Torn Sail…

It all started in late August, when an ordinary man in jeans and a T-shirt came to the prime minister to discuss the neck of the woods he wanted to buy for hunting. The man was mad with the president who failed to keep the promise he had given to the man in the run-up to the 2007 snap elections, which brought Tymoshenko, rather than her guest, to the prime ministerial office. The prime minister was on the verge of a nervous breakdown caused by the Presidential Secretariat’s attacks, including the hottest allegations of high treason. At that moment, sullen resentment against the president prevailed over their mutual dislike, and both decided it was solid enough a basis for their temporary alliance. The alliance could bring about a new Constitution opening up equal chances for victory to the leaders of two largest political forces. However, no definite agreement was achieved at this or subsequent meetings.

Negotiators started shuttling between the two leaders and their crews. Tymoshenko and Yanukovysh’s closest allies started distributing roles and estimating ratings. Members of both BYuT and Party of Regions admit that Yanukovych was prepared to form a situational alliance with Tymoshenko. In May, he had to give up the idea under Rinat Akhmetov’s pressure but in late summer he seemed more resolute. In the first days of September he even declared he could be “prime minister under President Tymoshenko”.

Having disposed of Bohatyriova and ruined her chances for premiership, having pleased the Kremlin with his statements on Abkhazia and Ossetia, having consolidated his clout in the party, Viktor Yanukovych decided it was his game. Interestingly, he was nicknamed “Sail”, reportedly by a founder of the Donbass Industrial Union, who nicknamed him “Sail” because there is no stopping him once he catches the wind. This time he set the sail, gathered speed but forgot about anchors--thatthe Firtash and Akhmetov groups refused to support a coalition with Tymoshenko and her premiership in such a coalition. The anchor chain turned out to be as long as it takes to cover the distance from the confusion of 2 September to a concerted effort to put brakes on the process. The matter is not even that Tymoshenko is at war with business groups involved in RosUkrEnergo and Vanco Prykerchenska Ltd. The matter is that the Tymoshenko-Yanukovych alliance, albeit transitory, would have upset the balance of power in the country. It would have neutralized the president as the third force lobbying (not without success) for the two business groups’ interests in the above companies, and safeguarding all large businesses against the concentration of power in one centre, a scenario worrying most Ukrainian oligarchs. Tymoshenko and Yanukovych left no doubt whatsoever that theirs would not be an alliance of two liberals, or even an authoritarian leader and a liberal. Given the constitutional majority in Parliament, even without MPs from the two above business groups, the tandem could have been unpredictable.

The internal opposition to the coalition of two largest political forces could have failed to withstand Yanukovych’s force and determination but for the OU decision (or, more accurately, that of 39 MPs from the OUPS faction) to leave the “democratic coalition”. This decision opened up new vistas for Yanukovych: further disgrace of BYuT and OUPS due to ceaseless in-fighting; failure to form a new coalition without the Party of Regions and, in the end of the day, new elections with good prospects for the Party of Regions to win and bring its leader back into the prime minister’s office, right on the eve of the presidential elections. So Yanukovych decided to go for it.

I would not quote opinions of MPs from the Party of Regions about their leader’s decision. I spoke not only to those fearing to be left out of the new election list, but also with those sure to be there. What they criticize is not his willingness to drop the bird in the hand and chase two in the bush. They share Taras Chornovil’s account of the events (without daring to endorse it aloud), whereby the party leaders exchanged responsibility for intrigue and ambitions. Taras Chornovil left the party, although he ranked third in internal popularity and confidence ratings after Yanukovych and Shufrych… Remarkably, most voters of the Party of Regions also favoured its coalition with BYT and did not want early elections, just like people in other regions of Ukraine. The party leaders chose to ignore the public sentiment. They must know what they are doing, since their voters have been loyal to them no matter what, never challenging their decisions and actions.

Well, once again have we come to realize that Tymoshenko and Yanukovych are not Obama and McCain – they will not bury the tomahawk in order to address the nation’s pressing challenges. The cleavage in the Party of Regions has become more sharply defined but the party leaders are trying to sweep it under the carpet as they did many times before. The parliamentary faction members either keep silent or complain to one another in a whisper.

Carthage should go

Yushchenko has, yet again, lost the country and won a personal victory. Parliamentarians’ passive doom and creative paralysis in anticipation of the “inescapable” dissolution of the Rada reminds me of Korney Chukovsky’s nursery rhyme, in which wild animals, scared to death by the cockroach, are ready to sacrifice their babies to it.

Still, many hoped there would be no dissolution. Some counted on Chaney to come and urge Yushchenko to restore the orange coalition. Yet Chaney came and went making us wonder about the purpose of his visit: was it to discuss Georgia, to call for reforms and order, or to sort out who is the best contact for future prospecting of the disputed Ukrainian-Romanian sea-shelf?

