«Having won without risk, you triumph without glory» - these words by great Pierre Corneille may well be addressed to today’s triumphers - leaders of major financial-political groups. Your author’s judgment could be doubted by many, but your humble servant has never had a single doubt about the Yushchenko government’s downfall since the very day when twelve months of the «Reforms for Welfare» program expired as did the moratorium on the Premier’s «shooting». The reasons why this Cabinet had very feeble chances to survive have been explained by ZN more than once and in every detail.

Still, let us take the trouble of recalling the main ones. First, Viktor Andriyovych stubbornly refused to bargain with any of those on whom his future depended - communists, oligarchs or the President. Of course, there were talks between the head of government and the head of state. But, according to trustworthy people, those talks were far from like bargaining. Second, this country’s official leader is known to be a man who places personal dedication above professionalism and who is apt sometimes to make decisions out of mere emotion rather than political expediency. Undoubtedly, Kuchma’s seven years of presidency have made him less impulsive and more experienced in intrigues. But Yushchenko is a very special case.

The President never bothered to conceal his dislike of the Premier. Even when he stood up for Yushchenko, one didn’t have to be shrewd to see in his manner and expressions: Kuchma doesn’t like Yushchenko. In the past year this attitude simply grew stronger. The President had every ground to consider the Premier a man leaning towards the opposition which was far from favorable for relationships between the two top leaders in the state. The President didn’t forget that Yushchenko had been, in fact, imposed on him. And Kuchma takes any pressure on him as a personal insult which he won’t bear. Moreso that the force which largely influenced his choice in December 1999 was Washington, and Kuchma has now very big accounts with the United States to square. To get a proof of it, it’s enough just to keep watching the 1st TV channel. And, finally, Kuchma won’t have rivals, and he has always believed Yushchenko to be his competitor. People in the know said that the President’s reaction to the Premier’s stable popularity was always harsh. And, as sources say, what infuriated Leonid Danylovych most was the fact that Yushchenko’s reputation remained high no matter what he was doing or whether he was doing anything at all. As everybody knows, sangfroid is not among the President’s best features. So the above is quite enough to conclude: his suppressed irritation and his vague leniency toward Yushchenko may well have transformed into something like hatred.

Did the President have a political need to preserve the Premier? Undoubtedly yes - the President has reasons to be afraid of oligarchs and has no reasons to break it off with the West. Did Kuchma understand that it was in his interests to preserve Yushchenko? Almost certainly: there were surely people among those well in with the President who took the risk of telling him about it. I can presume that it could have been Kuchma’s Chief of Staff Volodymyr Lytvyn and State Security Chief Volodymyr Radchenko. Not because they could ever be suspected of any warm feelings for Yushchenko. They simply don’t have such feelings for leaders of political-financial groups, either. And besides, they are obviously well aware of the jeopardy posed by clans.

How could the President have benefited from preserving the Yushchenko Cabinet? First, he would have shown oligarchs again who was the master in the political house. Second, he would have preserved the «buffer» between himself and the clans. Third, he would have partly calmed down the opposition. Fourth, he would have avoided further tensions in his relationship with the West.

What did the President risk by sacrificing the Yushchenko Cabinet? First, he was losing the last chance to restore the [parliament] majority (which he confirmed in public after the Premier’s dismissal). Second, he would get problems in the executive authority. The next Premier could be a protegee of the oligarchs, and that was a sure reinforcement of their power, which is absolutely not in the President’s interests. Besides, it is extremely difficult to find a candidate trusted by Parliament. In a way, an «Acting» Prime Minister would be good for the President. But isn’t it dangerous in such a complicated political and economic situation to give the tiller to an «interim» who is more likely than not to have no authority with people’s deputies or his own subordinates?

And one more circumstance that the President ought to have considered. It is obvious to everybody that the opposition has run short of strength. With Yushchenko leaving the Cabinet and (although not evident but quite possible) joining the camp of fighters against the regime, Kuchma would get a number of problems at once.

