The publication of Mykola AZAROV’s interview in full would have taken several pages as our conversation with the former Vice Prime Minister lasted over two hours. So the material below represents an abridged version of the talk, which did not go off smoothly from the outset: in our previous publications we have often argued with Mr. Azarov, disagreeing on too many matters. Consequently, this interview kept running astray and we had to check ourselves to avoid endless discussions. It is now up to our readers to decide whether to accept Mr. Azarov’s opinion.

— Mr. Azarov, let us start with something optimistic, just for a change. There must be some positive processes underway in Ukraine…

— A good thing is that the national economy is still alive and operational. It is not growing as rapidly as one would wish, it is true. It is also true that it is using the development momentum gained in the past. Yet it is going on…

— Do you think the momentum will last? Can the recent challenges to bank liquidity and decreased hryvna lending by some of the largest banks be interpreted as a portent of a slow-down in economic growth?

— Exactly. Everyone speaks about inflation today because it is felt straight away, its effect is immediate. However few have noticed grave problems with bank lending, although the government should put these issues at the top of its agenda.

Current economic performance results from what we launched about eighteen months ago. The dynamics continue but urgent measures are needed right now to preserve it in the future.

The national bank has returned to the two-digit discount rate that we had only in the most critical times. In 2003, for the first time in Ukraine’s history, we managed to lower it to under 10%,; now it has increased to 12%. Thus, commercial loans will cost at least 16%-20%, which, in turn, makes long-term investment unprofitable. The trends you mentioned are signals of the government’s wrong economic policy that caters to immediate needs of the population and does not take long-term interests into account.

— Speaking of long-term investments, does it make sense to invest, given the current inflation rate?

— No it doesn’t. Yet only a small group of experts – bankers, business leaders – appreciate the full scope of the problem. Listen to our politicians, MPs, governmental officials – they avoid commenting on this topic. Yet they play with the Hryvna with childish simplicity and carelessness!

— In your opinion, why did the Hryvna revaluation go unheeded? In 2005 such processes caused strong public reactions.

— A whole mass of scandals and conflicts are stirred up every day, and the people are disoriented. It does not mean, however, that people can be fooled. Everyone in possession of several thousand dollars is wondering if they should go on keeping their savings in dollars.

We speak a lot about the compensation for the lost Soviet-era bank deposits. It was a leitmotif of Tymoshenko’s election campaign, which yielded a very good result. Understandably, people wanted these deposits back, so they were most responsive to the election slogans. What happened eventually? Each of them got back their one thousand hryvnas but lost much more over the four months of rampant inflation.

— Don’t you think your government must share the blame for current inflation attributable, in part, to the heritage you left behind?

— I will comment later on our heritage and on what this government could have done within the five months in office. I would like to return to the topic that troubles me most. At present, bank deposits of the population amount to 100 billion in Ukrainian hryvna and another 70 billion denominated in foreign currency. This huge amount of money can have an adverse impact on the situation in the country, especially if people cease to trust banks and start massively converting one currency into another…

— Matches, salt, groats?

— I wish it were matches, salt and groats… We will have to buy imported goods! If our economy was prepared for that, the soaring consumer demand would be welcome. Yet the problem is that Ukrainian-made goods account for as little as 1% in the structure of consumption.

— Is it so? Aren’t you exaggerating?

— I am not. Goods of Ukrainian make are in short supply – look at what you and I are wearing at the moment. The state budget revenues come from import. It is unthinkable that the revenues from customs duty surpass those from taxes inside the country. Nowhere in the world will you find such a practice!

— According to the government officials, it is the result of import de-shadowing and overcoming illegal import schemes, which, allegedly, prevailed under Mykola Azarov…

— I would not even comment on it. I am certain that the incumbent government is not doing what it should under the circumstances. Do I have the right to judge them? I think so. When I was in charge of economy, in various capacities, the situation was much better, investment projects were implemented.

Two nuclear power generating units were constructed when we were in office. Our government takes credit for building the “Kyiv-Odessa” highway, albeit often criticized for being of insufficient quality. We started to build bridges across the Dnipro in Kyiv. Had we stayed in power they would have been commissioned long ago.

These are not items in the election programme. I am telling you what we did and what brought positive tangible results; what I conceived and experienced. I made different plans for 2008. I made them back in February 2007, rather than in December. The forest draft budget for 2008 was ready in June. It provided for serious investment projects. I do not see anything like that in the current budget.

