At the time this issue of Zerkalo Nedeli went to press, a presidential decree dissolving the Verkhovna Rada and calling early parliamentary elections had not been issued. Furthermore, it was not clear at the time, how firm the head of state is in his intention to disband the current Rada, as President Yushchenko’s lack of consistency is famed in legends and funny stories. These particular features of the head of state’s personality added to the coalition members’ optimism and diminished the opposition’s hopes for early elections. The opposition camp’s worst expectations became even stronger after the 'Guardian of the Constitution' announced on Thursday that additional consultations are needed with the heads of each faction to discuss the situation in parliament, even though as early as at the start of the same week, he was convicted that roundtables should be discontinued as they had been “useless”, but, as always, he eventually changed his mind.

According to the original plan, the decree dissolving parliament and calling early elections was to be issued on Saturday, in response to petitions that were expected from the National Salvation Committee, the Nasha Ukraina party congress and, finally, from rally participants on Maidan on March 31. The text of the decree is said to have been ready for the president's signature on Wednesday, one day after the country’s top leader gave his consent to get involved in the risky game.

The key person in winning the chronically-hesitating head of state over to the side of those hoping to dissolve the Rada was, as expected, Yulia Tymoshenko, after the exodus from her own faction to the coalition. The goal of the Donbass elite-dominated coalition is apparent enough – they want to make up a constitutional majority of 300 plus one to have complete authority and to do whatever they want. The BYuT faction leader realized that this might well become a reality within weeks, if not days, and managed to convince the head of state the situation he might find himself in if the already rusty hatchet is not unburied today.

When law is no order and order is no law

The job of drawing up the presidential decree dissolving the legislature before the end of its term was most likely done by Tymoshenko’s lawyers, as no tracks were found of Pukshyn, Zvarych, Kliuchkovsky, Poludenyy or any other presidential lawyer being involved in drafting the document. If we are right, the draft decree was authored by parliament deputy Viktor Shvets of the BYuT faction.

Many were quick to call the draft of the decree -- which was first posted on the Obozrevatel (“observer”) website on Wednesday – a “forgery”. But we do not think so, as the document obtained by this newspaper is absolutely identical. It is hard to predict at this point whether the final document will be based on this version or not. But what is remarkable about this is that key provisions of the draft decree have been ventilated in public by Yushchenko during the past few days. From this fact alone, one cannot but infer that if the head of state does go for early parliamentary elections, he will say the main reason for it is violations of constitutional procedures the parliamentary majority allowed to make up the coalition.

As far as we know, the opposition was originally considering three scenarios for achieving its goal. The first was to block work in parliament so that it could not start plenary meetings for 30 days. If that scenario worked, the head of state would have had every reason to strip the deputies of their mandates early, on the strength of Sub-clause 3, Clause 2 of Article 90 of the Constitution. But this scenario was rejected by opponents of the regime from the very beginning as being the most unlikely and difficult to implement. According to the second scenario, the President was to have dissolved the Verkhovna Rada on the ground that the Cabinet of Ministers was formed in violation of the constitutional provision that allows a sixty-day period for the formation of the government. This plan was also turned down, as there is consensus among the lawyers’ community that this plot has little if any legal prospects.

Finally, the third scenario, which was eventually opted for, aims to dissolve the parliament on the ground that the pro-government majority was made up in violation of the constitutional provision stating that the coalition should be formed based on party factions rather than of individual lawmakers.

Why did they finally decide on this third scenario? We believe this is because of the morality factor, as this reason for dissolution was thought to be most understandable to the electorate. We dare to explain what we are talking about. The so-called Anti-crisis Coalition was formed on August 18 of last year by unifying parliamentary factions of the Party of Regions, the Socialist Party and the Communist Party. But the coalition also included six lawmakers -- Oleksandr Volkov and Volodymyr Zaplatynsky of Nasha Ukraina; and Oleksandr Borzykh, Volodymyr Zubyk, Mykhailo Zubets and Volodymyr Tolstenko of BYuT -- who got into parliament on the tickets of other political forces. We will speculate more later on whether this violates the Constitution or not. Here, let’s enlarge on the moral aspect. Departures from the ranks of the opposition are known to have assumed massive proportions by now, and each such case draws a reasonably angry reaction from the Nasha Ukraina and BYuT factions. This is what the idea was. The need to dissolve the Verkhovna Rada is explained to voters as a concern about the will they expressed in the elections, as massive defections from the opposition has changed the parliamentary balance in favor of the political forces that effectively lost the election to the combined pro-democracy team. A good reason therefore emerged: to speak about the results of the latest parliamentary campaign having been revised and distorted.