The opposition would get a long-awaited leader, a pretext to step up its activity and additional chances at the future parliamentary elections. The President would lose Yushchenko the subordinate and get Yushchenko the rival. Besides, the President was aware that «the judgment day» for the government would be accompanied by mass action. That the demonstrators would be armed with not only pro-Yushchenko, but also anti-Kuchma slogans. That after the «ex» prefix was added to the Premier, pro-government factions in Parliament could join the opposition.

That’s exactly what happened in the end. I don’t know how much «professionals» are normally paid for participation in mass actions, but I would ask the opposition and personally Viktor Andriyovych to spare no money to generously reward «amateur» Kuchma for the lavish PR he furnished the opposition on April 26. The most unpleasant thing for Kuchma ought to be the fact that the declaration of four pro-government factions on joining the opposition to the President was voiced by Ihor Yukhnovsky. Yukhnovsky and Kuchma have old ties. In 1991 Kuchma was Yukhnovsky’s proxy when he ran for President, in 1994 Yukhnovsky was candidate Kuchma’s proxy. Besides, one of the patriarchs of the national liberation movement did a lot to promote the «Yuzhmash» director to Premiership. And when it happened, it was Yukhnovsky whom the new Prime Minister invited to the post of First Vice Premier...

So why did Kuchma fail to uphold his unquestionable political rival and as unquestionable (in the given circumstances) political ally? Because of pressure from oligarchs? Sure, they did try to influence Kuchma’s position, and their arguments, perhaps, had a partial effect. But a similar attempt was made by the West, and the Ukrainian President was simply bound to reckon with its position. Quite obviously, the statements he made in Lithuania were prompted by his talks with Schroeder, Kwasniewski and, possibly, Adamkus.

There are all grounds to presume that the President wavered until the last moment. Yet, what happened was destined to happen. Leonid Danylovych dislikes Viktor Andriyovych too much to defend him openly. Moreso that Yushchenko was openly against compromises. I have a feeling that if Kuchma had dropped in at Yushchenko’s country house on Thursday where the sacked Premier arranged «a funeral banquet for the Cabinet», he should have said: «I could have saved you, Vitya [Ukr. friendly diminutive of Viktor]. But you should have done at least something for your own sake...» And such a phrase could sound almost sincere...

I will also take a risk of suggesting that those who initiated Yushchenko’s dismissal (above all Viktor Medvedchuk) knew too well the peculiar character of the nation’s supreme arbiter to doubt a practical success of their venture. Of course, the guarantor [sarcastic way of calling the President, the Constitution’s guarantor] made oligarchs a bit nervous, but in the end he did just as they had expected.

No, he didn’t impose his will openly on the factions controlled by him like he did last spring, for example, when the government’s action program was adopted, or last summer when the April national referendum’s results were about to be approved. He only suggested that leaders of parliament groups vote to please both the Ukrainian President and the Ukrainian people. That demonstrated, on the one hand, how hard it was for the President to choose between political expediency and enmity to Yushchenko, and on the other - how hard it was for Kuchma to get over that enmity.

That’s why I insist that no matter what, Yushchenko had practically no chances to withstand and the oligarchs had practically no chances to lose. The demarches by the «Batkivshchyna» [Fatherland], Progressive Republican and People’s Rukh [Movement] factions who desperately fought for the Premier only delayed a little the inevitable outcome...

The above-quoted Corneille’s phrase, to my mind, describes quite clearly the situation in which the oligarchs have found themselves. No matter how anxious they were in recent days, after all they didn’t risk a thing. But their feat of arms has brought them no big glory. Quite on the contrary - the recent events have increased the number of their opponents, both open and latent, both in the society and political circles. And, in fact, there is nothing special to celebrate. They are facing a much more serious challenge - electing the new Prime Minister. The «Acting Premier» option (no matter what name is added to it) is not in their interests: the parliament doesn’t have effective levers of influence on an acting prime minister.

According to well-informed sources, «the hunters» [for Yushchenko] failed to agree in advance on a possible substutute, and they decided to put off the issue. The circle of feasible substitutes is very wide. We won’t consider the candidatures of Yevhen Marchuk, Volodymyr Shcherban and Valentyn Symonenko (with all our respect for those politicians). Each of them may be suitable for the «acting» position, but none of them is likely to collect 226 votes in Parliament. Viktor Medvedchuk may have the same problems, should he try his hand at premiership.

