Strangely enough, the long-awaited political event that happened last week came as a bolt from the blue, especially to those who had been working the hardest for it.

The scared leaders put up a brave front, trying to make everyone believe that it was all in their plans (which they invented on the fly). They made up whodunit stories to put themselves across as farsighted politicians and conceal their embarrassment.

“It was a Jesuit intrigue masterminded by Baloha at Yushchenko’s instructions and aimed at clearing the ground for a painless alliance between the Our Ukraine – People’s Self-Defense and the Regions Party.” It was the Donetsk clan’s cunning plan aimed at ruining and burying the “Orange” majority in the parliament.” “It was Tymoshenko’s crafty trick meant to allow her to break up with Yushchenko and ally with the Regions Party without losing her face or electorate.” “It was Medvedchuk’s monstrous plot meant for his political comeback as the string-puller.” “It was done by the Kremlin who has long dreamed of ‘zeroing’ in on Yushchenko and taking Tymoshenko under control.”

These are just a few of the versions, tales and rumors around last week’s developments in the Ukrainian parliament. But who is actually responsible for them? Who fanned the smoldering conflict into a blazing war? The people ask these questions, being anxious about a future that currently looks far from bright…

The pretext is just a derivative of the cause and the accidental is just the reverse side of the regular. Last week’s eruption might as well have happened at any other time, because it was inevitable.

There were three main factors that aggravated the political crisis: Yushchenko’s desire to get rid of Tymoshenko as soon as possible, the impossibility of their further coexistence, and the Regions Party’s desire to a) come back to the top and b) inability to do so on its own. And the underlying cause is known but too well: it is the notorious struggle for power which turns rivals into allies and friends into enemies.

Unfortunately for millions of Ukrainians who still cherish the “Orange dream”, the alliance between the OU-PSD and the Tymoshenko Bloc was doomed from its very first day. In theory, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko might take a third try, but in practice it is very improbable. And even if they did step into the same boiling stream again, they would hardly walk any further.

Bankova [street in Kyiv, seat of the Presidential Secretariat], Tymoshenko, and the “Dons” [leaders of the Donetsk clan] were not just after war. Each of these centers of political influence poured its bucket of oil into the fire. But when the fire burst out, it turned out that none of them was actually prepared for active combat.

It is obvious that Tymoshenko was interested in the de-jure existence of the de-facto non-existent coalition, knowing that she would retain her post and continue playing her role of “Mother Patroness” of the Orange ideals, standing out very favorably against Bankova’s shameless flirting with the Dons. She knew that if her formal allies balked and refused to support her government’s initiative, she would have the moral right to seek situational support in the ranks of her formal opponents – the Regions, the Lytvyn Bloc, and the Communists. She has used this method many times and had always gotten away with it.

There were two circumstances that made her life hard in this mercenary marriage: Bankova twisted her arms and was too loose-tongued. The last straw that broke her patience was the equally nonsensical and merciless accusation of masterminding an attempt at Baloha. There might just as well have been other pretexts, but Tymoshenko must have decided that it was the right time to return the insult.

The time was right politically: she saw that the protracted negotiations between Bankova and the Regions leadership were at a deadlock and the Dons were open to cooperation as never before.

The time was right psychologically: after Baloha’s slander, her step looked like a forced “act of coercion to peace” rather than an act of aggression.

Regaining vast powers of premiership at the expense of presidential powers through a bill on amendments to the Law on the Cabinet of Ministers for which her faction voted together with the Regions and the Communists, Tymoshenko killed two birds with one stone: she freed her hand and unburdened her heart.

Tymoshenko never expected the coalition to break up. She never believed that Bankova, having flunked the talks with the Regions, would take a step that threatened Yushchenko with a complete loss of power. She never thought that the majority of the OU-PSD would go that far because she knew how much they hated Baloha and feared yet another preterm parliamentary election.

She never expected that Yushchenko and Akhmetov would resume active consultations. Rather, she expected Yushchenko to sacrifice Baloha in exchange for peace – a quite agreeable price under the circumstances. Whoever might have replaced Baloha, he would have been a lesser hazard.

