forward to peace in the country as a token of respect. However, neither man’s expectations came true and both reacted lukewarmly: Akhmetov did not show up at the President’s meeting with national business leaders and took no part in voting against the “orange” ministers; Yushchenko fought for his ministers as enthusiastically and resolutely as the EU and NATO fight for Ukraine’s prospective membership.

The tug of war for more power in the triangle “Prime Minister – Parliament – President” is likely to continue and increase. All of them have prepared and are about to submit dozens of petitions to the Constitutional Court. Should one of the involved players decide to give in, their team will never let them do it.

The senseless war will be undermining credibility and popularity ratings of all belligerent parties. More than that, the entire country will be plunge into uncertainty with growing risks of various kinds. Of course, some could profiteer from the universal situation, particularly in view of the non-transparence of the Cabinet of Ministers, its arbitrary approach to decision making and subjective control over law enforcement.

The intellectual “arms race” between the Presidential Secretariat and the Cabinet has yielded no results: neither the former nor the latter, nor the NSDC have offered a break-through, innovation and meaningful strategic initiative. Former vice-Prime Ministers and ministers (let alone incumbent officials and politicians) are stuck in a banal battle for authority. Yet what do they need this authority for? How will they use it for the common good?

People at the grassroots level do not understand why the language of national political leaders abounds in verbs “claim”, “appeal”, “pressurize”, “veto”, “control”, “buy” and “induce” instead of “reform”, “support”, “develop” and “unite”. Inflation, skyrocketing rent and utilities tariffs make even financially independent people apprehensive and watchful of the government’s next steps. An overwhelming majority of household budgets are vulnerable to the authorities’ economic policies and practices.

What suffers most from the ceaseless skirmish is the nation’s unity and stability. The situation discredits all political forces that use it as a smoke screen to cover up the surrender of Maidan’s achievements. Was Maidan about fair elections? Where did you observe them last time? In Cherkassy? In Kirovograd? Was it about freedom of speech? Have you noticed any change in the tenor of comments on some national channels?

Not only do political forces implement self-destructive strategies in their relations with opponents but with themselves as well. Tension is mounting within the “anti-crisis” coalition; the President is getting a divorce from his parliamentary faction. Inside each team, rank-and-file members are vying for the leaders’ favours.

As a result, opinion polls look gloomy: the nation has no idea of what is in store. When asked “What do you feel when thinking of Ukraine’s future?” as few as 34.4 percent of respondents said they were hopeful, whereas 31 percent feel anxious, 20 percent – optimistic, 17 percent – curious, 16 percent – fearful, 9 percent – secure, 2 percent – satisfied, and 1 percent – joyful. Importantly, only 6 percent of the surveyed were indifferent about their country’s future.

Falling political ratings and stable interest in news programmes can also be interpreted as evidence of the population’s concern over the latest developments – they are not apathetic to what is going on; rather, they do not pay attention to political leaders anymore.

In fact, Ukraine lacks a true national leader. It cannot even boast a public figure that enjoyrs the support of half the nation. If presidential elections were held last Sunday, Viktor Yanukovych would muster 24 percent of the vote, Yuliya Tymoshenko – 19 percent, Viktor Yushchenko – 8 percent, Olexander Moroz – 4.5 percent, Petro Symonenko – even less. At the same time, 11.2 percent of citizens would vote against all of the above, 7.4 percent would not vote at all, and another 11.2 percent would have difficulty deciding who to support.

Ever more people, irrespective of their political preferences, are coming to realize that politicians use them in elections times, and otherwise don’t care a straw about their plight. If nothing changes and opponents fail to display common sense, the confrontation threatens to spill into the Constitutional Court and Verkhovna Rada. It could spiral out onto the streets, even coming to violence.

Sociologists have not yet studied how the last week, rich in political battles, will tell affect politician’s popularity ratings. However there is no doubt the country’s international rating will suffer, for reasons we will try to discuss below.

Registry of Reichstags set on fire

The war for power in Ukraine is a combination of strategic military operations, local arms passages, guerrilla sorties and minor diversions. Hardly a day passes without the parliamentary majority, government and opposition finding a casus belli. All such causes can be divided into three categories. The first category stems from an objectively painful process of a re-distribution of powers ensuing from the constitutional reform that curtailed presidential authority and expanded those of the parliament and cabinet. The second category is linked to gaps in legislative regulation due to multiple flaws in the new Constitution. Finally, the third category includes subjective factors: offensive acts at an opponent’s standing that urge them to respond in kind. May we remind you of the key points in contention occupying the lion’s share of the political elite’s time, effort and resources? May we also encourage you to tick the items that, in your opinion, affect your living standards and level of freedom most of all?