The leaders of «Labor Ukraine», the National Democratic Party, the «Regions» etc. still possess their faculties, and they are not going to give such an advantage to their political and business competitors from the Social Democratic Party (United). Mykola Azarov and Serhiy Tyhipko have more chances, but the Communists have announced that they will vote for neither. A lot depends now on their most numerous faction. After the majority fell apart and «Batkivshchyna», Progressive Republicans and Rukhites joined the hardline opposition, there can be no doubt that these factions, together with Socialists, will do all they can to bury practically any candidature, no matter who offers it - the President, oligarchs or communists.

In the meantime, the Communists have found themselves in a difficult situation. They have got lost in their game with the oligarchs, which can do their reputation no good, and a tarnished image with elections just around the corner is a dangerous thing. That’s why the Communist faction, namely its leaders Petro Symonenko, Georgiy Kryuchkov and Petro Tsybenko have announced their intention to propose their own candidate for the Premier’s post (most likely it will be Stanislav Hurenko, currently active as never before), and also their readiness to assume responsibility for the government’s moves in case they get an opportunity to have a hand in forming the new Cabinet. At the same time they have announced that they will turn down not only Azarov and Tyhipko, but any other candidate submitted by the President if he is not compatible with CPU requirements. In other words, if at least something about the new Prime Minister looks market-like. Almost for sure, the Communists will become more tractable later, but at first they will simply have to keep their brave political face.

The Communists can’t but realize: in these circumstances they have a wonderful opportunity to claim their rights. At the same time they are aware that they have little chance to make Hurenko Prime Minister. And should they really take such a risk a year ahead of elections? But turning the CPU’s former First Secretary into a Vice Premier and getting hold of a few more «lucrative» posts would be not too bad for Symonenko & Co. According to representatives of pro-president factions, the Communists have let oligarchs know about their ambitions. But so far oligarchs are in no hurry to meet them. So the bargain is to be hard. It’s difficult to forecast its outcome since the process has only just begun.

Apparently, Volodymyr Horbulin and Oleksander Omelchenko, also named among possible candidates, have little chances, too. If the available information can be trusted, the President is not willing to promote them to Premiership. Although Horbulin’s candidature could be agreeable in principle, because he dislikes oligarchs just as Yushchenko does.

It is Oleh Dubyna who appears to be the only real candidate today. He doesn’t cause allergy with communists, he doesn’t have any special enemies so far, and he doesn’t show any special ambitions. He has a reputation (hard to say how well deserved) of a man not tied to clans. Finally, the President favors him. And maybe that’s why Leonid Kuchma might want to keep him. According to unconfirmed information, in the situation where the President has driven himself into, it is more advantageous for him to have a temporary, provisional figure at the Premier’s post. That is, an industrious and trustworthy man. But one who could be «surrendered» without regret at an appropriate moment, at election time. And who could be made a scapegoat without regret. So far such a man is not in sight. But in the nearest days his shape is going to emerge. And Dubyna can be appointed later. If he doesn’t disappoint the President by then, or those who will be solving staff issues for him.

Anyway, the chances for Dubyna to stay in the government are pretty high. So far the same chances are with Anatoliy Zlenko, Oleksander Kuzmuk, Ihor Mityukov and Vasyl Rohoviy. But everything may change tomorrow. There are equally high chances that a suitable candidate won’t be found, and the Cabinet will be led by an «Acting» man: the recent developments have made the supreme law-making body too much exfoliated.

The past week has shown that the number of opposition members in Parliament may grow. The motion to include in the session’s agenda the item of impeachment to the President collected a surprisingly big number of votes - 209. Just to compare: on September 14 a similar motion was supported only by 140 people’s representatives. The main sensation was the «yea» by part of the «Solidarity» group which hasn’t joined the opposition yet, but seems to be gradually giving up its pro-presidential stance...

So it’s only the beginning.