However, there is good reason to presume that Tymoshenko’s emotions must have prevailed over rationality. She really went wild and ignored her allies from the OU-PSD. Yushchenko had long dreamed of the coalition’s breakup and could not even hope for a better gift from Tymoshenko, but he should have known that his go-ahead for leaving the coalition was tantamount to his political suicide. Nevertheless, he gave the OU-PSD the go-ahead and personally saw to it. With the help of two simple tools – his telephone and Baloha – he quickly achieved the goal of his long and futile efforts. The catalyst of his resolve and of Tymoshenko’s merciless demarche was the same – hurt pride. This is where the desire to avenge defeated political pragmatism.

Woe is the country where the two top leaders are unable to take a blow…

Unfortunately, their touchiness turned out to be a contagious disease. Those who subscribed to the coalition’s epitaph had various reasons, but most of them were also emotional.

It is hard to swallow insults, but regarding national interests, Tymoshenko’s light-minded irresponsibility can not be justified. It was obviously necessary and politically expedient for her to consult and find a common language with her partners (most of whom she truly respects).

It is up to the reader to agree or disagree with the OU-PSD members who voted for seceding from the coalition, but the boastful pride in their comments looks at least surprising.

The mutual claims set out by members of the OU-PSD and the Tymoshenko Bloc are deeply rooted in personal insults and so make their reunion impossible. It is hard to imagine Tymoshenko recalling the bills passed last week. It is even harder to imagine Yushchenko and Baloha apologizing to Tymoshenko.

In the light of such accusations and insults Tymoshenko’s alliance with Yanukovych looks quite probable, despite countless criticisms of each other. It is true that Yanukovych called Tymoshenko “a cow on ice” and Tymoshenko said that Yanukovych had done Ukraine more harm in 100 days of his premiership than Leonid Kuchma had done in ten years of his presidency. It is true that both have flatly ruled out the possibility of such an alliance: in 2006 Yanukovych said “Never”, and four months ago Tymoshenko said she would resign if the OU-PSD allied with the Regions in a grand coalition.

There was another loud statement worth remembering. In late August of 2007 Tymoshenko accused Yanukovych of “betraying national interests” and promised to bring criminal charges against him. The Tymoshenko Bloc said in a recent statement that Yushchenko and Baloha were “sources of a threat to national security”. More recently, a senior official with the Presidential Secretariat accused Tymoshenko of “high treason” and “political corruption”. Now all these high-handed leaders must either apologize to one another or go to jail.

All of them are to blame, but Yushchenko’s sin is the gravest. Who forced him to ally with Tymoshenko for the second time if he hated to? Who kept him from allying with the Regions if he wanted to? He failed to keep together one coalition and failed to create another. It is not a matter of his plans, wishes, or fears – they are all but too clear. So is the fact that in pursuit of his interests he disregarded the interests of the state and let the fuse burn.

Most observers call the situation “muddy”. In muddy water some drown or surface quicker and others catch more fish. All the rest – who are called a nation in between elections – are anxiously waiting for a deluge.

In medical terms, a political analyst is more like a forensic expert than a therapist. It is hard to predict the further course of this disease, knowing that the remedy is in the politicians’ trembling hands.

Broad Coalition

The scenario that appeared to be the most probable before the new political season proves to be the least feasible now. It was clear that the democratic coalition was doomed and it seemed that the OU-PSD would ally with the Regions and the Lytvyn Bloc in a new coalition. However, the plans had to be changed – largely because the Ukrainian political leaders are so illogical and unprincipled.