Following is an example of one of the arguments offered to voters. Anatoliy Kinakh, whose Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs campaigned as part of the Nasha Ukraina party bloc, was elected to parliament not by his personal supporters but those of Nasha Ukraina, which did not authorize him to switch its allegiance to another political force. The Constitution declares the people to be the only source of power in Ukraine, and in this particular case, the popular will was defied. So the President as the guardian of the Constitution must take measures to defend the will of the people.

Here is another argument. During the most recent elections, the Party of Regions garnered support from only one third of voters. But this political force, using illegal methods, has effectively grabbed control of two thirds of the legislature. This is nothing less than an unlawful seizure of power, which is strongly prohibited by the Constitution. The president as the guardian of the Constitution must exercise his power to defend the people’s rights and freedoms.

Such arguments were reasonably expected to ring a bell with voters because they are largely justified. We will talk about justice, morality and responsibility a bit later. Now, let’s return to the legal aspect of the problem.

The legal grounds for the need to dissolve the legislature were formulated using different words. The lawyers speaking for the opposition had to “squeeze” their proposed formulas into the “Procrustean Bed” of Clause 1 of Article 90 of the Constitution. In all sincerity, we cannot say that they were too successful. In our subjective opinion, if the President does put his signature under the decree disbanding the parliament, he will do so for reasons of political expediency rather than concern about strict compliance with law. For that reason, the majority of politicians supporting the idea of dissolving the Rada and calling early elections refer to the pending presidential decree not as a legal decision but rather political-legal one.

In this given case, the violation the coalition is charged with will be not the cause, but rather a reason for such a decision. But there are sound reasons to doubt that such violations did take place.

According to Article 90 of the Constitution, the President has the power to strip deputies of their mandate before the end of their term if “…a coalition of parliamentary factions is not formed in the Verkhovna Rada in compliance with Article 83 of the Constitution”. Article 83 says that “…in accordance with election results and based on a compromised political position, a coalition of factions will be made in the Verkhovna Rada, which will incorporate a majority of the Verkhovna Rada”. The parliamentary majority (originally named the “anti-crisis coalition” and later renamed as “the coalition of people’s unity”) was set up in August of last year, just to have its legitimacy called in question by the opposition and the President six months later.

It logically follows from their arguments that, if the Constitution talks about a coalition of factions, this cannot be formed in a way other than through unification of factions and, furthermore, in their full strength. Membership in the coalition by individual deputies that were elected on the party lists of political forces other than those making up the coalition is inadmissible, according to the Presidential Secretariat and the opposition members. But the arguments offered by the draft presidential decree and a memorandum accompanying it are, to put it mildly, very strange. One says that “…a deputy represents nothing more than his/her personal subjective political position”. If the opponents of [Prime Minister Viktor] Yanukovych and [Verkhovna Rada Speaker Oleksandr] Moroz are so concerned about compliance with the Constitution, they should have avoided using arguments like these, because, according to the Constitution, a deputy is not “a bearer of his/her personal subjective political position” but rather a mouthpiece of the people’s interests. During the election, the people delegated to their deputies the right to govern the country for five years. In countries with a majority and proportionate electoral systems, this right is delegated to deputies in a direct vote or through the support of a certain political force, respectively. Political parties or party blocs act as mediators between voters and their deputies, but not as dictators. This was the reason why the Venice Commission was so critical of the provision on “imperative mandate” in the Ukrainian Constitution. European lawyers believe that the imperative mandate makes deputies hostages to the will of their respective political parties, whereas the letter and spirit of the Fundamental Law gives legislators the status of “people’s deputies”.

This demonstrates that the chief goal of the authors of the draft presidential decree was not to protect the people’s interests. There is one more interesting nuance here. Since there is a constitutional provision (at least, as the authors of the draft decree interpret it) stipulating that a parliamentary coalition shall be made up of factions, supporters of the idea of early elections came to a highly controversial conclusion that the coalition must incorporate each member of respective parliamentary faction without exception. It therefore follows that refusal by at least one deputy to enter the coalition makes the entire coalition illegitimate.

