In human terms this scientific label means that every day and month may be worth two or even three. The turmoil of these last months has fatigued us all, not only the politicians - those who are directly involved. And not only those who give their last penny for a newspaper, still hoping, believing and going to bed after midnight, after news of the day that become shorter and falser. We are all tired - we, the people of Ukraine, staunch and patient, and stronger than metal. This is shown by the returns of the September 18-24, 2002 national poll, conducted by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Center [of Economic and Political Studies]. Interviews were taken individually from 2002 respondents aged 18 and over.

We have seen once again that the common people are wiser than politicians think and even wiser than politicians are. The people do not trust the authorities any more. Today the people are mostly on the side of the opposition. Yet, disappointment with its actions is already visible. The people want to look into the future with hope, but few are ready to fight for their right to a better future. The people don’t understand everything, but they are able to see the truth in the floods of lies. There are grounds to presume that if parliamentary elections were announced today, they would not be so disheartening as they were on March 31, and our choice would be somewhat different.

No Dialogue Between the People and the Government

The poll has shown that more than a half of Ukraine’s adult population (52% - 54%) do not support the authorities, do not trust them and want changes.

55.3% of respondents support the main demand of the protest action “Arise, Ukraine!”: President Kuchma’s impeachment (this demand is not supported by 29.5%).

54% do not agree that the protest action poses a threat to Ukraine’s national security or may trigger a civil war (27% believe in the authorities’ “horror stories”).

52% of respondents do not agree with to Kyiv city authorities’ ban on holding the action in the central part of the city and their recommendation to stage it at a suburban airfield; they maintain that “the aim was to create difficulties for the protest action and not to let more people know about it (23.3% believe that “the decision was dictated by [the authorities’] concern for public order in the center of the city and convenience of those who were not involved”).

54.6% condemn the authorities who dismantled the protesters’ tent camp in front of the Presidential Administration [on the night of September 16-17 ], saying it was “suppression of the opposition action by force” (the step is supported by 26.2%).

67% call the criminal case filed by prosecutors against the organizers of the action “Arise, Ukraine!” political, not criminal (ten times fewer people - 6.7% - agree with the prosecutors).

The above figures prove whose arguments - the government’s or the opposition’s - are more convincing to the public. Why? Because the authorities’ arguments are a power which is based on force rather than intellect; because they are an instrument of suppression rather than a means of prescience and prevention. And specialists estimate that preventing a conflict is ten times cheaper than controlling it.

The way the authorities behaved before and during the [September 16] protest action testifies to one thing: they failed to prevent it. Because it was not spontaneous (it had been announced long before), the preparations were slow, the beginning was placid. Besides, the authorities had repeatedly received signals of readiness to negotiate from some of the opposition forces (mostly from Viktor Yushchenko, the leader of “Our Ukraine”).

But the authorities chose to behave as they had always done, resorting to their three usual arguments. Number one: there is no alternative replacement to those in office, the opposition has no convincing program for action (the fact that the President has never had one seems to have been overlooked). Number two: the opposition is something irrelevant - all its members are “one-timers, now disfavored”; besides, because of their different ideologies and the absence of a uniting idea, they are about ready to fall apart. Number three: the opposition is a threat to national security, it could lead to a revolution, a civil war. These arguments contradict one another: why be afraid of what is weak and unstable? As we can see, the government fails, as before, to offer any convincing arguments.

What is really worth our attention is not the arguments, but the steps taken by the authorities - a subject for serious discussion in the National Security and Defense Council. Where is its Secretary? Is he still in office? He, being in charge of the Council’s agenda, does not seem to be bothered by the fact that not “homeless and schizophrenic individuals”, but regional councils of several eastern regions threaten the President. By their attempts to change his declared foreign policy and stage referenda - on the official status for the Russian language, on joining the union of Russia and Belarus or even the Eurasian Economic Union. When the Crimean Communist No.1 [the then Crimean Parliament Speaker Leonid Grach] threatened in February to announce a referendum [on seceding from Ukraine and joining the Russian Federation] in a much milder manner, everyone stood up against him and saved the country. Would the authorities tolerate attempts to tear the country asunder only to reduce the scale of (legal and peaceful!) protest actions by a few thousand people?