Ever since the incumbent coalition was formed, its transformation has been negotiated and Yanukovych has been the biggest obstacle. None of the potential allies wanted to see him in the post of Prime Minister, but Akhmetov and Kolesnikov did not dare go against the grain and Yushchenko would not give way, remembering Yanukovych’s premiership that ended in a preterm parliamentary election last September. Yushchenko and his entourage demanded guarantees that Yanukovych would not run for president in 2010 and that the Regions would support Yushchenko’s candidacy. They also demanded that the Regions help Yushchenko abolish the proportional model of parliamentary elections in favor of the single-mandate model. The negotiations proceeded in fits and starts and members of the largest faction began to grumble: firstly, Kolesnikov and Akhmetov had promised to form a grand coalition right after the preterm election but Yushchenko backed down; secondly, the OU-PSD faction failed to contribute enough votes for Tymoshenko’s dismissal and so let the Regions faction down.

In spring, unable to bear his opposition status anymore, Yanukovych agreed with Tymoshenko to cooperate in amending the Constitution. The President was nervous. Akhmetov and Kolesnikov supported their impatient “leader”. Yanukovych obeyed but did not believe their promises.

In May Regions officials stated that the party would not initiate the Tymoshenko government’s resignation. Nikolai Azarov announced pathetically that this cabinet would be “toppled by the people”. However, in June the Regions faction demanded to dismiss the government and Azarov acted as the public prosecutor during the hearings.

What made the Regions change its position? It is known that Bankova made another promise to Akhmetov, but when the Regions faction gave all their 172 votes to dismissing the government, the OU-PSD added only two votes. It is known that after the failed vote Baloha looked utterly at a loss and wondered naively why the Regions had not enlisted support from the Communists and the Lytvyn Bloc. The infuriated Donbas bosses parried rhetorically, “Who are we supposed to ally with in this man’s grand coalition – Symonenko, Lytvyn, or the Our Ukraine?”

The faction began to lose trust in the negotiators. Besides, they were increasingly irritated by Raisa Bogatyryova, Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council. Losing their patience and norms of “party morals”, the negotiators proposed to Yanukovych: he would remain the head of the party and Bogatyryova would head the government appointed by the grand coalition. In response he hurled a “grenade”: he demanded to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The move did not only aim to restore Moscow’s favorable attitude, but also to speed up the grand coalition talks. He needed time to restore and strengthen his positions. Luckily for him, Bogatyryova came up with a statement that ran counter to the party’s declared ideology. First she expressed satisfaction with Ukraine’s new prospects for joining NATO, and then she said that Yanukovych’s opinion with regard to the self-proclaimed Caucasian republics was “not necessarily shared by the rest of the Regions Party”. Bogatyryova was immediately expelled from the party. Kolesnikov kept grumbling and Akhmetov flew to Sardinia. They were surely disappointed: Yanukovych took the upper hand, leaving their protégé Bogatyryova and her team in the sidelines.

Bankova keeps sending signals to the Regions headquarters but gets no reply. There is no one to negotiate with the presidential team: Kolesnikov is negotiating with Akhmetov, Yanukovych is communicating with Tymoshenko, and their “authorized representatives” – Turchinov and Klyuyev – are working together day and night on a new constitution (and, very probably, on a grand coalition project). According to reliable sources, Yanukovych took with understanding the Kremlin’s categorical warning against allying with the political force led by the radically pro-Georgian President.

Yanukovych is not afraid of a coalition with the Tymoshenko Bloc which can give him the constitution he likes and half the power in the state and subtract a part of the electorate from Tymoshenko. He is not afraid of a preterm election that leaves Kolesnikov, Akhmetov, and Bogatyryova short of time for building a separate political project. All he hates to do is play second fiddle in a coalition with Yushchenko.

Very broad coalition

“First the periodic table of elements came to Pushkin in a dream. But he was unable to understand it. Then, it had to come in a dream to Mendeleev” – this joke briefly explains the route from losing the chance to establish a broad coalition up to obtaining a chance to establish a very broad coalition.

Today, at least three task forces – constitutional, quick response and cadre – work on establishing a coalition between ByUT and Party of the Regions (Regions).