Thus, conflicts are mainly caused by:

The Prime Minister’s desire to cut the list of issues subject to NSDC scrutiny and approval, and the President’s desire to influence the Cabinet’s decisions via the NSDC decisions;

The countersigning of presidential decrees, its use as a pretext to block the implementation of NSDC decisions, refusal to abide by the presidential decrees;

The parties’ attempts to promote their own draft laws on the Cabinet of Ministers (two competing drafts prepared by the government and Presidential Secretariat provide for different sets of the Cabinet’s rights and responsibilities and, accordingly, for a dissimilar approach to the re-distribution of executive powers that the Constitution fails to regulate);

Both parties’ multiple complaints to the Constitutional Court and struggle to get a loyal majority of justices in this institution;

The parliamentary majority’s attempt to deprive the President of his right to veto the budget law by seeking the Constitutional Court’s ruling on this matter;

Contradictory approaches to the law on business companies passed by Parliament and vetoed by the President (that can be put down, inter alia, to both parties’ vested interest in controlling Ukrnafta cash flows);

Disagreement on the parties’ respective influence on the head of state administrations at all levels (the President does not approve candidates nominated by the government; he appoints heads of local administrations without their nomination by the government; he does not dismiss the heads of local administrations that received a vote of no confidence from two thirds of the local councils; the Cabinet does not consult with local councils about the candidates it nominates for the president’s approval);

Fighting over the Constitution (the “anti-crisis” coalition members strive to either cancel the presidential post altogether or to amend the Constitution so as to empower the Rada to elect the president; the opposition and pro-presidential forces announce their intention to petition the Constitution Court to reverse the reform and restore the president’s previous jurisdiction; the President initiates the establishment of a constitutional commission to improve the Fundamental Law; the coalition would not delegate its representatives to the commission);

The coalition’s efforts to get rid of the “orange” ministers appointed within the President’s official and unofficial quota (main targets are Tarasiuk, Lutsenko and Gritsenko; main objectives – revision of foreign policy, turning the Interior Ministry into a tool of political and economic competition, unlimited access to military property, first and foremost, land);

Struggle for control of law enforcement and prosecution;

Non-transparent mechanisms of VAT reimbursement to privileged companies at the tax authorities’ discretion;

The government’s preparation of lawsuits against the President over the latter’s failure to approve the candidates to head local state administration nominated by the Cabinet (the initiative of the Ministry of Justice was postponed for an additional round of negotiations with the Secretariat);

The government’s censoring and limiting of information on current developments in the country in general, various ministries and public agencies, in particular; its reluctance to share information with the Secretariat;

Differing opinions of the government’s package of tax laws approved by the coalition, of budgeting tools and procedures and of budget allocation priorities;

The Cabinet’s aspirations to strip the President of control over the administrative function and to put the State Administrative Department under the government’s supervision;

Struggle over the appointment of the Ukrspetsexport CEO and control of the special (arms) supplier;

Bureaucratic wrangling between secretariats;

Disregarding by the Prime Minister and other ministers of rules set for international visits whereby directives for negotiations should be agreed with the president and the Foreign Ministry;

Fighting over the capital city (the President’s and Prime Minister’s teams took different sides in the war for power and resources available to Kyiv);

Defiant disrespect by Cabinet members of the rules requiring that a governmental representative be present in the airport every time the President leaves the country or returns after an official visit;

Viktor Yanukovych’s refusal to let the head of state chair Cabinet meetings that he attends (which, in fact, ruled out any possibility for Viktor Yushchenko to participate in the government’s sessions);

The Prime Minister’s neglecting meetings with the President (on the day of the OU announcement about joining the opposition, Viktor Yanukovych failed to present himself at the appointed time for a meeting with the head of state without any notice of cancellation; on November 22, although invited by Viktor Yushchenko, neither the Prime Minister nor the coalition ministers appeared in Mariyinskyy Palace to celebrate the “orange” revolution anniversary; on November 25 the Prime Minister of Ukraine ignored a ceremony in commemoration of the victims of the Great Famine).

In no way is the above list exhaustive, but it is sufficient to illustrate the scale and strain of the war on the top.

And who are you?

As for the latest scandal with the Prime Minister’s nearly cancelled official visit to the USA, its true cause was neither Foreign Minister Tarasiuk’s personal conflict with Yanukovych nor the Foreign Ministry’s disagreement with the rest of the Cabinet. It was just an episode in the snowballing confrontation in the limelight.

Presumably, the President’s team regarded the preparation for Viktor Yanukovych’s visit to the USA as an opportune occasion for dotting all “I’s” in matters related to the control of foreign policy and its implementation, and for getting the Prime Minister and his Cabinet to respect the Constitution and laws of Ukraine. Put differently, the President’s patience wore thin and he decided to show “who is the king of the castle”, at least in defining foreign policy. [Vice Speaker] Adam Martyniuk’s public statement that Yanukovych would be pursuing the coalition’s, rather than the President’s agenda, added to his determination.

You will remember that on Nov. 13, 2006 the President issued a decree advising the government to submit, by November 22, draft directives for the Ukrainian delegation’s working visit to the USA, for the head of state’s approval. Although today Yanukovych blames the Foreign Ministry for failure to prepare the document on time, our sources in the Presidential Secretariat and Foreign Ministry report that the Cabinet deliberately turned a deaf ear to the President’s requirement and was not going to submit the document, in spite of several reminders from the Secretariat.