The opposition maintains that the Constitution was violated because:

n Among the coalition, there are deputies that are not members of the Party of Regions, the Socialist Party or the Communist Party (main argument);

n The Socialist Party entered the coalition without all of its members, as deputies Vinsky and Harmash refused to join the majority (additional argument).

The conclusion is: since the Fundamental Law does not make provisions for deputies entering the coalition on an individual basis, Article 83 of the Constitution was violated, and the coalition is therefore illegitimate. According to Article 90 of the Constitution, this gives the President a good reason to disband the Rada and call early elections. Curiously enough, a memorandum accompanying the draft presidential decree says, referring to constitutional article 102, that the President ‘must’ dissolve the house before the end of its term, not ‘can’.

Let’s begin with the latter. Article 90 of the Constitution (which describes conditions for dissolving the Verkhovna Rada) sets down in black and white that “…the President has the right…”, so he can, but not must do so. There is no such word as ‘must’ in Constitutional Article 102 either, this article only defines the powers of the President as the head of state and the guardian of the state sovereignty, territorial integrity, the Constitution, human and civil rights, and freedoms.

Furthermore, the Constitution does not contain a single word saying that factions making up the coalition should be represented in full strength. The authors of the draft decree erroneously believe that each deputy of a certain parliamentary faction is nothing more than just an instrument for exercising the will of that given faction, which obviously goes against the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Deputies are free to maintain their own position and to vote as they think proper. The concept of “imperative mandate” is only outlined in the Constitution, and it is due to come into force after adoption of a respective law, which is not there thus far. More importantly, the ‘imperative mandate’ restricts only part of a deputy’s freedom. It does ban a deputy from going over to another faction or leaving a faction that brought him/her to parliament. But it gives parliamentary factions the right to expel deputies, and this right has been exercised on numerous occasions by, for example, the BYuT faction. The Constitution therefore lays down the institution of unaffiliated deputies, whom the Fundamental Law does not discriminate from parliament members affiliated with a deputy group in terms of the amount of their vested rights. On this simple ground alone, one should not call to question the right of individual deputies to enter a parliamentary coalition, neither should deputy groups be mandated to enter such coalitions in full strength (especially as there is not a single word in the Constitution about this).

In formal terms, the coalition was made up in compliance with the Constitution: 1) it was formed within the allowed timeframe; 2) it was formed by three parliamentary factions; 3) the strength of the coalition exceeds the legally established limit of 226 deputies. So any further speculation as to whether the coalition is legitimate or not should end there.

Concern about strict compliance with the Constitution and law (about which the President has talked so much recently) should have been welcomed. But it is not, at least for one simple reason - Viktor Yushchenko has already equaled with if not surpassed his predecessor Leonid Kuchma if you count how many times these two violated the Constitution and law. Stories of this kind are numerous, but let’s enlarge on one of the most recent and notorious ones. In line with a Supreme Court ruling (which is not subject to any appeal), President Yushchenko, whether he liked it or not, was to have restored Yevhen Zhovtiak as Kyiv Region Governor. Not only did the President refuse to comply with the court ruling, but he even displayed contempt for the decision by the top-level judicial authority by calling it “a show”. Why should we have belief in the honesty of the man whose approach to the rule of law is so selective?

Another reasonable question one could ask is why the President was so worried about constitutional violations in March 2007 but remained silent in July-August 2006. As mentioned above, at the time when the coalition was officially announced, it already incorporated deputies from factions other than the Party of Regions, the Socialist Party or the Communist Party. But this fact did not worry Yushchenko at the time. Moreover, by nominating Yanukovych for prime minister at the coalition’s request, the President himself legalized the coalition. Why didn't he accuse anybody of violating the Constitution then? The answer is evident: at that time, Yushchenko hoped to come to terms with the Party of Regions, but today there is nobody willing to come to terms with him.

But this is not the only question for the President to answer. If we are right, it was not the Party of Region (as is the common belief) but… Roman Zvarych of Nasha Ukraina who was the first to raise the issue of individual deputies’ membership in a parliamentary coalition. The reason is obvious, again: at that time Viktor Andriyovych sincerely believed that an ‘orange’ coalition would be there, and, just for security, intended to lure five or so deputies away from the opposite camp. Why was luring deputies away from rival factions admissible then but is interpreted as a constitutional violation now? Because at that time, the President hoped to enlarge his power, but now he attempts to at least retain what he still has remaining.

