That Arsenii Yatseniuk has been nominated for foreign minister in the parliament did not come as a surprise to Zerkalo Nedeli. This newspaper had already made that prediction. But we must admit we had not altogether expected that Arseniy Yatseniuk’s nomination for the post of the country’s chief diplomat would be so impressively supported, as he was given 426 (!) ‘yah’ votes during Verkhovna Rada vote on Wednesday. This all happened a mere one day after the Anti-crisis Coalition refused, again, to approve Volodymyr Ohryzko for this post -- on the ground that he dares to speak Ukrainian (!) [during official meetings with guests from Moscow] and is firm in his intention to pursue the foreign policy course as identified by the Ukrainian law (!) – saying they would like to have a more experienced diplomat in such a responsible position. Therefore, as early as on Tuesday morning one could expect that the foreign minister’s approval saga would go on for many more days, thus contributing to the country’s already-deep internal political crisis.

But on Wednesday the Anti-crisis Coalition approved Arseniy Yatseniuk as foreign minister almost unanimously, even though he -- a native of Chernivtsi and speaking Ukrainian not only at work but in his everyday life as well – did not utter a single word in Russian while speaking from the Verkhovna Rada rostrum. Everyone seemed to forget altogether that it was Yatseniuk who had been behind a plot and resulting notorious scandal that might have disrupted the most recent US visit by Premier Yanukovych. Furthermore, the 32-year-old chief deputy head of President Yushchenko’s Secretariat has not worked a single day as diplomat, nor is he a diplomat by training. Instead, the Coalition and [deputy Speaker] Adam Martyniuk applauded every answer to all the questions they asked Yatseniuk as a nominee for foreign minister, praising his answers as being highly diplomatic. True enough, deputy Anna Herman of the Anti-crisis coalition still expressed doubt that Yatseniuk will perform as foreign minister as effectively as a representative “of the constellation of more experienced and brilliant diplomats that are here in Ukraine” would do, the more so as their names are well known and were proposed more than once by the Coalition.

As for another hopeful foreign minister, Oleksandr Chalyy, an experienced diplomat who has long dreamed of becoming foreign minister one day and has many more reasons for that than Yatseniuk, it was support for his nomination from the Coalition that has done him bad service and only contributed to Yushchenko’s doubt about his nomination, in addition to the not-very-favorable opinions the President heard about Chalyy from the people he is inclined to heed at times.

But it may well be that for Oleksandr Oleksandrovych Chalyy such a turn of events is all for the best, because being foreign minister in such turbulent times is difficult and may be dangerous for a further diplomtic career. On the one hand, the probability is high that he who may be appointed to the foreign minister’s office to defend the presidential course (that is often at variance with the Coalition’s interests) is set to be replaced very soon. On the other hand, Chalyy, as any other person with high ambitions, would like to achieve something in such a high post, whereas the Foreign Ministry has yet again fallen hostage to the internal political situation, its capabilities and influence decreasing from day to day.

We therefore have every sound reason to believe that Oleksandr Oleksandrovych is not very disappointed in his expectations, and he may even be happy that the President and the Coalition preferred someone else, especially since Yatseniuk’s departure from the Presidential Secretariat has given him a chance to strengthen his own position there.

But the one with the most reasons to be happy about this situation is the head of Yushchenko’s Secretariat, Viktor Baloha, who successfully farmed out to the building on Mykhailivska a presidential favorite who has had the same kind of access to the head of state as Baloha has himself.

No less pleased was of course President Yushchenko himself, who, as he believes, obtained as foreign minister a 100% man of his own, who furthermore is compatible with him psychologically, which has always been of particular importance for Yushchenko.

Wednesday was a victory day for the Anti-crisis Coalition as well, and also for [first deputy prime minister] Mykola Azarov who had lobbied hard for Yatseniuk’s nomination and previously had had successful experience working together with him, in the apparent hope that his further joint work with Yatseniuk as foreign minister will be equally successful. By approving Yatseniuk for the foreign minister’s office the Coalition killed at least three birds with one stone. First, as the most respected Coalition members believe, they once again managed to defeat the President – they said they would not tolerate either Tarasiuk or Ohryzko as foreign ministers, and they have accomplished their ends by voting for anyone but those two.

Second, in the opinion of Coalition members, by appointing Yatseniuk to head the Foreign Ministry they thereby deprived the Presidential Secretariat of its most competent economist (Oleksandr Shlapak is no less competent, but he does not enjoy the status as presidential favorite, which degrades his role to one of the rank-and-file). Moreover, when Arseniy Petrovych fixes himself in the office on Mykhailvska, he will hardly have much time left to devote himself to internal policy issues, as foreign minister’s daily work schedules are typically tight, allowing very little time even for the ministry’s routine matters. Thirdly and finally, a presidential man’s appointment to the foreign minister’s office will signal to the West (which has already begun to worry about what is going on in Ukraine) the Cabinet of Ministers’ readiness to go for compromises with Viktor Yushchenko.