However, at the COB on November 20 (i.e. two days before the deadline) the government did, indeed, instruct the Foreign Ministry to urgently draft the directives. In bureaucratic language, “urgently” means within seven days. The Foreign Ministry did the job sooner, by November 24, but the document was not forwarded to the President’s Secretariat. Therefore last Tuesday the Secretariat and the Foreign Ministry held serious consultations with Washington and the US Embassy in Kyiv that resulted in handing a memorandum on the visit re-scheduling to Ambassador Taylor. In addition, according to the ZN sources, Washington’s official representative received a letter to President George Bush. We can only guess about its contents but it was delivered in a package with the memorandum. The American party was not very happy with the situation but they would have been even unhappier had Ukraine, yet again, been sending controversial signals to the international community and if the Brussels embarrassment recurred in Washington. As Olexander Chaly, Deputy Head of the Presidential Secretariat, stated at a briefing on the next day, “the American party’s message was that, in form, it was going to act in compliance with international law and consider the memorandum initiated by the Ukrainian President, to be the ultimate will of the Ukrainian state”. Late on Tuesday night, William Taylor phoned the Ukrainian Prime Minister, which could be the reason why the directives were discussed at the Cabinet meeting and submitted for the president’s approval on Wednesday. The President slightly amended and approved them.

The first person to tell the media the Prime Minister was going to the USA, after all, was Arseniy Yatseniuk, the President’s envoy to the Cabinet. He qualified the episode as “misunderstanding”. We kept wondering what exactly he viewed as misunderstanding: his presence at the meeting with the American Ambassador when Volodymyr Ohryzko, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, passed the memorandum and the letter over to Mr. Taylor; or his okaying the information leak to internet sites and information agencies; or else, in view of the avove, his tagging the event as a “misunderstanding”...

Wouldn‘t it be fairer and more sensible to call a press conference on the night the memorandum was delivered and to tell the media (and the general public, for that matter) that Yanukovych’s visit to the USA was being postponed/called off due to his non-compliance with the presidential decree and constitutional norms. According to our sources, Yushchenko originally meant to cancel the visit but, characteristically, contended himself with middle-of-the-road measures…

On Wednesday afternoon, the Foreign Ministry’s Press Service, “in response to media comments on the supposed re-scheduling of V.Yanukovych’s visit to the USA”, made an official statement that the Prime Minister’s visit would take place as planned. O.Chaliy’s briefing for the press finished the story: “The problem has been resolved. The key principle of the country’s comprehensive and consistent foreign policy has been reasserted, together with the President’s jurisdiction over the defining and managing foreign policy. This practice will be continued in the future”. So he made it clear that the President will keep issuing decrees concerning foreign policy and the government will be expected to submit directives for the head of state’s approval.

Hence a question: does the Prime Minister need any directives? Some experts maintain that, according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers do not have to prove their authority to represent their respective states. Commenting on this international provision, O.Chaly expounded that the Vienna Convention allows national legislation to limit the right of certain categories of officials to make foreign policy statements. He underscored that the Constitution and laws of Ukraine adequately regulate these issues. “In parliamentary republics, the prime minister usually approves the directives, whereas in presidential and parliamentary-presidential ones, it is the president’s responsibility. There is no divergence whatsoever from the Vienna Convention,” – continued Mr Chaliy, a renowned expert on international law. According to him, there are two major cases when directives should be prepared and approved: when international treaties are signed (Ukraine has a special law regulating the relevant procedure) and when the prime minister, foreign minister, other cabinet members or properly authorized representatives of the state conduct international negotiations or perform other acts in the foreign policy domain. In O.Chaliy’s opinion, the time is ripe for the President to initiate a clearer regulation of the country’s representation on the international arena. It cannot be ruled out that another presidential decree will see the light soon, which is designed to establish a procedure for preparing and approving directives for events, other than concluding international treaties, namely: visits, talks, etc.

The Presidential Secretariat wishes to send a clear signal (not only to Yanukovych and his entourage but also to Ukraine’s international partners) that the head of state exercises sole and personal leadership in foreign policy. The team is going to get the government to coordinate all of the Prime Minister’s foreign visits with the President. They firmly intend to debar everyone from international negotiations who attempts to further a foreign policy course out of sync with the presidential one, and to entrust international talks to people who strictly follow presidential directives.

Two weeks ago, preparing for the move, the Presidential Secretariat and the Foreign Ministry jointly compiled a circular addressed to all foreign embassies and missions of international organizations accredited in Ukraine, emphasizing that, under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Ukraine’s national legislation, all official affairs (including requests for official meetings with representatives of the Ukrainian state, notices of upcoming visits, negotiations on visit agendas, proposals on concluding international agreements, etc) should go through the Foreign Ministry. It was underscored that any affairs arranged in breach of the described procedure would not be deemed official. The Ministry wasted no time sending the circular around.

It brings us back to President Kuchma’s decree of 1996 (updated and amended last year) stipulating that executive powers should agree with the Foreign Ministry on all matters pertaining to visits abroad or the invitation of official delegations, public speeches, official statements and international initiatives, directives, instructions, terms of reference, etc.

The Cabinet seems to need reminding from time to time. The previous occasion was Russian Minister Fradkov’s visit to Kyiv. The government cut the Foreign Ministry out of the preparation process, but the Russians insisted on receiving a properly drawn and documented invitation, i.e. on the Foreign Ministry’s diplomatic note. Thus the Cabinet had to involve the Foreign Ministry.