The idea of establishing this alliance has come to both party leaders. From time to time, with different degree of intensity Victor Yushchenko pushed them towards it. But Yanukovych thought Tymoshenko was an disagreeable person, and Tymoshenko’s voters thought of Yanukovych as next to nothing. Their maximum junction occurred in April-May this year while working on a new Constitution draft. But Akhmetov and Kolesnikov insisted that all contacts between Yanukovych and Tymoshenko come to an end, as they guaranteed the success of negotiations on Bankova Street. But events in Parliament on September 2, instigated by leaders’ desire to take revenge on Victor Yushchenko, resulted in the collapse of the coalition.

«If a mouse crawling in the desert does not die of hunger, it will die of thirst in five minutes”. The democratic coalition existed on paper, but was not operable; it would have died any way, but at least it would not have caught all the major actors unawares. The exit of thirty-nine deputies (thirty-eight, to be more precise, as deputy Pliushch did not join the coalition, but was on the list of those who left it) in the evening the same day became a catalyst that dotted all “i”s. As a result, there is a chance to obtain a coalition of two parties that have not just a majority, not even a constitutional majority, but a majority that exceeds three fourths of Parliament members.

What does it mean? This means that the Parliamentary opposition has never been so weak. It does not even have the 150 voices necessary to establish a Parliamentary investigation commission and to enter on the agenda (even symbolically) the issue of dismissal of the Premier or Speaker.

This means that President loses control over the General Prosecutor’s Office, because this control was ensured solely by the underground alliance of the former with the Party of the Regions.

This means that the coalition obtains a chance to change the Constitution, and even in case of fierce inter-party riots there is still a surplus of voices to fill in for the rebuff.

This means that the majority of judges in the Constitutional Court will recognize the power of the coalition; while Victor Yuchshenko could have relied on the Court as a sanitation barrier in the constitutional process plotted by ByUT and Party of the Regions.

This means that any changes in the legislation are possible, including those that are necessary to undertake impeachment procedure.

This means that at any moment the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence can be dismissed and acting ministers appointed by the Parliament.

This means that Ukraine’s external policy can be amended significantly. It would not become purely anti-Russian, but rather … pro-German or pro-French… And possibly even anti-American.

The draft of the Constitution on which both parties work and which could be submitted to Verkhovna Rada next week, deserves special attention. Its major provisions were covered by “ZN” last week in the article “Will PR&ByUT kill the President?”. But the draft was and is being amended, though some things we know for sure. The President is left succinct powers to exercise external policy, and has all the powers over the army and security. The nomination of the Prosecutor General is granted to the opposition. The Parliamentary majority is formed during the second round of elections in which only the two largest parties participate. The party that wins the majority of voices, no matter how many, obtains 226 seats, forms the government and takes all the decision. If the existing election system is preserved, an imperative mandate will ensure the solidity of the majority and Premier who remain undisturbed during the whole convocation period.

Among many variants considered by Yulia Tymoshenko when the democratic coalition was shaking but had not fallen yet, one was as follows: Tymoshenko was eager not to take part in the presidential elections-2010 on three conditions: first, President Yushchenko had to stop ruining the coalition; second, guarantee that she remains Premier until the next Parliamentary elections; third, accept the new draft Constitution according to which the President controls external policy and national security and is completely deprived of the power to influence the Executive Branch and Cabinet of Ministers, accordingly.

Quite probably, this model would be applied for Victor Yanukovych who already made a comic statement that he is eager “to be President under a Premier Tymoshenko government”. We would not go into this deliberation further for several reasons: firstly, it is for Ukrainian voters – and not negotiating groups – to decide who takes which post, though the new broad collation of such an organizational, administrative and financial standing can considerably revise the results of elections; secondly, Ukraine lacks any working mechanism to guarantee the implementation of under-table agreements; it is possible to fix a certain model in interim provisions to a new Constitution, but not positions for concrete personalities; thirdly, many things can change before the election, allies could become alienated, or associates split.