Some relied on Lytvyn – and for good reason, since he was ready to find common ground with BYuT and “Our Ukraine” for the sake of saving the country and in exchange for the parliamentary speaker’s position, four ministerial and four governor seats. The president, however, publicly refused to have Yatseniuk replaced, making it clear that everything depended on him, and the “coalition of three” was hung.

Some hopes were pinned on a rebellion inside “Our Ukraine – People’s Self-defence”after Yushchenko announced there would be no election bloc anymore and invited politicians from OUPS constituent parties to join “Our Ukraine”. Up to 30 representatives of the constituent parties, unhappy with these developments, showed unusual determination and tried to formalize, speed up and steer negotiations on creating “the coalition of three” or restoring the “democratic coalition”. However, according to the ZN sources, the Presidential Secretariat lured 42 MPs out of the process by promising to include them in the OU election lists and to help OU get at least 17% of votes in the next parliamentary election. As a result, it retained control over the majority in OUPS faction.

At the Lviv Economic Forum the president, reportedly, assured the present European Parliament members he would allow Ukrainian MPs leeway till 16 October so that they could form a coalition. Some of his opponents put it down to the desire to hold elections on the New Year eve, which cannot be ruled out. In this case, however, Viktor Yushchenko will have to issue a relevant decree in late, rather than mid, October since the Constitution clearly stipulates that snap parliamentary elections should be held within 60 days of the decree issuance date. Should the requirement of 50% turn-up be preserved in the Law “On Elections”, the elections could be disrupted. Even if they do take place, can you imagine the vote counting in the ten days of New Year and Christmas celebrations? How much it will cost the key stakeholders to keep enough people sober? Every political force represented in local election commissions will do its best to bring administrative pressure to bear in the areas under their control. Neophytes of the election process will fall prey to inveterate vote-jugglers. Major campaign headquarters will get the result they hoped for, trying to avoid a summative outcome of 101% (as was the case in Baloha’s constituency at the 2000 referendum). It is easier (and cheaper) for the largest political forces to play the “rock-paper-scissors” game: the party with “paper” goes to the opposition, the one with “scissors” – to the coalition. At least they would save the national economy UAH 40 million. The question is where to get this money? Will the Rada vote for it? Will this voting be indicative of a possible new coalition?

Most probably, there are other reasons for the absence of a prompt presidential decree on the Verkhovna Rada dissolution. Viktor Yushchenko has not yet resolved three critical issues. First, voters do not support the idea of snap parliamentary elections. Thus, our unpopular president, being solely associated with this initiative in the public opinion, runs the risk of aggravating his situation. So he needs time to imbue the public mind with the idea of inevitable elections, and to give MPs an “opportunity” to demonstrate their total inability to reach compromises. The president must be sure he has enough leverage in the Party of Regions and “Our Ukraine” to prevent any format of coalition from materializing.

Second, Yushchenko may claim in public he is not interested in party ratings but, in fact, he studies them very closely. What he learns does not please him at all: the pro-presidential force has 4.5%-5% of popular support. If he heads the party list a year before the presidential elections, he will make public his own popularity ratings as a candidate. Even if the above indicator doubles, his allies and sponsors will be disappointed. Without Yushchenko’s name on the party list the outcome will be disastrous: 7%-10% at the most.

However, there is a way for the pro-presidential force to bring to Parliament as many elected representatives as it has today, or even more. For that, the Law “On Elections” should be amended to provide for open party lists in 27 (worst-case scenario) or 450 (best-case scenario) election districts. So far, negotiations with the Party of Regions have yielded no results. Yet the president keeps hoping they will. To get the law on elections amended that he needs an operational, non-dissolved Rada. BYuT does not want open lists. The Communists (with the only exception of Adam Martyniuk wishing to rotate the faction membership) do not want them, either. Alongside OUPS, Lytvyn could be interested in having open lists so that he could offer his brand to sponsor-businessmen. The Party of Regions is weighing all pros and cons. While the party leaders are analyzing what method of vote counting will suit them better in the event of open-list elections and who can be appointed campaign manager (and scapegoat, if need be at a later stage), Viktor Yushchenko is contemplating the best candidate to replace Baloha. His entourage and advisors have, supposedly, nominated two candidates: Bohatyriova (promoted by Akhmetov) and Bezsmertny (supported by most OU members). According to our sources in the Presidential Secretariat, Baloha will head the pro-presidential force’s HQ and run for parliament himself.

Yet irrespective of how successfully Viktor Yushchenko copes with the three issues above, he intends to call snap parliamentary elections, since it is the only sure way to get rid of Yuliya Tymoshenko as prime minister. Frankly speaking, that is what all the fuss was really about …

“I would not have been so frail and fragile”

Yuliya Tymoshenko’s situation is unenviable. Every day brings her closer to the end of her premiership. She should not be too worried, though: given a skillfully organized and conducted campaign, she can get a fairly good result and start her presidential race as the opposition leader, a role which is much more preferable than that of the head of government, given the deepening economic crisis. Yet Tymoshenko does not want to lose power; she fights for it passionately, feverishly and not always effectively. Her only reliable supporter today is her electorate, fluctuating in size within the sociological error. Unless the “Iron Lady” works miracles and forms the coalition, stopping the early elections, the myth of her invincibility, which entrances enemies and attracts friends, might be dispelled.