Finally, the President and the Foreign Ministry must have resented the fact that the Cabinet Resolution from November 24 excluded the deputy foreign minister from the official delegation, although it provides for the presence of three MPs, the Prime Minister’s two advisors and the head of secretariat and a media delegation of 21 (sic!) reporters (the President took twice less journalists with him last year). As a result, the “non-confrontational process of cooperation in the context of parliamentary-presidential republic” was reduced to absurdity: retorting to the Cabinet’s refusal to take the deputy foreign minister (which has always been a common practice), the Presidential Secretariat, purportedly, demanded that a diplomatic passport be denied to Serhiy Liovochkin, Head of Prime Minister’s Secretariat. Eventually, as O.Chaliy told journalists at the briefing, the government agreed to invite Olexander Khandohy, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, to join the official delegation.

Will the President’s will be fulfilled? Will the Prime Minister and members of his Cabinet stick by the President’s directives? When commenting on the situation with the US visit [of Yanukovych], Chaliy said: “Currently, there is no reason to worry about the Prime Minister not fulfilling directives during his visit to the United States.” “We explored the scenario of possible actions and obtained an appropriate result, which puts an end to this issue. The President has effective tools to call out any official if they oversteps laws or if their actions affect the Ukrainian state,” the deputy head to the presidential secretariat said.

Bankova [the site of the presidential secretariat] is sure that an important victory has been achieved in the asserting the president’s personal right to direct foreign policy. We, however, have strong doubts that this issue has come to an end and that the president’s tools are indeed effective and that he is ready to apply them rigidly and methodically.

What threat can failure to fulfill the president’s orders and directives pose to the prime minister? According to the newly amended Constitution, the president has lost the right to dismiss the prime minister. Bankova says that in case presidential directives are disregarded, it will be possible to apply the Criminal Code of Ukraine on the abuse of power. But who will start criminal proceedings against the Prime Minister and his team? Prosecutor General Medvedko? Moreover, there is a prominent case in the recent history of Ukraine when the-then head of the Ukrainian delegation, Mykola Azarov, blatantly violated directions given to him during negotiations on creation of the SES. Did he bare any responsibility? Now Azarov is feeling pretty well in the seat of first vice prime minister. Moreover, the secretariat of the president (!) is seriously considering his candidacy to head of delegation to negotiate with the EU on a new agreement…

The second effective instrument of the President, according to Bankova, is to “overturn the will on any of the issues”. Its effect was demonstrated for the first time when the President was trying to postpone (or cancel) the visit of Yanukovych to the United States. How effective did this instrument prove to be? Yes, the directives were given. However the very next day, on Thursday, the Prime Minister went to Moscow, without any directives. Moreover, the Foreign Minister learned about this visit … from journalists. The Ukrainian embassy in Moscow learned about the Prime Minister’s visit only on Wednesday afternoon. The Cabinet faxed information about this visit to the Foreign ministry only at 15:30, or less than a day before Yanukovych’s flight to Moscow. By the way, there were no representatives of Foreign Ministry, except for the Ambassador Demin, in the Prime Minister’s delegation.

When commenting on this visit, the deputy head of the presidential secretariat, Yatsenyuk, once again “reassured” journalists saying that this was an unofficial visit and that there was no special decree from the President concerning it, and on the whole Yanukovych “goes there pretty often…”

Yet, Yatsenyuk had better refrain from commenting, at least foreign policy issues. First, the Cabinet once again blatantly violated the 1996 presidential decree, which instructed that the Foreign Ministry should take part in the arrangement of all visits of representatives of state powers (including their programs). Second, the Russian side demonstratively ignored this decree and arranged this visit not through the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine, but over-the-counter. Consequently, according to the decree, the president has every reasons to consider the agreements reached in Moscow during this visit unofficial and legally void.

There are a large number of other questions. For example, why didn’t we hear any comments (except from those by Yatsenyuk, of course) either from Mikhailovska (the Foreign Ministry) or from Bankova despite those listed violations? How can a representative of the president call the visit of the Prime Minister unofficial (by the way, vice prime minister Tabachnyk called it a working visit), when Yanukovych meet with both his counterpart and President Putin and discussed a future meeting of the heads of Ukraine and Russia within the framework of the Yushchenko-Putin intergovernmental commission as well as cooperation of this two states within the SES framework, problems of energy safety and many other important issues in the relations between Ukraine and Russia? Why wasn’t there a special decree on the visit of Yanukovych to Moscow? Maybe the President, similar to the Foreign Minister, didn’t know about it? Or will the president regulate foreign policy only in the West, while in the East Yanukvovych, who “goes there pretty often” can do whatever he likes? For example, he can pass the Ukrainian gas transportation system to the Russians. So can we call the foreign policy of Ukraine “integral and unified” and Ukrainian president its single head in such a context?