By resorting to force and threats, the authorities demonstrate their weakness. A strong leadership, relying on popular support, is not afraid of dialogue, openness, responsibility or reform. Our leaders were afraid, as they demonstrated strong muscles and weak brains. As a result, they the lost trust and the support of the people.

The biggest loser is, as expected, the President. He has the two lowest indexes among all state institutions. Firstly, his actions are not supported by the greatest number of Ukrainians - 53.3% (the police is rated second - 46.3%, the parliament is rated third - 45.1%). Secondly, his actions are supported by the least number of Ukrainians - a mere 6.6% completely and 34.6% partly (totaling 41.2%); the figure for the police is 43.9%, for the parliament - 46%. The indexes of other governmental structures - the Cabinet of Ministers, governor offices and local self-governments are notably higher.

Leonid Kuchma as a person, a political figure is judges even more critically: he is supported by 5.9% completely and by 29.8% - partly (which totals 35.7%), while more than half the country’s population - 57% do not support him. No other top-placed Ukrainian politician has such a high negative index - the rest “enjoy” 50% or less. The growing potential of protest against the President is alarming. May: 7.7% of complete supporters vs. 51.3% of those who did not support him at all; June: 7.5% vs. 53.6%; August: 6.4% vs. 54.1%; September: 5.9% vs. 57% respectively. During the summer, President Kuchma lost about 700,000 supporters and gained two million new enemies. Answering the direct question about a change in their attitude to Leonid Kuchma since the March parliamentary elections, 34.6% of respondents said that it had become worse, and only 4.2% said that it had become better.

54.5% of Ukrainians disbelieve the sincerity of the President’s intention to alter the form of government in Ukraine which he announced on August 24: 17.6% of them see behind it “the President’s intention to shift the responsibility for his own deeds onto the shoulders of Parliament”; 16.3% view this step as a “concession under pressure from the opposition”; another 20.6% - as an attempt to foil the opposition’s protest action by declaring his readiness to cede some of his authority to Parliament; and only 9.3% are convinced that the President wants to “raise the level of democracy in Ukraine”. And 50.9% of all respondents do believe that the country needs the political reform, the necessity of which the President stated.

The popularity rating of Kuchma’s closest environment tends towards zero as well. Vice Prime Minister V.Semynozhenko, who is known to advocate Kuchma’s prolonged term in office, enjoys a mere 0.3%; S.Tyhypko, who broke his back to form a parliamentary majority to Kuchma’s liking, has 0.9%; V.Lytvyn, “dispatched” by the President to the Speaker’s post, has 1.4%.

What is the reason? Of course, the “tape” and other scandals have not passed unnoticed. Yet, the monthly monitoring of public attitude to the President shows that he has frittered away his political capital and credit of trust, especially during and after the election campaign. Instead of ensuring equal rights for all candidates, the President backed an unpopular political force and pressured those who were the people’s hope for the better. Then he meddled in parliamentary affairs; his pressure on the opposition persisted. The thus provoked protests were strangled by the authorities. In doing so, they transgressed the limits of legality and human morality.

Their deeds did not go unnoticed by the public. Consequently, the loss of trust in the President has become a steady process; whatever initiatives or slogans he proclaims, he is most unlikely to retrieve the former trust. It looks like we are not the first to come to this conclusion: the President’s and other politicians’ popularity ratings have practically vanished lately from the Ukrainian mass media, as if all pollsters had stopped working. This alarming trend must have been noticed by political experts working for Bankova who corrected their “recommendations” to the press. At least M.Pogrebinsky of the Kyiv Center of Political and Conflict Studies and M.Mykhalchenko of the All-Ukraine Sociological Service that was established by Kuchma’s directive, who used to publish Ukrainian politicians’ popularity ratings on a regular basis, now keep away from journalists.