We would not deny that there are people among the opposition who are really concerned about the people’s wellbeing and sincerely believe an early parliamentary election to be the only possible way to rescue the budding democracy in this country. But we have few reasons to believe that President Yushchenko is one of these people. This is the man who until today has not acted as a true guardian of constitutional rights and liberties as he is supposed to; the man who uses almost every meeting with Prime Minister Yanukovych or Speaker Moroz to trade something they want for something or somebody for himself – whether it is a foreign minister, SBU chief or guarantees of immunity from prosecution for his closest associates suspected of being involved in dubious ‘business operations’. Conduct like this reveals his weakness, and for this reason (according to some sources) Yanukovych, after yet another round of useless and fruitless negotiations with the master of the building on Bankova, described Yushchenko as an “inapt negotiator”. This is why the Party of Regions’ elite is so convinced of its strength, and is not hesitating to apply it.

The opposition’s plan might fail or be rejected. In any case, the Party of Regions will only strengthen its power. How they might use that power is anyone’s guess. We have some suspicions already, and these do not inspire too much optimism. The developments in Kharkiv -- where some people were denied their constitutional right of freedom of assembly while others from among ‘their own’ were not – are seen by many as the first ‘alarm bell’. Afterward, the same situation took place in Kyiv, and this made the doom-and-gloom picture even more so.

We have already seen what kind of methods Yanukovych and his men are using to “maintain civil security and peace, and enforce the Constitution’, as those people are no better or worse than Yushchenko when it comes to doublethink. Rather, they are a bit better than Viktor Andriyovych, because the latter was violating laws in a hit-and-miss, if not stupid manner, while his opponents were strengthening their power with every passing day, using much more sophisticated and far-reaching techniques. The current political regime is increasingly reminiscent of the days of Kuchma’s presidency, as the use of law enforcement agencies for stamping out dissent and phobia of dissent are again becoming elements of State policies. The presence of numerous and strong opposition parties and of the president, good or bad and vested with the veto authority, is still working as sort of a deterrence force. But what will happen if this ‘bastille’ falls down?

The coalition has threatened that it would not comply with the presidential decree as “unconstitutional”. Meanwhile, it is only the Constitutional Court that can make decisions about whether a law is consistent with the Constitution or not. Deputy Mykhailo Chechetov of the Party of Regions accuses the President of interpreting provisions of the Constitution at his own convenience, saying the latter should have waited until the Constitutional Court brings its verdict before beginning to speculate about constitutional violations or threatening to dissolve the parliament. We dare not agree.

Yushchenko, if he comes to it and disbands parliament, will not interpret a respective provision of the Fundamental Law but rather apply it, and his opponents will have the right to contest such a decision in Constitutional Court. As for Mr. Chechetov, he would be well advised to recall how the Law on the Cabinet of Ministers was adopted, notably its provisions that apparently run counter to the Fundamental Law and were contested in the Constitutional Court. But the coalition was not about to wait for a Constitutional Court decision, having brought into force the document which has effectively changed the system of power distribution among government agencies. Meanwhile, Justice Minister Serhiy Lavrynovych – when asked if they should better have waited until the Constitutional Court has its say – said something like “this is our right”, adding that, if the court finds some individual provisions or the entire law to be unconstitutional, the coalition will obey. Why is the same right of the President being denied by Mr. Chechetov and his bosses?

The Party of Regions is crying about law and morality as loudly as the President is. But which law and what kind of morality allow them to buy deputies to reinforce the coalition?

The ‘orange’ team has done nothing to defend the tenuous budding of democracy. And there is no good reason to believe that they have learned any lessons from the mistakes and defeats they suffered during the past two years. The determination they display in fighting the Party of Regions does not spell anything but the striving of some people to retain what has remained of their once wide-ranging powers and the desire of other people to come back to power.

The new authorities have never made secret of their desire to scrap anything the Orange Revolution achieved. And they seem to have enough resolve to eliminate everything they do not accept or like.

Those that care about whether this country remains democratic do not rely on another Maidan [or Orange Revolution] as the only way to salvation. But is this new Maidan possible, and whom, or, rather, why should people support it, again?