Yanukovych’s team is not going to give up and submit to the President within his constitutional authority as Bankova would like to believe. The 247 votes in favor of Tarasyuk’s dismissal during the parliamentary voting is yet other evidence of that. When writing this article we still didn’t know if the President applied to the Constitutional court to verify the legitimacy of this dismissal. Although it was reported earlier that the President did have such an intention; however we doubt that he will fight for his minister to the very end, since there are the reasons to believe that not only parliament wanted to get rid of Tarasyuk… The head of the presidential secretariat, Baloha, indirectly confirmed this assumption when saying that the President has the right to propose the candidacy of Borys Tarasyuk for the Foreign Minister once again but he can also put forward another candidate. The President has a “good pool of choices” for that, Chaliy said importantly. “We will act within the legislative framework. If there is a decision of the Verkhovna Rada to dismiss Mr. Tarasyuk, he will comply with this decision.”

Re-melting the Terminator

Parliamentary voting for the dismissal of Internal Minister Yuriy Lutsenko has become symptomatic [of current situation] and has far-reaching consequences. Thus, it played a role of a litmus and identified the problems of the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc. A month ago its leader disputed the creation of an interim commission investigating corrupt activities and power abuses by certain officials of the Internal Ministry published by the media. However, people from Tymoshenko’s milieu voted in favor of the appropriate resolution. On November 30, despite the official position of the faction on this issue, other members of BYuT, mostly businessmen who could not be easily deprived of their cards as was the case with other obstinate faction members, voted for dismissal.

Thus, this voting will obviously give a new, powerful incentive to the issue of an imperative mandate, about which politicians have cared for, for quite a while. The demand of any political force that all the deputies who make it to parliament on their party list should comply with the faction’s decisions is understandable. On the other hand, such a binding of every deputy to a certain political faction will only have a negative effect for the society on the whole.

Today, everybody seems to know the actual reasons of such close attention to the activities of law enforcement now, at this tense political moment.

First of all we dare to insist that there was no Internal Minister in Ukraine whom it was impossible to dismiss from his post either in six months after his appointment or in five years on the basis of the charges, which the parliamentary commission put on Yuriy Lutsenko. Let us remind you, that neither court, nor the Prosecutor General’s offices, which is unlikely to be suspected of sympathy with Lutsenko, failed to find any reasons for the charges against him. So, we will concentrate on the parliament’s charges.

Volodymyr Syvkovych from the Party of the Regions read the report of the investigatory commission. The reason for the creation of this commission was a notorious publication in the press. We have to note, however, that this highly praiseworthy of people’s deputies to respond to revelant publications in the media, which happens very selectively. For some reason parliament did not react to articles about the activities of Naftogas Ukraine board chairman Boiko, which were repeatedly published in ZN as well as the activities of a whole series of other heroes of our articles that could have become the subject at least of a parliamentary investigation. But this didn’t happen for some reason. It is interesting that someone from the session hall asked a rhetoric question, if Syvkovych considers the book “The Donetsk mafia” to be the subject of investigation by a new parliamentary commission and if he will head this commission. A deputy from the BYuT faction asked quite a logical question: why did representatives of the anti-crisis coalition unanimously vote for Lutsenko’s appointment in August, but in a month respond so keenly to the article, as if they learned something fundamentally new about him? The speaker said: “I believe that we made a major mistake when we let the minister appointed by your faction leader push us around as well as when we listened to her [Tymoshenko] saying that he would manage the Ministry best of all.” A secret service employee with a long service record saying this sounds very unconvincing.

The report contained numerous facts, which according to the speaker need additional study. It is unclear why then they were included in the parliament’s ’indictment’. A series of charges are based on complaints from common people, to verify the validity of which take much time and effort. Parliament, however, proved to be miraculously efficient: “A large number of complaints were submitted in October and November… All the facts, which were submitted, have been verified by now.” Also there are numerous complaints about “groundlessly repressed employees of the Internal Ministry.” Moreover, the parliamentary investigation came to a conclusion that “the Internal Ministry doesn’t work enough to reduce criminal influence on the growing generation.” How do you like it! Can the militia really improve the economic situation in the state or, say, forbid the broadcasts of parliamentary sessions to protect children from seeing what is going on in the top legislative body?

It is common knowledge that the Ukrainian militia is very close to a catastrophic state as well as that it works mostly for itself and not for the citizens or the state. In the context of Lutsenko’s dismissal it would be logical to ask the following two questions: what exactly could he do under current situation? What did he actually do? Most likely his honest answers to these two questions would result in his dismissal, similar to the show set up by parliament and its investigatory commission. Nobody tried hard to prove that the Minister didn’t cope with the tasks.

Could he really overturn the system of law enforcement that was set up long before him and that consisted of advocates of certain groups’ interests, in particular financial-oligarchic groups? Could a civilian appointed by the president break officers of the criminal investigation department of a habit to arrest only bums, because all the rest could turn out to have ties to the government? Could he stop the process of covering up drug traffic by those who specialize in fighting it or transportation of illegal immigrants by those who should prevent it? Could a minister, who headed a whole “army” of people but had very few of those whom he trusted, really do this? Certainly not. Did he do his best to change the situation? He didn’t.

In the near future, perhaps nobody will seriously investigate whether there really was a corpus deliciti in the activities of the Internal Minister. People will remember the oxymoron “corruption without selfish motives” and his poorly grounded dismissal. As well as public speaking that is incompatible with the post of Internal Minister. Unfortunately, few know that Lutsenko provided competent information to the president about many things which were going on in the capital and city hall, and for example, explained difference between the coal and coke.