No Way of Carrying On Like This.

Which Way Then?

Judging from the opinion polls of the past two years, the opposition did not have to work too hard to form a social base and muster public support. It only had to listen to the smoldering grumble of discontent outside the government walls. The opposition responded like a sensor that reacts to deviations from the norm and sends a signal to the control system where corresponding decisions are made. But the control system pretended that the sensor was wrong, so the displayed deviations from normal were interpreted as the intrigues of enemies of the state.

In such circumstances, the opposition had no difficulty buying support with negative slogans like “No way of carrying on like this!”, “Shame!”, “Get out!”, and anything that goes well with “Down with” and any number of exclamation marks. It was more difficult to rally the people, but that was a problem of organization and resources. To the merit of the troika of opposition leaders [Tymoshenko, Symonenko, Moroz], they managed.

The people, unheeded by such big political leaders before, now got a chance to be heard and wed it. Naturally, the people and the authorities see the opposition and the protest action initiated by it in entirely different ways.

Unlike the authorities, the overwhelming majority of common people (67.5%) maintain that the opposition’s actions pose a threat neither to the nation as a whole (67.5%), nor to them personally (81.2%). Moreover, 16.5% are convinced that the actions were good for Ukraine versus 7.3% of those who state the opposite; 9.1% say that they personally gained from the actions and 3.1% say that they suffered or lost from them.

As for the threat to the President, the common citizens’ and the authorities’ opinions coincide here. 50.4% of respondents confirm that the opposition’s actions pose a threat to the President (31.3% are negative). Almost a quarter of respondents (23.6%) believe that they pose a threat to the oligarchic clans (46.3% do not think so).

In fact, the public has developed a more favorable attitude to the political forces involved in the protest actions. [Yushchenko’s] “Our Ukraine” has gained 13%, the Socialist Party - 9%, the Communist Party - 8%, Yulia Tymoshenko’s Bloc - 7%. As usual, the least active are rewarded best of all…

The personal ratings of the opposition leaders have grown substantially, too, unlike those of the President and his close circle. If presidential elections were held “next Sunday”, no one would win in the first round, and the second round would be contested by Yushchenko (25%) and Symonenko (12%). And if by next Sunday Yushchenko made a final choice from among his numerous hobbies - painting or bee-keeping, and left public politics, the figures would be different. Not in the authorities’ favor, though. The first round would bring no winner, and the second round would involve Tymoshenko (13.1%) and Symonenko (12.7%). Either way, the opposition would remain in the race. And there are grounds to expect that Symonenko would not win in the second round, because Leonid Kuchma has succeeded twice in scaring Ukrainians with the “red” menace.

Yet, the fairest chances for presidency rest with Yushchenko. Strange are the ways… Or are they already laid out? Although Yushchenko took no part at all in organizing the protest action, Ukrainians (at least 28% of them) still look upon him as the leader (?!) of the opposition (?!). Tymoshenko should be content with a mere 13.2%, Symonenko - 11%, and Moroz - 7.6%.

But one way or another, with an appointed or a self-promoted leader, the opposition enjoys tangible popular support. Unlike the authorities.

The opposition has managed to partly break through the information blockade, to make the nation hear and talk about it. It looks like Tymoshenko is going to keep her promise - to make the authorities go to bed, sleep and wake up thinking about the opposition. Thus, one of the declared goals - to amplify the muttered grumble up to a powerful roar - has been achieved. Most Ukrainians do not want to live like this any longer and who must “Get out!” has been heard not only on Pechersk Hill [the seat of the Presidential Administration in Kyiv], but on Capitol Hill as well.

The opposition has consolidated after September 16. Now, estimating its strength more realistically, it is besieging the government. This is something more dangerous to them than a lightning attack on the local Bastille. They have quite legitimate means to counter single-stroke attacks. But they have no remedy for a creeping, latent opposition. It is like flu without high temperature - nothing to treat, but a lethal outcome is possible.