To be exact, the last statement is not quite true: the broad coalition is capable of doing anything, including changing the time of election; and this may turn the heads of coalition rulers. By the way, in case the President retires for health reasons, his duties for three months before the next election are to be fulfilled by Verkhovna Rada Chair. Following the current blueprints designed by ByUT and Party of the Regions, the position of Verkhovna Rada Chair is reserved for Victor Yanukovych. It may happen that there will be not enough fingers to press the buttons during the impeachment procedure, but there will be enough arguments – following the old Bolshevik tradition – to explain to the President that the guards are tired and deserve rest. Quite probably, the developments would not go as far as that, of course, if Victor Yushchenko himself does not make a mistake that would cost lives to Ukrainian boys. As was eighteen months ago, for President the “use of force” variant is still strongly recommended against.

In any case, even if votes are lost, first of all in Western Ukraine, the coalition between ByUT and the Party of the Regions is the worst possible solution for President Yushchenko who is the main, albeit not the only, instigator of the current crisis. “And the worst of all, — as one of people’s deputies said, — is that now we will have to protect him”.

By the way, the President will not be the only victim of the Tymoshenko – Yanukovych alliance. This union is a nightmare for the oligarchs. Akhmetov, Kolomoysky, and Pinchuk were against an equal concentration of power in the hands of Tymoshenko or Yanukovych. And suddenly the two got together! Yanukovych as the head of the pyramid can please Firtash; but the discontented look of Serhiy Liovochkin demonstrates that his clan does not place any hopes with ByUT and Party of the Regions’ alliance. In all probability, “ISD” is also strained. Hayduk has good relations with Yulia Tymoshenko, but not with Yanukovych. Consultations started. Should they result in establishing a collective resistance, or each should fight separately — today is difficult to say. Observing the fight will be interesting, but dangerous. Better do it from under shelter.

The coalition may bring some benefits, in spite of the danger of curtailing democracy; the treat of swift twist in external policy; the danger of accelerated redistribution of remaining state’s assets. The activities of the executive supported by significant majority may become more efficient and better organized; implementation discipline will increase; communication between the Cabinet of Ministers and Verkhovna Rada will improve; the legislature will work like a clock. In a country that needs reanimation, people in power should forget their differences and focus on implementation of mutually acceptable solutions in the areas most in need of intervention. By the way, for ByUT and Party of the Regions there are many such areas. These two political “heavyweights” have more in common than they do differences as they are striving to establish a two-party system in Ukraine. But the question is, how efficient will the solutions developed by the two political forces be? Will solutions be reform-oriented or populist, like the Law on Prestige of Miners’ Labor? Having obtained all the levers necessary for self-realization and exercise of power, Yanukovych and Tymoshenko have a unique chance to re-invent the country. Intelligent autocracy, mobile and efficient – that is what Ukraine needs now. Those who did not chuckle or choke at the word “intelligent” in this context may throw stones at us.

«There will be no legal grounds for early election”, that is how one of the ByUT’s most influential members answered “ZN” question about the prospects for a very broad coalition. “Tymoshenko has not made a final decision yet, but a coalition with us is inevitable”, that is what a no less influential Party of the Regions member told us.

And Tymoshenko, who is making a very complicated and dramatic turn for herself and the country, is in deep thought. The engine to establish a coalition with the “Regions” has been launched. The offer to Lytvyn faction to join the democratic coalition in order to revive it has been made – by the Premier. With one reservation — the Speaker will be from the Lytvyn faction, but not be Lytvyn himself. Still, Yulia Tymochenko hardly believes in the revival of the democratic coalition – Victor Yushchenko’s order to Our Ukraine faction to exit the coalition, his order to the Presidential quota ministers to ignore the sessions of the Cabinet of Ministers, and his ban to heads of regional and district administrations to come to the Cabinet of Ministers’ session on the budget leave no illusions as to the future of their relationship. There is also the matter of the tough wording in the Statement on the Premier’s treason, upheaval and dictatorship.

In spite of all this, Yulia Tymoshenko is still in doubt. Out of all the bad options (there are no good ones) her senses have chosen the coalition with the Party of the Regions. But her heart is still alive and clutching at the hands of capitulating Maydan. Of course, Tymoshenko is considering her losses in ratings. Of course, she hopes she will be able to restore them thanks to her coordinated work with the “Regions”. But her burnt out and devastated soul still has some room for sentiment. Therefore, today, on the third day after the crisis and forty days in advance of the President’s right to dismiss Verkhovna Rada we cannot disregard the possibility of early election.