Yuriy Lutsenko gave his last interview as Internal Minister to ZN five minutes before the parliament decided to dismiss him.

— Yuriy Vitaliyevych [Lutsenko], what was your reaction to information that the socialist faction was ready to vote for your dismissal in exchange for the appointment of a new socialist minister?

— Today (December 1) I attended the Socialist faction for two minutes and thanked them for their behavior at the session. Their nonparticipation in my political punishment was very important for me. After all, despite our political differences in the current situation we still have normal relations. On the other hand, the position of the Socialist party saved the country from seizure by Donetsk revenge-seekers, except for the Prosecutor General’s office, which could be extremely dangerous for Ukraine, for democratic processes, business and many other things. If the Socialist party will manage to insist on a non-Donetsk representative as Internal Minister, this would be a very good compromise.

— You used to speak rather bluntly about Yulia Tymoshenko. We have an impression that you’ve revised your views recently and now you are closer with her than you used to be.

— I have never spoken bluntly about Yulia Tymoshenko. When she was not right I told her about it. Nevertheless, I have never considered her to be a political rival. Probably today I’ve said this even more intensively. I believe, and time has proven, that the opposition in the orange camp suits the non-democratic forces well. I decided to show an example. This started a few months ago, on the day before yesterday I once again warned the puppeteers that if I will have to leave the Internal Minister’s post and return to political activity, they should not expect me to become a factor for splitting democratic forces. This is my principal stand, even though I have differences in tactical issues with Yulia Volodymirivna [Tymoshenko]. I also have questions to the deputies from her faction who discredit her as a leader. At the same time I consider us to be the close allies according to strategic goals. It seems to me that Tymoshenko’s milieu is trying to instill the idea of bi-partisanship in Ukraine and as a result is trying to monopolize the orange camp. I would call this the behavior of a cuckoo in an orange nest and I consider this behavior to be unconstructive.

— Do you support early parliamentary elections?

— I would really like to, but for now I don’t see such an opportunity.

— You will leave the Ministry without bodyguards. You might have gained quite a few enemies while being at this post. What measures will you take thereupon?

— This is the only reason due to which I gave a pistol to myself. Pretty often I liked to “escape” from bodyguards and go to the book market with my sons or to the hall with game machines with my younger son. That is why sometimes I carry weapons myself. But then I understand that no bodyguards will save me from a contract killing, it can only stop hooligans. That is why the people’s support is my guard in this case. On the other hand I can honestly say that the head of the guards, who came to the Ministry together with me, will leave together with me.

— Don’t you think that the president didn’t make enough effort to defend you as Internal Minister?

— I am not a small boy to be defended by grown-up parents. I knew what I was doing and what I could count on. The President provided political support, which is very important for me. All the rest is regulated by the Constitution, including the right of parliament to dismiss me.

— What, do you think, your career will be like?

—It will be good.

— Do you see yourself at the head of a certain political force?

— I think that one should head a political force not at his own wish but at the wish of that political force. I am not creating a political project. I would like representatives of democratic forces in Ukraine to unify this spring and resist the rather monolithic forces with opposite political views. If as a result of such a unification I will be offered to join a force’s leadership I will accept this offer.

Lutsenko insists that he is not creating his own political project. Nevertheless, sociologists assumed what disposition forces might be like if it suddenly turned out that Lutsenko was a bit too modest or decided not to lay his cards on the table ahead of time.

Let’s have a look at the results of the nationwide sociological poll conducted from Nov. 8 to Nov. 22, 2006. The party Ahead Ukraine (Lutsenko, Baloha, Yatsenyuk) would gain 1.7% of votes, while the Our Ukraine bloc (Yushchenko, Bezsmertny, Martynenko) – 7.1%. Yet if Ahead Ukraine is headed by Yushchenko, Lutsenko and Yatsenyuk, 5.5% would vote for it. At the same time Our Ukraine lead by Bezsmertny, Martynenko and Poroshenko would receive only 2.5%. If Yushchenko is not on the list of Our Ukraine, the party Ahead Ukraine! (Lutsenko, Baloha, Yatsenyuk) would gain 4% even without the president on its list. However Our Ukraine would not get more than 2.5% of the vote without its honorary leader on its list.

At the same time, despite numerous forecasts, Lutsenko will not be able to win the support of Tymoshenko’s voters. Regardless of the hypothetical memberships of Our Ukraine and Ahead Ukraine, BYuT would get from 20.5% to 21.2% of the votes.

The Verkhovna Rada dismissed Yuriy Lutsenko from the Internal Minister’s post. 248 deputies including 186 representatives from the Party of the Regions, 5 from the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc, 2 from Our Ukraine, 30 Socialists, 21 Communists and 4 non-affiliated members voted for his dismissal.

Lutsenko’s place was taken by Vasyl Tsushko, who got the support of 246 deputies.