— Viktor Pynzenyk claimed on various occasions that those investment projects were corrupt. Didn’t your government discredit the very idea of increasing investment expenditures of the state budget? Is Mr. Pynzenyk wrong?

— He is totally wrong. Corruption is the topic of the day but give me at least one example of a corruption-related project. The procedure for evaluating proposed investment projects was open. Among bidders were the National Academy of Sciences, branch institutes, various committees and commissions, MPs. Show me where the potential for corruption lies!

Perhaps corruption exists everywhere at all times. However, we should not liquidate investments programmes under the anti-corruption pretext. When in the XX century Italy was building a railroad network, I think there was room for kickbacks, money laundering and corruption schemes. Yet the railroads are there to operate for decades to come and improve people’s lives. We speak of corruption a lot but to no avail: there no more railroads, nor is there less corruption.

My understanding is that there are special state authorities in charge of combating corruption. My task as a head of the economic block in the government was to set priorities in innovational-investment development and mobilize the necessary resources.

Ukraine will not make a breakthrough even if it produces twice as much grain, meat or steel, because it will still be producing less per capita than in the leading developed economies. We need to catch up with them at the expense of a totally new quality of economic development, which is impossible without investments. Say, 20%-30% of funds will be embezzled (which is a problem for the state, and competent authorities should address it), but 70% of funds will be used for effective production.

There were a lot of discussions about free economic areas, priority development areas, technical parks… They cancelled all those projects as prone to corruption and shady scheming. Yet they did not prosecute any corrupt managers, suppliers, contractors, etc; did not investigate even one case of corruption.

The world knows of no other mechanisms for accelerated economic development than those mentioned above. Not a single developing country – China, Indonesia and Singapore – managed to speed up their economic growth without creating priority areas.

— You are speaking about priorities. Why didn’t the Yanukovych government ever produce an action programme to set such clear priorities?

— We formed the government on 4 August 2006. I will not tell you what we got from our predecessors: total misbalance in finance and budget spheres, gas and electricity arrears, need to raise tariffs. I am sure the new government will face similar challenges. She will quit now and somebody else will have to…

— Have you got reliable information that an early dismissal of Tymoshenko’s government is inevitable?

— No, I haven’t! Frankly speaking, I do not care. Yet the Prime Minister’s behaviour is indicative of her desire to leave and slam the door behind her. And the situation will be identical to what we received from them in 2006. There will be even more chaos, more uncertainty in relations between the president, government and Parliament. The coalition will be less stable because of the upcoming presidential elections of 2009. You should also keep in mind that the world economy has notably deteriorated since 2006.

Why didn’t we manage to have the action programme adopted? For one thing, there was a four-month anti-crisis programme, which we implemented by the end of 2006. At our first Cabinet meeting on 4 August we had to address the most pressing issues, like getting ready for the winter season, debts for power supplies, budget deficit, i.e. we had to overcome the crisis.

— Put differently, you were overwhelmed with dull routine. Ukrainian governments have been giving this excuse for seventeen years now…

— We were not overwhelmed. We started developing the programme. It was drafted by February, a good, consistent programme. We planned to finalize it in cooperation with the McKenzie Company consultants but in March the parliamentary crisis erupted and on 2 April the President signed a decree dissolving the Supreme Rada. So our government became provisional.

We were prepared to work for five years but the snap elections forced us to switch from an economic strategy to electoral one. Had we had an opportunity to pursue the policy we developed for 2007, inflation would have been around 7%, and economic growth rate – not less than 9%-11%.

I told Viktor Yushchenko: “This decision of yours will throw Ukraine back, at least for five years.” Nobody believed me: “The decree is signed, inflation indices in April are normal”. Of course, they were because the April inflation index was formed three months earlier.

— In the same vein, Yuliya Tymoshenko can now justify her lack of success due to an non-operational Parliament and, thus, with the impossibility to replace ineffective public managers and to adopt badly needed laws.

— Yes but they have their coalition, at least on paper. What we had, instead, was the decree on Parliament dissolution.