Early election

Among the big stakeholders, nobody wants it. Neither Lytvyn — the rumours about the rapid rise of his rating are to a large degree overestimated (from 2,8 to 4,3%). Nor the deputies from OU-PSD bloc — not all of them will be invited to the Yushchenko bloc or Tymoshenko bloc, some will be unwilling to join either. In addition, for the next election the most optimistic forecast for the President’s political force, headed either by Yatseniuk or Yushchenko, does not go beyond last year results (from 3,2 up to 7%). Nor the Party of the Regions who theoretically may take up to 35% of voters, but their current condition is rather dubious from the point of view of their party lists and the course of the election campaign. ByUT believes that they are capable of improving or repeating last year results, but it will not be enough to take 226 seats, and there will be nobody to bloc with if ByUT wants to hand in power to Yulia Tymoshenko again. No doubt, early election will be the most honest way out – let people decide if politicians failed. But election results will not differ significantly from what we have today and open the same opportunities that we have now: either Baloha and Kolesnikov will transform Ukraine into a stock house (Lytvyn will be responsible for the empty counters); or Tymoshenko and Yanukovych will close the country in a safe box; or Yushchenko and Tymoshenko will prolong the state’s sojourn in the lunatic asylum.

East and West together do not want election?

Yesterday, “ZN” got hold of results of telephone survey conducted by the Razumkov Center on September 4-5 in 7 regional centers throughout Ukraine. When this material was completed, the data for Odessa, Donetsk and Kherson were not ready yet. Still, interesting results can be made based on the data already available.

First, the majority of the population regards early untimely elections to the Verkhovna Rada rather unfavorably. The opponents of the next untimely election campaign are 68,4%respondents in Lviv, 67% — in Vinnitsa, 63,8% — in Kyiv and 58% — in Dnipropetrovsk. The supporters amount to —24,1%, 15,7, 20,5 and 25,6% accordingly. The disposition is obvious. It is a rare occasion when “East and West are together”.

Quite unexpected is the relative support provided by the population of different regions to the reduction of the President’s powers achieved by the joint effort of the Party of the Regions and ByUT. It was rather easy to predict support among citizens of Dnipropetrovsk: 59,5% are in favour and only 16,3% are against. On the whole, the reaction of Lviv citizens was predictable: 51,6% expressed dissatisfaction. But at the same time, there were quite a lot of people who expressed support — 23,7%. In Kyiv, 42,6% supported the temporary union between the “Regions” and ByUT (with 22,2% being against it). Special attention should be paid to results of opinion polls in Vinnitsa, the city where sympathies and antipathies are comparable to nationwide results, as sociologists believe. 43,6% of citizens expressed support for the endeavours of ByUT and Party of the Regions, and 28.3% opposed it.

But the overall attitude to the potential union between the two political forces is more diverse. The coalition between the Party of the Regions and ByUT is supported by 54,2% of Dnipropetrovsk citizens (with 27% against), 40,1% of Kyiv citizens (with 35,8% against), 32,1% of Vinnitsa citizens (with 49,3% against) and only 16,5% of Lviv citizens (with 69,0% against).

The blow to the democratic forces struck by last week’s events is rather strong as was revealed by the response to another question: “Do you support the activities of NU—NS that declared of its exit from the coalition?”. “Do not support” answered 55,1% of Lviv citizens, 43,9% of Vinnitsa citizens, 41% of Kyiv citizens, 16,3% of Dnipropetrovsk citizens. 57.7% expressed their support to Our Ukraine’s deed in Dnipropetrovsk, 25,5% of Lviv, 26,4% of Kyiv and only 20,6% of Vinnitsa population. It is noteworthy that about one third of respondents in Kyiv and more than one third in Vinnitsa were undecided or could not give a distinct answer.