The head of the Presidential secretariat, Viktor Baloha, gave surprisingly cheerful comments on the reshuffle at the Internal Ministry. “This is one of the best decisions, since Tsushko is a balanced politician, who will not make sharp moves and would care for the quiet awareness of society to the role which the Internal Minister has to play,” Baloha said, having called Lutsenko’s dismissal as a “normal process”…

Lost in the Middle of Everywhere

SBU Chief Igor Dryzhchany was dismissed as quickly as he was appointed on Sept. 8, 2005. Initially, he was supposed to stay at the post for a couple of months at most, before assuming the post of Prosecutor General. The plan would have worked if the President had not estranged his “dear friends” and Oleg Rybachuk [then chief of the Presidential Secretariat – A.B.] had not lobbied for Alexander Medvedko. Dryzhchany stayed.

Under his command, the Security Service became depoliticized: its “all-seeing” eye detected corruption in all offices and businesses regardless of their political color, but its hands never took up the sword. Perhaps, for the first time in years, the SBU was not a tool for settling political or economic accounts. Dryzhchany was too cautious to act the hard way. Even the majority coalition had nothing against him. His “pacifism”, however, did not quite fit in the route of political survival followed by the Yushchenko camp.

On November 29, Dryzhchany had a meeting with Viktor Yushchenko and [Presidential Secretariat Chief] Viktor Baloha. The sky was cloudless, but a cold shower poured later in the day: the Verkhovna Rada website published Yushchenko’s statement on Dryzhchany’s dismissal. The next morning, Dryzhchany was invited to the Presidential Secretariat where he received copies of two presidential decrees: one on promoting him to the rank of General of the Army – the topmost in Ukraine’s military, and the other on appointing him Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council in charge of law enforcement.

It is Mykhailo Doroshenko, not Viktor Baloha, who played the key role in Dryzhchany’s career. Doroshenko never concealed his confrontation with Dryzhchany, who sued him several times and won all the cases. Dryzhchany had no direct access to the President: he had to get through many “filters” in the secretariat and reception. Doroshenko had all the doors open. Naturally, the President did not object to Dryzhchany’s dismissal.

Dryzhchany had a chance to fight: members of the parliamentary majority were ready to turn down the President’s proposal to sack him. Yet, he chose to resign. In public he explained, “the President appointed me without consulting the parliament, so I’m going to leave office same way.” In a closer circle, it is known that he simply hated to be in limbo. Besides, the parliamentary majority’s support would have obliged him to use the SBU in their interests. Dryzhchany was objectively unable and personally unwilling to play for either team.

At present, the acting chief of the SBU is Valentyn Nalyvaichenko who has made his career in diplomacy rather than intelligence. He is educated, reserved, and well-mannered. Yushchenko likes him. As to the SBU staff, there are different attitudes to him, but they are generally positive. He is no worse than his predecessors, but he is no terminator.

Baloha would prefer Maj.-Gen. Vitaliy Romanchenko – a successful businessman and a hero of the Orange Revolution. It was Romanchenko, then chief of military counterintelligence, who informed SBU Chief Igor Smeshko about a secret order to use military force against the demonstrators in Kyiv and thus prevented a massacre. Romanchenko used to work in the Emergencies Management Ministry when Baloha headed it. Baloha trusts Romanchenko and believes in his capabilities.

Mykhailo Doroshenko lobbies for another candidate – Mykola Malomuzh, chief of the foreign intelligence service. Every time the presidential chancellery raised the issue of Dryzhchany’s dismissal, Malomuzh was named the number one candidate to replace him. Yushchenko trusts Malomuzh as well.

It is clear that none of the candidates – Nalyvaichenko, Romanchenko, or Malomuzh – is going to have an easy ride through the session hall to the post of SBU Chief. Members of the pro-government majority are unlikely to vote for any of the three, regarding each as Yushchenko’s men. They have their own candidate – Volodymyr Radchenko [who used to occupy the post of SBU chief under Leonid Kuchma– A.B.]. It is also clear that another replacement surely means another series of staff reshuffles and another organizational reform. The problem is not the political orientation of the future SBU chief. The problem is that neither the “orange” nor the “blue-white” political leadership has demonstrated a correct understanding of the SBU’s mission. Neither has been able to formulate clear tasks, proceeding from national interests.

Bonds of Mistrust

The conflicts between Yushchenko and Yanukovych, between the pro-presidential and the pro-government forces, and between the coalition majority and the opposition minority eclipse serious disagreements among different groupings within the ruling team. Representatives of the Donetsk clan (the backbone of this team) keep dirty linen in the house, letting it pile up to a critical mass. Everybody knows about tensions among members of the government. The sector of fuel and energy has turned into a battlefield for personal ambitions and interests. So has the financial sphere. By cutting mercilessly allocations for practically all programs, Finance Minister Azarov let the number of his enemies grow and shatter the non-too-solid government. The “manual mode” of decision-making without consulting the Cabinet irritated all ministers, regardless of their political positions.

The ministers who do not come from Donetsk feel deprived and depraved. Their deputies (surely of Donetsk extraction) are “looking after them” as warders, reducing their role to that of an effigy. The most eloquent example is Transport Minister Mykola Rudkovsky: any decision he makes has to get the green light from his watchful deputies.

