“Ukraine has made a sure step toward overcoming the consequences of the global financial crisis.” The Verkhovna Rada has adopted (in the first reading) the notorious package of anti-crisis bills. The co-authors of the document call it “historic” and mete out interviews. Their well-trained voices have a ring of fear. Yes, they are afraid, and many say honestly that they do not know why. Some huff and puff to cameras, spouting abstruse terms. The incompetent cite the competent and venture to make forecasts. The cognizant judiciously refrain from public statements. Everyone is aware of an imminent impact. Few know when and no one knows how. It is very difficult to predict the scale or even possible forms of the impending doom. Theoretical knowledge and practical experience prove to be of little help. Far from all victims of the financial tsunami in Europe and the United States were naïve ignorant bunglers, but the crisis hit them all the same. The positive vote for the document that opened the door to the IMF loan was not a conscious step but a reflexive attempt to do something. It is totally wrong to call this first step “conscious” and “sure”.

Some even say that “Ukraine has taken a resolute step toward restoring the democratic coalition.” It would sound funny if it did not look so regrettable. All the reasons why the MPs voted for the anti-crisis bill are known, but the terms “coalition” and “democracy” are not in that number.

“Ukraine has taken a step toward cancellation of the preterm parliamentary election.” This is the main political result of the past week. Now the probability of yet another race is very low.

“The crisis has buried the President’s absurd idea and stopped the election.” Such categorical statements made by Tymoshenko’s supporters are somewhat hasty and not quite earnest. Confronted by the threat, the political leaders had to change their plans and actions but have not joined their forces yet. Each of them tries to make the approaching economic recess “the enemy’s enemy.” Yushchenko believes that the crisis will “drown” Tymoshenko. Yanukovych hopes that it will “bury” both. Such a specific attitude to the real threat disables resistance. Economic crises make victims of friends and foes alike, so the country’s bankruptcy is sure to ruin each leader’s political career – Yushchenko’s, Tymoshenko’s, and Yanukovych’s.

Bankova [street in downtown Kyiv, seat of the Presidential Secretariat] is evidently revising its initial plans. Yushchenko keeps insisting on the early election, but his insistence is losing resolve. The Premier is so far making the most of her trump cards – her influence on courts and control over the central budget. The presidential decree [on the parliament’s dissolution and the preterm election] is still in court limbo and the Central Election Commission is still waiting for money to launch the election campaign. It is already clear to everyone that the election will not take place this year. But will it do Yushchenko any good next year? His initial aim – to get rid of Tymoshenko – makes no sense now. He took this aim in September, but under the present circumstances the country will get a new government in late spring at the earliest – just a couple of weeks ahead of the presidential race.

Besides, Yushchenko is beginning to see the approaching economic danger. Those who have the privilege of contacting him are still doubtful whether he realizes the hugeness of the looming threat. He simply turned a blind eye to it until the nosedive of the national currency drew him from his idées fixes – the NATO Membership Action Plan, the Holodomor [international recognition of the Great Famine of 1932-1933], and the early election. Yushchenko must have come to realize that in the coming months the country can not remain without the parliament and government and that Tymoshenko’s premiership might eventually earn him good political fortune as all impacts of the crisis could be blamed on her.

Yushchenko’s “alter ego” Baloha [chief of the Presidential Secretariat.] is not interested in the early election, either. He sees that his political party [Yedyniy Tsentr (United Center) composed of renegade members of the pro-presidential bloc Our Ukraine and other rightist and centrist parties] stands no chance of entering the new parliament. Seeing that the OU is on the verge of political death, its “flexible” members refuse to ally with Baloha’s party in an election bloc and even demand guarantees from Yushchenko that after the election he will not force them to join the Regions Party in a new coalition.

The latest surveys show that the pro-presidential political force has meager electoral chances. Baloha does not want to be left holding the bag after his political project fails and so has to restrain his ardor.

Yushchenko and his confidants keep declaring their determination to follow through, but their serious doubts as to the expediency of their venture are already visible.