What happened between the end of 2004 and the start of 2005 was a remarkable phenomenon, indeed. But what is planned for today is sheer technology. Popular support at that time rested on the people’s faith that the morrow will be bright. What they are offering us now is to provide support for ‘men of yesterday’ that are fighting with other ‘men of yesterday’. This is the difference the sponsors of a fresh revolution do not see or do not want to see, and this is the difference the current authorities are abusing. But the trouble is that everyone who will have to choose between taking or not taking to the streets must realize that the fruits of this ‘combat in high spheres’ – no matter which color wins – will be all ours. Whether society will have its effective say in this situation remains to be seen. But the President must have his say. Which say it will be? There are three probable scenarios, and we will consider each of them here.

1. If the President does not sign

the decree on dissolving parliament

Supposing, Viktor Yushchenko does not sign the decree on dissolving parliament, being aware of the questionable legitimacy of such a decision; unsure that he has enough real power to ensure its implementation; comprehending the open physical confrontation that might emerge if the ruling coalition ignores his decree; uncertain about the new parliament’s qualitative configuration; heeding Europe’s worry expressed in Javier Solana’s phone call; getting Viktor Yanukovych’s assurances that parliament would vote for any candidate to the post of Security Service Chief nominated by Yushchenko, that the coalition would accept no more renegades from opposition factions, and that the Prosecutor General Office would forget about charges brought against certain men in Yushchenko’s entourage; and considering the apathy and disillusionment among the “orange” electorate.

If Yushchenko does not sign the decree, his popularity rating will stay at the same low level in Eastern Ukraine and will drop significantly in Western Ukraine. Then, the pro-presidential Our Ukraine bloc is likely to split: one part of its members and supporters will side with Yulia Tymoshenko and the other will crawl under the wing of the pro-government coalition.

Yushchenko feels that this is his last chance. Of course, he could raise the preterm election issue later, but one thing is clear: in August 2006 the chance was possible; in March 2007 it is still possible, in theory; but his third cry “Wolf! Wolf!” would sound ridiculous – because his only trump card would be utterly devalued. Moreover, the coalition majority would beef up its ranks even faster: firstly, because the President would have to side with it as having failed to justify the opposition’s trust; secondly, the army of volunteers and mercenaries might just as well vote together with the majority, even though staying in the opposition formally. It is like a common-law marriage: the same functions, only without the stamp in the passport.

What does the formation of a constitutional majority in the Ukrainian parliament give Prime Minister Yanukovych?

First, he builds a closed cycle of power. Actually, it is already working in the financial and energy sectors – free from public control. Unlike the “orange” leaders who stood at the helm for eighteen months, the “white-and-blue” team has rigid discipline, a stable majority in parliament, confident positions in the Constitutional Court, and full control over law enforcement, tax bodies, and the government. Naturally, Yanukovych & Co feel assured and safe – they have won the battle for power. The only thing that still mars their joy is the President’s right to veto bills passed by the pro-government majority. How can they prevent him from derailing the government’s wheels? – By letting Yushchenko fly his kite – the notorious Art Arsenal museum project, NATO, or even foreign policy. Seeing that his initial plan did not work, Yanukovych decided to take the bull by another horn: he began to beef up the majority. With 300 votes in parliament he would not have to reckon with Yushchenko and could do almost anything in this country: change the rules for business and courts; staff courts and replace prosecutors; redistribute property exclusively on his own terms; revise the Constitution and the foreign political course; and rebuild the system of central and local government at his discretion. Then, of course, nobody except the opposition and the public would stand in the way as the President would be de facto stripped of his last powers.

Yanukovych has spent eight months wrestling for power and marking his territory. Now that he has it all, it is unclear how he is going to use it.

On one hand, he has restored decision-making and executive discipline. At the same time, he sees that not all the men he recruited for war are fit for work in peace. His team is evidently short of think tanks, so he turns to Western experts for assistance in drafting and implementing reform programs. Yanukovych is beginning to feel his responsibility for the country and its interests. He wants to demonstrate his capability and maintain good relations with the West and Russia.