Incidentally, Yatseniuk’s new appointment came as good news to the West as well, at least on the official level. This appointment has already been welcomed by NATO, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and by Javier Solana and Benita Ferrero-Waldner in person.

Russia might be less happy about that, as Yatseniuk enjoys a reputation as a pro-Western politician. Even so, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov sent him a letter of congratulations.

We would note for ourselves that having a reputation of being pro-Western does not at all mean having enough capabilities, persistence or will to firmly pursue the current foreign policy course, especially as the question “What kind of foreign policy course is minister Yatseniuk going to purse?” has remained unanswered thus far. Speaking on the Verkhovna Rada floor on Wednesday, Yatseniuk said that the foreign minister must pursue its foreign policy course as identified by the Ukrainian State, which is to be developed by the President “in constructive cooperation” with both the government and the parliamentary coalition. But this begs the question to which we would like to get an explicit answer: whose position is minister Yatseniuk going to defend as that of the State if the position of the government and the ruling coalition is at variance with the President’s? And will a foreign ministry headed by a man with a view like that be able to perform as an influential entity in a situation where there is “one more foreign ministry” on Hrushevskoho that is notorious for its willingness to ignore everything being done on Mykhailivska?

True enough, it is believed by some very optimistic men that with Yatseniuk’s coming to the foreign ministry a real chance will arise to revitalize the once effective triangle “Foreign Ministry-Presidential Secretariat-National Security and Defense Council” which worked effectively enough in the latter half of the 1990s. This possibility appears realistic enough, given the list of the politicians originating from one and the same root: Yatseniuk, Chalyy, and Haiduk.

It is hard for us to predict at this point how persistent Arseniy Yatseniuk is going to be in defending the presidential course and securing the country’s national interests, and how flexible and compromising he will be when entering the building on Hrushevskoho. For that matter it should be recalled that Arseniy Yatseniuk as Economy Minister adopted a very tough stance on both the Common Economic Space organization and, most remarkably, on RosUkrEnergo. And this is what distinguishes him from some members of Yulia Tymoshenko’s and Yuri Yekhanurov’s Cabinets (on Common Economic Space) and also some close presidential associates with a direct interest in RosUkrEnergo. We recall that it is Yatseniuk who should be given much credit for not allowing that entity to raise natural gas prices on Ukraine’s domestic consumption at will. So it may well happen that Mykola Azarov would find himself somewhat disappointed in his expectations concerning Yatseniuk.

But on the other hand, if Yanukovych, Azarov & Co are disappointed and displeased too often, it won’t be long before Arseniy Petrovych is replaced with someone more compromising (he himself said in a statement recently that Verkhovna Rada is within its rights to fire President-appointed ministers even if he disagrees).

But let’s return to Wednesday’s developments. That was a day for celebration for everyone except for those in the Foreign Ministry, even though they on Mykhailivska have long gotten tired of all the uncertainty that has continued since the end of last year. The long absence of a full-fledged foreign minister has had a negative impact not only on the country’s international image but on the effectiveness of the ministry’s everyday diplomatic work, too. It is hard to maintain normal business contacts with Ukrainian government agencies at a time when the foreign ministry is effectively isolated. It is hard to conduct a constructive dialogue with foreign partners when your vis-a-vis well knows that your country’s acting foreign minister does not enjoy support from the government, and the presidential influence is falling down from day to day. From this perspective, such a strong support for Yatseniuk’s nomination by parliament objectively adds to Ukraine’s reputation in the international arena. But the Foreign Ministry’s reaction to Yatseniuk’s appointment was that of restraint and caution, to put it mildly.

For some members of the diplomatic community Yatseniuk’s appointment came as a surprise but not a tragedy: they reacted calmly to the coming of the “carpetbagger”. Others took the appointment to the foreign minister’s post of a person with zero background in this field as kind of a shock and humiliation. The Foreign Ministry is a specific entity with a specific subculture. And it is not enough to be a bigheaded snoot or foreign-language-speaking intellectual to be considered a true diplomat. In a community where career path normally goes through each step of the hierarchic ladder and people work by the sweat of their brow for years to be moved up to the next rank or promoted to a higher-ranked office, an “alien” element is received with suspicion if not hostility.

Anxiety of some kind is also present at the Foreign Ministry, in that during the past two years medium- and top-level executives such as department heads, deputy ministers and ambassadors-at-large have all been appointed by Borys Tarasiuk, and are therefore taken a priori as the ex-minister’s placemen. Considering the most recent comments given by Borys Ivanovych on Yatseniuk’s possible nomination for foreign minister, the diplomats’ fears concerning possible personnel changes within the ministry are well-grounded and understandable. Even though almost all of the ambassadorial positions where the current Foreign Ministry leadership could be “exiled” are occupied already, nobody knows what the newly-appointed minister’s plans are as to personnel changes.