The Regions Party is no longer enthusiastic about the election race. Most of its members, who hated to ally with Tymoshenko, regarded the early election as the only reasonable alternative to such an alliance, but now this “hard choice” looks petty vis-à-vis a far more serious problem: the party’s sponsors are running out of money and are reluctant to invest in the election campaign. One of them said recently, “The robbed don’t perform charities.” They are not even ready to continue paying the regular “party tithe.” Why should they sponsor Yushchenko’s election campaign?

They are too busy saving their assets to work at political projects. They are convinced that this crisis will hit both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko and believe that the lower their ratings fall the more votes the RP will collect.

They have every reason to expect Tymoshenko to become more compliant under the present political and economic circumstances and each of them wants to get his piece of the pie in a haggle. The RP team has never been so disunited.

The Tymoshenko team, which has always been known for discipline and submissive subordination, is confused as never before. Each player is waiting for a “miracle” but none imagines how Tymoshenko can work it out.

For months Tymoshenko has been advised to give up holding on to her post and vacate the “electric chair.” Now it is too late, even if she does.

Today she has the tactical advantage: Yushchenko is now less persistent about the election and has to echo her rhetoric about “confronting the crisis as one.” This is ingratiating, but what’s the use? The time for lip service is over and the leadership is unprepared to act.

Tymoshenko says she is ready for her Cabinet’s partial or even complete rotation. Many experts call her executive team the weakest one in the country’s independent history. The question is: where are those who are able to adequately respond to new challenges? Tymoshenko could invite practicing entrepreneurs, but once they occupy top positions they may just as well lobby for their own business. And after all, who would let them manage the country?

Tymoshenko is obviously on the horns of a dilemma: she knows that the government needs professionals (though she hardly knows where to find such kamikazes) and that she needs the majority in the parliament. To the latter end she is even ready to make concessions to Yushchenko, Yanukovych, and Akhmetov. The presence of their protégés in her Cabinet would even spare her the trouble of undivided responsibility for the possible fiasco. Her teammates explain, “Nothing doing – one has to break an egg to fry it.” They are right, but why break it over a trash can instead of a frying pan?

So far, the RP is not ready to delegate its men to the Tymoshenko Cabinet and is in no hurry to resume “peace talks” with her (on which she counts so much). Yushchenko does not want to close the books on the election issue. Both forces believe they have time to wait and see how painfully the crisis hits the country and how effectively Tymoshenko deals with it.

Tymoshenko has no time to wait. If her government proves to be helpless in the next few months, her career is doomed. She hopes to keep the situation under control for six months and counts on Yushchenko’s support. She does not expect him to put spokes in her wheel: if the country goes to pot, he will have to answer for it, too. For the time being she withholds criticism against him and his chancellery, but when the presidential race starts in summer she is going to put herself across as a “guardian angel” whose wings he has been cutting.

Yushchenko, on the contrary, plays up his role in saving the country from economic upheavals. He has almost given up on his idea of reelecting the parliament but has not decided yet how to explain his retreat. Admitting that Tymoshenko was right and he was not, he would own to his failure to follow through and so let his low popularity rating drop to zero. It was vitally important for him to get the parliament to adopt his version of the anti-crisis bill: if the resistance to the crisis proved to be consolidated and effective, he would attribute its success to himself; if not, then he would blame Tymoshenko for her failure to implement “such a good plan of saving the country.”

Meanwhile, Bankova keeps its horses ready for the race: if the situation worsens in the near three months, it will simply drown Tymoshenko in the way of popular anger and will have a good excuse for its possible alliance with the RP under the slogan of “uniting the East and West of the country in the face of economic collapse.”

Bankova may as well be contemplating another scheme: introduction of direct presidential rule and concentration of all power in the President’s hands. However, such a scheme is hardly feasible. Both Tymoshenko and her political rivals in the RP understand that it would frustrate their political plans because Yushchenko would conserve his regime at any cost. Besides, it is clear to everyone that Yushchenko is the least fit for the role of an “economic stabilizer.”

There are those who believe that his predecessor Leonid Kuchma would cope with this mission at the head of the government. Just imagine how many MPs would vote for him…

As we can see, the incumbent lawmakers are not only actively resisting the preterm election. They are resisting the hard choice of either joining hands or risking their heads. But they can no longer sit on the fence behind others’ backs…