On the other hand, Yanukovych is evidently bent on centralization of power. He is building a new dictatorship: law enforcement chiefs are ready to lash out at anyone that might pose any threat to it; arbitrariness reigns in the privatization sphere; taxes are bearing down ever harder on mid-size businesses; exporters only laugh at the term “VAT reimbursement”…

These are only general impressions. Those who know what’s what inside the kitchen are tight-lipped as long as they have something to lose…

A constitutional majority in parliament would allow Yanukovych to control domestic and foreign policies. Now it is up to Yushchenko to decide whether to get involved and up to Yanukovych to decide how far to let Yushchenko in.

Second, Yanukovych needs a constitutional majority to expand his room for maneuvering – both outside and inside the coalition. 300 votes would untie his hands, securing the adoption of bills the Communists or the Socialists object to. Rinat Akhmetov’s 70 votes would also lose their critical value. Akhmetov did not need a war with Yushchenko, but Yanukovych ignored that. Akhmetov did not want to see this country ruled by a man vested with Kuchma’s powers, but he is going to see it. Akhmetov’s men never made it to the top of the ladder and will hardly get there. Perhaps, that is why Akhmetov is calm about the possibility of an early election, knowing that he will hardly lose anything. And Yanukovych has apprehensions.

Yushchenko’s refusal to dissolve parliament puts the opposition into trouble, leaving Yulia Tymoshenko with shrinking electoral support. The orange leaders’ chronic unwillingness to set and keep rules for the political game leaves them without financial backing from business circles that sided with them before. Their obvious inability to achieve goals leaves them without attention from the West that is seeking contacts with the real movers and shakers in this country. Once the structured opposition in parliament breaks up, the same will inevitably happen to opposition organizations across the country. Representatives of the opposition will be finally ousted from local self-governments.

The opposition needs time, a lot of effort, and favorable circumstances to enlist new supporters and raise new leaders. The ruling coalition is doing everything possible to prevent such circumstances.

There might be a more favorable scenario. If the President acts the hard way and his opponents act reasonably, the sides might reach an amicable agreement. Yushchenko could abandon the idea of dissolving parliament in exchange for enacting the imperative mandate bill and expelling non-partisan MPs from the coalition. Thus, he would save his face, the parliamentary opposition, and Tymoshenko’s political future. The latter poses a certain threat to Yushchenko and a lethal threat to Yanukovych & Co. It might be even more important to them to take levers of political influence away from Tymoshenko than to placate Yushchenko.

By leaving his decree unsigned, Yushchenko would give the green light to domestic and foreign policies that are totally obscure to him – they might be consistent, effective, and beneficial for the country, or disastrous to all democratic gains. Yet, no matter what Yushchenko decides, this situation shows how dangerous it is to vote for personalities.

2. If the President dissolves the parliament

but it refuses to comply

Many in both camps view this scenario as the most likely. This scenario is fraught with bloodshed. The coalition’s lawyers have prepared an inquiry to the Constitutional Court and are ready to send it right after Yushchenko signs his decree on the parliament’s dissolution. No one in the Yanukovych camp doubts that the CC will invalidate the decree. Besides, any citizen can challenge it in any local court. The government might also reinforce the guard at administrative buildings, including the presidential office.

Both camps brandish their swords, looking cautiously to the army. Yushchenko relies on the Security Service, and Yanukovych relies on the police. However, there are quite a few intelligence officers who remember how unjustly Yushchenko treated them, and there are quite a few police officers who do not want to assume the responsibility for the actions of the government that might as well change. Such sentiments among the top and especially middle-rank officers in both camps might change the plans of the “hawks”.

The word “blood” keeps sounding in both political camps. The ruling coalition and the opposition keep accusing each other of plotting provocations that can lead to casualties. And the louder it sounds, the higher the probability. In fact, everyone fears bloodshed, and that is what makes the President and the Prime Minister keep negotiating.

If parliament and the government refuse to comply with the presidential decree, there might not only be physical casualties. Their refusal might totally annihilate the institute of presidency in Ukraine and open a Pandora’s Box of legal nihilism. The President has no power to coerce the coalition to comply with his decree. If parliament continues its sessions and the Finance Ministry gives no money for a preterm election, pro-government forces might form a constitutional majority without Yushchenko’s blessing. Then, confrontation might finally lead to the abolishment of the institute of presidency in September (the relevant amendments to the Constitution require 226 votes now and 300 votes in September) and to imminent hard reprisals against the opposition.