It may well be the case that the Foreign Ministry does need a “man from the outside” or some new blood to make the ministry’s work more effective and better optimized. Problems are legion in the Foreign Ministry’s work, particularly its institutional, staffing and financial aspects. But for old-timer diplomats who have spent half of their lives at negotiating tables and who well know all the tones (and also semitones) of the diplomatic language, the coming of a young minister with an unlimited assurance from Yatseniuk may be a problem, indeed. It is therefore evident that the newly-appointed minister will have to work long and hard with the Foreign Ministry before he is accepted by the diplomatic community as their chief diplomat. But if the new blood type is not compatible with the Ministry’s, the latter or the minister himself are in for an “anaphylactic collapse”.

Yatseniuk could well start with pay adjustments for employees of the central staff (as of today, salaries of diplomats in the attache status (bonuses not included) range between $140 and $180). But prior to this he should get into the elementaries of the diplomatic work as soon as possible to make up for the absence of an appropriate background. This implies not only mastering the art of negotiation but also widening his professional outlook, which in turn will help him identify the correct goals and achieve them using multipath approaches.

The new minister’s young age or lack of appropriate experience are no disgrace. Yatseniuk is widely considered to be a well-educated intellectual who learns easily. Furthermore, his knowledge of economics and jurisprudence may come in handy when the time comes to draw up a new framework agreement with the European Union, notably its provisions on the free-trade area. Ukrainian diplomats are all hopeful that the new minister would heed to the opinion of his older and more experienced colleagues to avoid unforgivable mistakes. The first statements to be made by the new foreign minister (one of the government officials entitled to speak on behalf of the State) will be given special attention, and he has to be as cautious as possible lest he should do harm to the State or himself.

But those who have communication experience with Yatseniuk on professional topics of various kinds point to other features of the new minister – too much confidence in his knowledge and professional skills and reluctance to heed expert opinions. This is what Borys Deitch of the Party of Regions faction was speaking about in parliament on Wednesday: “I hope you become a true minister. But you need first to shake off some defects in your character such as conceit, uppity and a proud stomach!” Deitch well knows what he says, as he was Yatseniuk’s “godfather” when he had just begun his career as a servant of the State. These words are particularly relevant with respect to the diplomatic community, where old-timers, if their professional pride is injured, are well in a position to set their chief up in such a sophisticated manner that it could go off without a hitch.

Those feeling sympathy with Yatseniuk maintain that he has come to the Foreign Ministry with ambitious plans that include recruiting young diplomats, making older ones sit up and optimizing the whole work there – in sum injecting some amount of drive into that conservative entity. But other voices can be heard saying that these plans will never translate into reality as the new minister is a poor manager and orchestrator, and unduly ambitious too. They recall that Yatseniuk, when coming to work with the Economy Ministry and the Presidential Secretariat, was expected to bring with him innovative bright ideas, and work for these ideas to become reality. But this has never happened…

It is doubtful that the new minister will succeed in filling the Foreign Ministry with young professionals (which it needs indeed). As far as we remember, at the beginning of 2005 the then-deputy Prime Minister for Eurointegration affairs, Oleh Rybachuk, was, as Yatseniuk is now, obsessed with plans to recruit young professionals with Western university degrees and speaking a few foreign languages. Some of the young professionals even answered his call. But they were cruelly disappointed, as none of the promises given by Rybachuk have ever been fulfilled. Will Yatseniuk have enough resources and financial capabilities to attract to his agency young, ambitious and well-educated men?

But the principal idea Yatseniuk is bringing to the Foreign Ministry is economization of foreign policy activities. Rumors have it that the first question he asks when discussing an issue of any kind is “Show me where the business is there.” The foreign policy economization idea is nothing new, as it had already been dallied with by the country’s senior leadership at the end of the 1990s. Some experts do believe that foreign policy economization should play a role, saying that the day of classic diplomacy is gone and the Foreign Ministry should work in close contact with the Economy Ministry, business circles and defense-industrial community members, and begin to think about energy security. (By transferring a great part of the energy dialogue to the level of commercial entities, the former head of the National JSC Naftogaz Ukrainy Ivchenko, followed by the current Fuel and Energy Minister Boiko, effectively ousted the Foreign Ministry from this sphere. Given Yatseniuk’s interest in and position on energy security issues, we expect that Mr. Boiko will soon face some problems with implementing his energy policy).

On the other hand, the good idea of foreign policy economization may never come true, as it is very unlikely that Yanukovych, Azarov and [newly-appointed Economy Minister] Kinakh would allow a sizeable part of the State economic cake to be nipped off by the young and quick foreign minister. In this context it will be very hard for Arseniy Yatseniuk to fulfill this idea of his, in particular to concentrate all foreign economic activities in the Foreign Ministry’s hands. But this is not the only problem. For the course towards foreign policy economization to be effective, not only work with diplomats is needful but also well-coordinated actions by special services, effective management of Ukrainian manufacturing companies, an integrated policy implementation by the government and effective support for the foreign minister’s actions on the part of the Cabinet of Ministers. And, finally, for this scenario to come true this country lacks an attractive environment and a decent enough international image.