— Didn’t you provoke the President to make this step by announcing your plans to from a constitutional majority? You procrastinated with the programme drafting for seven months but you were very fast in planting your people in key positions. Now you are censuring Tymoshenko who is just following your suit…

— You can say whatever you want but experts, including political analysts, should be carefully monitoring politicians’ statements for lies. What can Yuliya Tymoshenko accuse us of? We left behind UAH 24 billion in the State Treasury, bequeathed it to her government. There was a sufficient grain reserve, five annual supplies of vegetable oil in the state reserve. In 2005, when the gas price was USD 45 per 1000 cubic meters, who made her terminate the gas agreements with GASPROM?

— What about the UAH 30 billion hole in the budget cited by the incumbent Finance Minister?

— How did that hole appear? You are experts, find it out.

We spent monthly about UAH 9 billion from our treasury account. So the new government could not possibly get a UAH 30 billion debt as they claim. Who made them pay in advance? No one did.

— He meant the debt arising from pension payments the Yanukovych government made in September, whereas the resource was available only till 1 January 2005…

— Nonsense again. The decision to raise pensions was made in July, not in September. And it was totally financed for 2004. Now, looking at 2005, we intended to win the elections, not to lose them. I was going to stay in charge of the economic block. Could I afford a hole of UAH 30 billion? Of course not.. So the 2005 budget, which I presented to the Rada in December 2004 and which was adopted by the revolutionary parliament and signed by Kuchma, did not have the UAH 30 billion deficit. It is mere propaganda.

What sort of Finance Minister is he who announces a deficit of UAH 30 billion at the beginning of the year? What will investors, bankers, economists think?

In December 2007, I met with the major creditors of the NJSC NAFTOGAS UKRAINY. At first, as a Finance Minister of the outgoing government I declined the invitation. Yet Yuliya Tymoshenko declared to the entire world that NAFTOGAS was on the verge of default and the worried creditors flocked to Kyiv.

Arseniy Yatseniuk (who had been elected as a Supreme Rada Speaker by that time) was present at the meeting, alongside 12 investors, when they asked me: “Is it true that default is unavoidable?” I answered: “I do not know where I’ll be working tomorrow but no Finance Minister of any country will let the leading national oil-and-gas company go bankrupt.”

I might not know every detail of the NAFTOGAS financial situation but if there is a gap of, say, UAH 2-4 billion I will always be able to fill it in with the available budget resources. The national financial system that currently spends about UAH 14 billion per month should have at least a two-month funding reserves to finance any emergency costs.

Four months have passed, and now no one even mentions the default or the company’s bankruptcy. However, the scandal did take place, and the investors had a nasty experience, after which they will hardly ever risk to deal with this company.

The incumbent government’s methodology is to provoke scandals. This methodology, this kind of policy will tarnish Ukraine’s image and make it unattractive for investors.

— You said in 2007 that the Cabinet of Ministers operated as a provisional government. Why were your anti-inflation measures so ineffective? Why are Ukrainian governments so keen on administrative leverage? You threatened the vegetable oil manufacturers with quotas and limited grain exports. The incumbent Cabinet of Ministers has not come up with any innovative ideas. As a result, the government fails to curb inflation but places excessive burden on agriculture, depressed as it is…

— The issue of agricultural development is so huge and multidimensional that it cannot be either resolves or aggravated with banning grain export or introducing quotas. Why does any government find itself between the rock and a hard place when it comes to agricultural policy? Because of the frequent changes of government, it operates under the pressure of perpetual elections, re-elections, pre-term dismissals, etc.

It is my firm belief that Ukraine needs a government of technically cognizant ministers, professionals in their respective sectors who would get a mandate for at least ten years. The other branches of power should be preoccupied with the judicial or constitutional reform, while the government should be focused entirely on economic policy.

What is the main problem of the Ukrainian agro-industrial complex? It is not quotas – it is the final WTO accession, which will open our borders to competitors. What issues are there on the agenda? First, land and land reform. Second, who is going to till land. Third, investments. Fourth, machinery and equipment. Fifth, modern technologies. Sixth, grain and seed quality.

All of it was there in the Yanukovych government’s programme that we didn’t’t have time to publicize. It specifies timeframes and resources. It is true, the programme implementation will take seven to ten years, after which Ukrainian agro-industrial complex will change beyond recognition.

Another important factor is sound foreign economic policy: a painstaking search for new markets, and a reasonable division of labour. Again, it was envisioned in the programme, which, I would like to reiterate emphatically, needs time for proper execution uninterrupted by snap elections.