In case either side resorts to force, local conflicts might turn into large-scale confrontation and latent animosity into open hatred. Subsequently, the country could be divided de jure. Some politicians on both sides of the barricades even view such a scenario as inevitable – with or without an early election…

At present, key political players have strong bastions of electoral support, but neither is large enough. The popularity ratings of Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, and Yanukovych are just the light of dead stars. They could shine again only if the people see tangible results of hard work or feel the physical impact of confrontation. Representatives of the coalition are right in saying that passions are being fanned artificially: the people are grumbling, but they are well below the boiling point; besides, they see no trustworthy leaders to follow. Representatives of the opposition are right, too, warning that the formation of an obedient constitutional majority through revising election outcomes is a serious threat to Ukraine’s economy, independence and democracy. Open confrontation is not a solution: it will be fatal for the defeated, and the usurpation of power by the winners might well be the fulfillment of their last wish before their political execution in the next election.

3. If the coalition agrees to an early election

Last week, the leaders of almost all coalition allies were told “to be ready” for an early election. According to some sources, local organizations got an order “to get ready” on Friday. The Regions Party, as a well-organized and disciplined political force, thought it best to confront any turn of events. No one in Yanukovych’s close entourage supports the idea of a preterm election, but quite a few members of the Regions Party presume it.

The Communists, in theory, ought to be for an early election, since the latest opinion polls show their growing popularity. Probably Yanukovych’s radical supporters, who expected a quick return to communism and his active anti-West position, are returning to their original pro-communist positions. The Socialists, including their leader Olexandr Moroz, ought to feel alarmed, understanding that their voters are straggling out to join Lutsenko, Tymoshenko, and the RP.

RP think tanks are sure that by mobilizing the electoral and financial resources and using their control over the executive branch, the party can collect even more votes than in the 2006 election and form an even stronger coalition together with old and new satellites.

Yulia Tymoshenko is no less confident. She does not seem to care that up to fifty percent of voters in the western regions are undecided: all she needs is a sufficient voter turnout on election day. She has every reason to expect that they will not vote for the coalition parties. She hopes to collect at least as many votes as the RP does and to form a majority alliance with Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine and Lutsenko’s Popular Self-Defense.

The orange forces are unlikely to run for parliament as one. However, if they present a transparent action plan and manage to convince their potential voters that there will be no repetition of last spring’s tragic clownery, they might well succeed.

In theory, an early election could change the parliament’s political configuration and the color of the majority. The question is whether today’s political elite are able to change their priorities, habits and methods. There is no answer so far.

Of course, it is impossible to change the imperfect election law overnight, but the leaders and their teams should learn some lessons. Who will fill the spaces in the ranks of the Tymoshenko Bloc left by deserters – loyal “button-pushers” or new intelligent and capable politicians? Nearly a year ago, Tymoshenko announced a new political project named “Ideal Country” and aimed at enlisting non-partisan professionals. It would be good if that project were not just another promo action of hers.

Of course, Our Ukraine is going to clean up its ranks, too. The problem is, once those Yushchenko wants to get rid of leave the bloc, it will have no think tanks; if they stay, the voters will hardly support it. OU may try to invite a few well-known figures, but there are two obstacles.

First, if Yushchenko decides to play this all-or-nothing game, he will try to get as many important people as possible on his election roll, but voters might object to such a “motley crew”.

Second, most “pro-orange” figures are more inclined to support the Lutsenko project: his Popular Self-Defense looks more attractive, proactive, and creative, and the burden of collective responsibility for mistakes is not so heavy there.

The RP election roll will change as well: Yanukovych will put more people on it capable of working at responsible executive and legislative positions, not just pushing buttons. Akhmetov will simply have no time to launch his own project.

The biggest problem, however, is technical. Once the Central Election Committee announces a preterm election, it will only have two months to organize it. Of course, there will be heaps of lawsuits, complaints and heart attacks. CEC Chairman Yaroslav Davydovych has repeatedly warned about numerous and almost insurmountable technical and procedural difficulties.

Thus, a preterm parliamentary election gives the RP a chance to retain power and the Tymoshenko Bloc – to get hold of it; it can let some fresh air into the stale atmosphere of closed election rolls; it might debar the power-thirsty from usurping power; it is yet another opportunity for the people to confirm or deny their trust in this or that political force; and it might become a kind of litmus paper, showing whether the democratic changes in Ukraine are really “irreversible”, as Yushchenko described them.