Her belief (a well-grounded one, it is true) in her ability to come victorious out of no-win situations has done her a disservice: she has developed a gung-ho attitude to systemic and crisis-causing problems.

First, Tymoshenko’s decision to head the government after the 2007 elections seemed dubious. Everyone understood that from 19 December 2007 on, the Presidential Secretariat would stop at nothing to remove her from office. Of course, nobody suggested their aggression would acquire the scale of insanity.

Second, Tymoshenko brought a weak team to the Cabinet. She realized it soon enough but did not reshuffle her ministers. She opted to rely on a couple of key persons in her staff. As usual, the prime minister communicated with everyone, but listened only to those whom she wanted to hear. The BYuT faction members were unhappy; they thought she missed the whole picture, failing to see the forest while focusing on the trees. Yet Tymoshenko did not hear them; she spent too much time, energy and nerves on Baloha and Yushchenko’s peremptory shouts.

Third, Tymoshenko was not alerted to the bloc’s failure at the Kyiv council elections. Her ratings in Kyiv looked soothing. However, the mayoral elections in Kyiv should have made her worry not over her own popularity but, rather, over poor preparation and the abovementioned gung-ho approach to problems. Had she drawn correct conclusions, she would not have been carried away by emotions (fully explicable in a human being) and voted with the Party of Regions on 2 September 2008. This step could have been justified in two cases: if the prime minister had a firm agreement with the Party of Regions on forming the coalition, or if she had thoroughly prepared projections as to the president’s potential reaction and safety of the “democratic coalition”. Yuliya Tymoshenko had neither. She started fretting and fidgeting. She allowed Yanukovych to step back and Yushchenko – to step forward.

And it is still more difficult to understand the direction of Tymoshenko’s own steps. The BYuT members maintain that she sincerely wants to restore the “democratic coalition” – that is why her faction did not vote for overcoming the presidential veto of the laws passed on 2 September. It could be true. The question is whether all Tymoshenko’s voters will understand “why Yuliya gave in to Him”. On the other hand, if we speak of state interests, why should the BYuT faction agree to repeal useful amendments to the laws “On Constitutional Court” and “On Ad Hoc Enquiry Commissions”? Can’t Tymoshenko realize that Ukrainians’ love of her is big but it is much smaller than their dislike of Yushchenko?

The conflict between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko has never been about ideology because neither the Forced Famine of the 1930s, nor “my dearly beloved” make up an ideology. It has not been a managerial conflict because there can be no professional conflict between a non-manager and a manager. It has always been a personal conflict. That is why as the conflict climaxed they both became personal. At first, Yushchenko pitted Baloha against Tymoshenko but later he used each of his own public appearances inside and outside the country to assail her, without sparing our self-esteem, dignity and international reputation. Tymoshenko kept silent for seven months, and people around her dropped their eyes every time they heard her mantra: “I hold the president in high respect”. Then she lost control, too. When it came to her statements inside the country, one could attribute it to emotions. However, emotions are not a valid excuse for following the opponent’s suit. Even the grotesque story concerning the prime minister’s aircraft on the eve of her visit to Moscow could not justify her silence in response to the Russian prime minister’s insulting our head of state.

Almost two hundred years ago Alexander Pushkin said: “I deeply despise my fatherland but it vexes me when a foreigner shares this feeling of mine”. I do not think they taught it in the KGB Institute named after Andropov. Yet Yuliya Tymoshenko should have heard this quotation in her school…

I believe we are all responsible for our president. We shouldered this responsibility when we elected him. We felt responsible when we tried to warn him about possible mistakes, when we pointed to the ones committed and suggested ways of correcting them. Today we are responsible not only for revising our choice and remedying the situation, but also for learning to trust deeds rather than words.

Some day the crisis of state power, lasting since 2000, will be over. Some day we will be divided in the leftist, rightist and centrist in our political allegiances, rather than in the East and West. Some day the president will demand that the Parliament passes the budget law in a timely manner, rather than a law on expanding his powers. Some day businesspersons will do business and public institutions will be staffed with professionals. Some day we will implement reforms, join the EU, and turn from the population into citizens. It will start small – with a traffic policeman refusing to take a bribe; with a hundred hryvnias paid as a party membership fee rather than five million paid for a place in the party list; with a cab-driver turning on the mile-meter when you get in; with accurate scales at the Bassarabsky market; with a park won back from the crooked developer; and from the president’s political opponent responding to their foreign peer: “I would kindly ask you to choose your language carefully. We will put our house in order ourselves.” And then there will be only one thing left – to put our house in order.