And look at who wins the elections – the populists. Campaign pledges force every new government to make populist decisions. It is akin to alcohol addiction: the dose gets larger, the frequency increases. Some politicians hope that later there will be time to correct mistakes and undo the harm to the national economy. For example, they promise a wholly professional armed force and win the elections. OK, they’d better forget all about it when they come to power and focus on economy. What do we have instead – yet another snap election.

— What is the way out?

— The key task of the present-day elite (which for me is not equivalent to top political leaders) is to stop arguing, start thinking and realize the need for structural reforms. They should understand that these reforms will require sacrifice on the part on the wealthy and the needy alike; that all national potential will have to be gathered together; that all actors will have to work hard. The job of the government is to ensure that the rich shoulder more burden of the sacrifice. Yet the burden should not be too heavy, in order to not discourage them to support reforms. The government should also make sure that those who have nothing to sacrifice are least affected.

— Mr. Azarov, when you were Vice Prime Minister and when you headed the government, structural reforms were much spoken about. However, since 2000 nothing has been done to launch them.

— People are forgetful. How did 2003 start? Of course, you do not remember. We began with the pension reform. We passed a law to introduce pension differentiation.

— And then the 2004 elections disrupted it all. Later there was an attempt to establish some opaque non-state pension fund for the employees of budget-funded institutions…

— You are right in that elections disrupt everything in Ukraine. Yet in European countries, the non-state pension funds account for more than 60% of pension benefits.

It is another story worth a separate interview. You ask why we didn’t carry out the necessary structural reforms – we only had one year to do so, 2003. In 2004 the presidential elections were held. What government could launch reforms under such circumstances?

Your question about the administrative itch characteristic of all governments is apt. They all want to cut down prices here and now. How can they do it? The only realistic way is by boosting the supply of goods and products, by managing industry in an effective and efficient way, by encouraging cattle-breeders to produce more meat. It is all time-consuming but, as you know, Ukrainian governments do not have time.

Frankly speaking, though, the situation in 2003 was not conducive to reforms: it was a year of drought when we lost a large part of the crop having exported a lot of grain in the previous year. We had to guarantee the country’s food security. Some theorists claimed the market would regulate it without governmental intervention. I said: “It will but the price of bread will rocket from one hryvna to four, with the average pension of UAH 132!” Therefore those who upbraid us for administrative methods of management (which is a correct criticism per se) should bear in mind the environment in which we worked.

How can the ban for exporting vegetable-oil be substantiated today, in 2008?

— Wasn’t it your idea to introduce it…

— Do you mean to say I introduced it?

— You didn’t because Kinakh reached an agreement with the manufacturers…

— Because I invited their association representatives and told them: “Look, guys, your trade markup is 50%-60%. Please, cut it down to 10%-20%; otherwise I will have to forbid the seed-oil export.” I would have never have actually done it, of course, because the oil production exceeds domestic market demand many times over. However the seed-oil manufacturers, well aware of my temperament, believed I would.

Yet did our government pass any resolution to ban vegetable oil export? It did not. The Tymoshenko government did.

Another important point for understanding the current inflation mechanism: some experts say the “notorious” thousand hryvna of returned deposits could not possibly cause rapid inflation as it is peanuts compared with the present commodity turnover.

Imagine loaded scales in balance. How much does it take to disturb the balance? Sometimes a milligram suffices to upset the entire system. That is precisely what the January payments did. On the one hand Tymoshenko is right: inflation rates in December-January were high. What should one do to improve the situation: go on adding to the system or try to restore the balance?

When the decision was made to continue loading the system, I understood the government did not mean to stay long. As I said, we designed a set of anti-inflation measures and started implementing them in the autumn. In order to accomplish the task, the Rada should have adopted the budget we prepared as it was, without any changes. It was of an anti-inflation character and would have brought inflation under control within the first half of 2008. How was my budget different from the one adopted in late December? It did not provide for the repayment of lost deposits, which proved to be the proverbial last straw.

— Mr. Azarov, if the only difference between your budget and that of the Tymoshenko government was the absence of compensations, your budget would not have curbed inflation, either. For instance, according to the NBU Quarterly Monetary Review, one of the inflation drivers was the 50% increase in salaries in the budget-funded sphere…

— I have my own opinion different from that of the National Bank. The three main inflation drivers, apart from the monetary and budget expenditure factors, include the so-called “inflation expectations”, or speculative factor.