Relationships within the so-called anti-crisis coalition are far from cloudless, either. Deep-rooted controversies surfaced during the dramatic debates over the bill on the Famine. Speaker Olexandr Moroz, who pressed for recognizing the 1932-1933 famine as an act of genocide against the people of Ukraine, got a slap of criticism from the Communists. They reminded him in no uncertain terms what he really was, whom he owed his top position, and how he should behave. Moreover, Petro Symonenko threatened him with the Communist faction’s secession from the coalition.

The public squabble between the two leftist parties was only the top of a huge iceberg of mistrust. According to reliable sources, on the eve of the debates on the famine, Moroz said he was ready to support the version of the bill drafted by the Regions Party [which termed the famine as “tragic events”, not as “an act of genocide” in the President’s version – A.B.]. In exchange Moroz, demanded the post of Interior Minister for a Socialist. Of course, it was nothing personal – he needed control over one key structure. He believed that Yaroslav Mendus – the “power broker” of the Socialist Party – would cope with that role best of all. As alternative candidates, Moroz offered Vasyl Tsushko, a man of commendable zest, and Vasyl Volga, a man of excessive ambition.

Moroz also promised the RP that the Socialist faction would vote for sacking Defense Minister Anatoliy Grytsenko, Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, and Interior Minister Yuri Lutsenko, although he wavered a little about the latter: he knew that Lutsenko, his thankless “pupil”, enjoyed tremendous popularity with voters. Besides, he did not want to burn the last bridges between him and the President who was against Lutsenko’s dismissal. Moreover, he knew that at least every third member of the Socialist faction was against making short work of Lutsenko.

Finally, Moroz decided that the Socialists would vote for the “Donetsk” version of the famine bill and contribute to Lutsenko’s dismissal in exchange for appointing “his man” to the vacated post of Interior Minister. He thought that the deal would be equal and fair.

The Donetsk clan had a different opinion on things. They reminded Moroz that his men already occupied more ministerial positions than the Socialist Party was entitled to – the Socialists had the posts of Transport Minister, Science and Education Minister, State Property Fund Chairperson, Energoatom President, etc. Moroz was supposed to return their “generosity” with “fruitful cooperation” but failed to pay his dues. Some members of the RP faction even accused him of separate contact with the presidential chancellery, saying that he was simply “throwing them over”.

There is no factual evidence of Moroz’s secret contact with the Yushchenko team or his deals with the RP, but there is abundant indirect proof.

The allies misunderstood each other. The Speaker gave up and got a bonus. He and the Socialist faction supported the President’s version of the bill that declared the 1932-1933 famine “an act of genocide”. He and the Socialist faction did not flog Interior Minister Lutsenko on Thursday. That was supposed to add a little polish to the paled icon of someone who might-have-been the moral leader of the nation.

Moreover, the fear that Moroz might again play his own game made the pragmatic members of the RP more tractable. After they failed to send Lutsenko packing, they accepted the terms of the cunning speaker. The result came immediately: Yanukovych nominated Vasyl Tsushko for the post of Interior Minister, and Vasyl Volga announced that the Socialist faction would vote unanimously for sacking Lutsenko. On Friday, Tsushko replaced Lutsenko. The whole procedure took less than ten minutes.

Volga is also going to get his piece of the pie: he is likely to become the new Minister of Emergency Management. If Moroz continues to cleverly alternate tractability and intractability, the number of Socialists in the government might well grow.

Quite a few authoritative members of the RP regret that Our Ukraine is not in the coalition. They believe that the “orange enemies” could have been the best partners. Besides, such an alliance would have kept Yushchenko’s hands tied. Rinat Akhmetov is still hoping for a RP-OU alliance and still trying to persuade Yushchenko. Many are helping him. Yanukovych seems reluctant to play a pointless game. Many agree with him. This difference only charges the atmosphere in the Donetsk camp.

Most RP players understand that the Socialists are far less reliable and the Communists are far less capable as partners than the pragmatic businessmen from OU. However, having no other allies but the Socialists and the Communists, they have to reckon with Moroz and Symonenko. There is no possibility to get rid of the Socialists or at least to keep their “ministerial appetite” down. Knowing that, they hope to enlist deserters from OU and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc. They did not conceal their joy when Tymoshenko said she was going to expel a score of “traitors” from her faction. However, even if they beef up their ranks with those turncoats, they cannot reformat the coalition or revise the established ministerial quotas. Such a scenario is fraught with serious complications – all the way up to a potential preterm election. Therefore, the RP is recruiting neophytes from the opposition camp just to minimize the influence of their Socialist and Communist allies, not to get rid of them.

The three allied political forces have to put up with one another, swallowing their pride and concealing their dislikes. They are simply doomed to coexist. OU might join in, but this idea has fewer and fewer supporters in both camps. Moroz is doing everything he can to prevent such a “reinforcement” of the coalition. He knows that in a “grand coalition” he might turn from the subject into an object, a target that many, especially the Communists, would like to hit.

The Ukrainian political game is on. Yanukovych and his team will stop at no cost, knowing that it is worth everything. How much is it going to cost the country? Is the coalition viable if it is held together by a fear of losing power and bonds of mistrust?

This article refers to the outcome of a poll conducted by the Institute of Political Analysis and Social Prognosis on Nov. 9-15, 2006 among 2,000 residents from every administrative region of Ukraine.