If I am a market vendor and I know that consumers have received an additional thousand hryvnas each, why should I keep the meat price at UAH 30 as before? I’d raise it to UAH 35. People buy it. Well, I can raise the price to UAH 40 tomorrow, even though the government frowns…

I am not saying the compensation of lost deposits was unfair. We were not any sillier or less compassionate than the Tymoshenko team. We also thought of possible ways to compensate the people for lost savings. We thought a lot about it. Back in 1996, I championed the draft law on repayment of UAH 50 as the first step in compensation process. The problem has to be addressed, no doubt of that. Yet I did not see any feasible way to do it in the next two-five years.

To start with, all such debts should have been accounted. Today nobody knows the exact numbers. We should take stock of all accounts, of all heirs/legal successors, i.e. of the people eligible for compensations. Their right to property should be honoured.

As matters stand, the disbursements are, in fact, unlawful. We did not recognize that debt as internal sovereign debt. What are we repaying to people?

Indexation is another issue: one ruble in 1990 and one hryvna of 2008 are two different things. There were too many technical problems to solve them all with one populist act. When the repayment started, people got euphoric: they received a thousand hryvnas in windfall. Hence the gratitude and confidence... Now, however, people are coming to understand that this money works against them. The thousand has long been spent, but prices go on rising.

— A traditional question: what is to be done?

— As I said, Ukraine needs a technical government for a certain transition period, and the elite should consent to it. Can I remind you about the Constitutional Agreement of 1995 – a compromise of political elites that changed the situation in the country dramatically, after the turmoil of the early 1990s? Perhaps, today’s political elites should use this model to reach an agreement on transitional government?

— Do you think it realistic?

— I wouldn’t talk to you unless I did. ZN readers are intellectuals who are concerned about the current situation, they represent the elites I was referring to.

— You chair one of the key Supreme Rada Committees. What is your forecast as to when Parliament will start functioning properly (if at all)?

— You know, at all times the government is most interested in effective functioning of Parliament. I always did my best to support the passage of laws crucial for the country’s development. We did not have the internal problems, unlike the present coalition, but there were a lot of other challenges when our allies threatened us with the collapse of the coalition…

So, if the government is truly interested in the Rada’s productive activity, can Portnov be so significant a figure to disrupt it? I do not think so.

The economy and society are expecting the government to present an anti-inflation budget. The government should make a statement about changing its policy, introducing a tough saving regime and setting such-and-such milestones for the year. It will provide clear guidance to industry, to business as to the new economic course.

— How resolute, do you think, is the BYuT’s demand for the Rada to consider and pass anti-inflation laws?

— I am not sure what Tymoshenko means but all import duties were defined in WTO agreements, and their final approval by Ukrainian Parliament is just a technical measure.

As for limiting trade markups for socially-significant products, there is a law authorizing local state administrations to limit such markups. The Cabinet of Ministers passed a relevant resolution last year defining the procedure to set them. No additional law is needed.

The only effective measure of all proposed by the Prime Minister is to establish a zero import duty on 350 thousand tons of meat. However it should not be done; I’ll tell you why. Imagine I plant to buy a piglet to breed it. I will not do it knowing about the zero import duty on foreign meat. Nor will I build a meat processing factory for 40 thousand pig carcasses because I will know that the subsidy per kilo of pork in Poland is ten times as high as in Ukraine. My pork will always be more expensive than the Polish one, so I will lose the competition if I bring my meat onto the market.

The meat shortage should be addressed but on a different basis: first, by increasing the domestic meat production; second, by subsidizing the consumers, where necessary. We cannot kill our domestic production by importing cheap meat from other countries.

Of course, quality should be one of the major concerns. Where can we get large amounts of high-quality meat ready for import? It can only be found in reserves, which should be replaced periodically, which means we will import meat frozen years ago. We studied this subject in detail and decided against it.

In fact, the government does not have a set of anti-inflation laws to submit to the Supreme Rada. It should concentrate its efforts on the budget. That is more important. The budget should indicate that we have a reasonable deficit and are not doing to throw more money in circulation in the form of unnecessary social payments.

— What will happen if the government fails to submit the new budget before the summer?

— My impression is that we play a game called “Ukraine”: somebody assumes the role of prime minister, another of parliament member, etc. And everyone is an actor. We should not play these dangerous games. The budget is not a whim. It is a solid economic document determining the government’s policy and practical work, the NBU policy, the stability of the national economic system.

I am not saying that a collapse will occur in six to twelve months – we have seven years of sustainable economic growth behind us. But crises can start hitting the economy in the near future. We already see the first signals thereof. Crises will, undoubtedly, sharpen. In technical sciences there is a notion “fatigue of material”. I think we are presently observing the fatigue of economy.

They say, our neighbours are tired of Ukraine. Investors are also sick and tired of Ukraine. Large banks are tired of Ukraine. Many have even forgotten that Ukraine is hosting the EBRD annual board meeting this year.

— Is there a platform for various elites to unite their efforts?

— Yes, of course. It is the understanding that we should stop playing games and start building up our country; that we, our children and grandchildren are going to live in this country; and that serious steps must be taken for it. What is Euro-Atlantic integration about if really means something to us? I think it is about economic growth and social wellbeing. One cannot be after economic integration into Europe and do what we are doing. European integration begins with European standards of conduct in politics, economy, everywhere.

I think that sooner or later the platform for consolidation of the most levelheaded elites will emerge. It will be created by the most esteemed people, informal leaders of the nation. They should not necessarily be politicians or business persons – these can be doctors, economists, journalists…

— What form of government, in your opinion, should be in Ukraine?

— There, undoubtedly, should be a presidential-parliamentary republic in Ukraine. We should have a strong president. In the present situation of unstable state power in Ukraine, anything else wouldn’t be a success.

We need a strong president with strong authorities. He shouldn’t interfere in the work of the executive power. He should guarantee that everybody in Ukraine keeps within the law and legislature. If he carries out this function he would have enough authority and influence. The government is not able to carry out this function.

Certainly, there should be law-enforcement ministers in the government, but they shouldn’t be engaged with all questions of defense and foreign policy – this is the prerogative of the president.

It was very hard for us to work with Kuchma. He had a lot of authority and rights and could fire any of the ministers at any moment without any explanation. I, certainly, don’t want to idealize us or him. We had a lot of conflicts that emerged from nothing. However, after some time, we were able to find a common language and resolve those conflicts. And we never showed those conflicts in public. I am sure that 90% of our conflicts are not known to anybody.

Everything depended on professional ethics in our relations. Kuchma used to call me, the first vice prime minister, two or three times a day. He gave me concrete tasks and asked about their execution. Most of those tasks didn’t correspond with my personal views. But I never discussed this in the Verkhovna Rada. I used to go to the president and try to convince him to change his mind.

— Isn’t this called solving problems in the corridors?

— This is not a way to solve problems in the corridors. I have seen how the executive power actually works abroad. The political elite there choose acquiescent people to occupy the ministries' posts and also remove those officials that provoke the conflicts.

Do you know much about disagreements between Solana and Barrozo? Do you think that they always agree with each other on all matters? No. But there is a professional ethics there. If something gets out to the general public then someone is fired.

Certainly, it is necessary to define the authorities more clearly; certainly, I don’t like when the president has the right to cancel the government’s decree. However, on the other hand, if he is a guarantor of the Constitution then he is obliged to issue his acts canceling the decrees that violate the Constitution.

— As a representative of the Party of Regions, can you guarantee that there won't be a coup d'etat in our country?

— The Party of Regions is the biggest political party of the country which includes the most competent people. Do you think that we can play into somebody’s hand?

— And if you have common interests?

— What common interests? Tymoshenko is interested in changing the Constitution, and I think that this is not the main problem today. This wasn’t the main problem for me in 2002 either, or in 2006 and 2007. If I wasn’t worried about changing the Constitution, why is she so worried about this? The main authority of the government is economics.

If we could be as wise as the world’s leading nations! They don’t amend constitutions so easily. They understand that it is not good to change the fundamental principals very often. And such attitude to the Constitution as in our country – let’s amend the Constitution because we want more authority – irritates me.

The Party of Regions has its own understanding of the Constitution. When we discussed this question at the presidium, we declared that our draft constitution would include our program’s fundamental principals. However, we don’t want to discuss anyone’s principals. Today’s fight for the Constitution is nothing else but a personal fight between Tymoshenko and Yushchenko. This is not our game and we are not going to play it.