Can the opposition bestir the nation to revolt? Hardly. Firstly, because it has come to understand that without provoking the authorities it can achieve a lot more. Secondly, because it is not that easy to bestir Ukrainians.

In August, every fifth respondent (21.2%) was ready to participate in opposition actions; in September this intention was shared only by every tenth - 10.1%; only 3% said that they took part in the September 16 protest action. Will this mean that in a month’s time Ukrainians will begin to love their President like their neighbor? No. In August, the principal idea of the action - Kuchma’s impeachment - was supported by 52.4% of respondents, in September - by 55.3%; it was not supported by 28.9% and 29.5% respectively. In general, nothing has changed in the people’s attitude to the President. But something keeps them from rallying on the streets.

The reasons why those who intended to but did not participate in the actions of protest are both sad and funny. A third of them (33.2%) had no money, another third (33.8%) were ill or out of town, 13% felt unsure that the action would succeed, 4% stayed away, being afraid of counter-measures from the authorities, police, their bosses etc. Such fears were justified: 6.5% were pressured by their seniors, teachers or local authorities; 4.1% were stopped and checked by road police without sound explanations or not allowed to drive into the city; 3.5% reported direct bans on street rallies; 2.9% said that they were pressured by law enforcement or local authorities; 2.8% had problems entering Kyiv or other regional centers by public transport; 1.4% reported police and tax checkups of businessmen who supported the opposition; 1.3% reported other facts of pressure or obstruction. So Ukrainian citizens were shown once again that constitutional rights exist not for all.

On September 24, the opposition did not gather as many supporters as on September 16. Does it mean that the people do not trust the opposition anymore and do not intend to support it in the future? No. We conducted this poll exactly in between these two dates. The absence of a big crowd in front of the parliament building on September 24 must mean only one thing: the people are going to wait for the elections. They already had their say not long ago …

With a relationship like this, could the authorities restore its former level of trust and support? In theory, they could, if they raised visibly the level of well-being in this country. The poll conducted on the eve of the protest action showed that only 14.8% would choose democracy between democracy and well-being; more than a half of Ukrainians (57.1%) could agree to live in a country with serious restrictions of rights and liberties, but with high living standards. The higher the level, the fewer dissatisfied citizens. This was proven by a phone poll among Kyivans on September 19, right after the action. The resolution adopted during the protest rally, demanding the President’s impeachment, was supported only by 44% of respondents, versus 55.3% Ukraine-wide (71.7% of Ukrainians are positive about the President’s voluntary resignation).

The reasons for such differences are obvious. Average monthly salaries in Kyiv stood at UAH 680 [$128] in June, which is a lot higher than the country’s average (UAH 398 [$71] and the salaries in the Ternopil region (UAH 250 [$47]). As of September 1, official unemployment in Kyiv stood at 0.5%. In the Rivne region it was 14 times higher - 7.1%. Hence the difference in support for the opposition’s ideas. Can the authorities provide a decent standard of living outside the capital city? The experience of the past eight years gives a negative answer. The people have long since stopped trusting the authorities and believing their promises.

Another way for the authorities could be negotiations with the opposition, in order to ease the tension by a joint effort and start a concrete and honest dialogue. Are they ready for that? Negative again. They proved it on September 16 by fleeing to Salzburg and dismantling the tent camp, and reaffirmed it on September 24 by keeping members of parliament waiting on a staircase inside the Presidential Administration building.

So, the authorities have only one argument left - authority. It is no tautology. If the authorities send for “court officers” with batons, it means that they are afraid and weak. But it also means that this cannot last long. Today or maybe tomorrow the police will say that they cannot control the whole country. It is possible to “handle” a dozen or two MPs who run some private businesses, to browbeat 226 MPs - for a vote or two, to post SWAT men around all TV and radio centers, bridges - for a week or two, a month. But it is practically impossible to block the entire country, to block all businessmen who are sick and tired of this unfair game without rules, to suppress all the people’s representatives who are tired of being a chorus in this one-man show. Very soon the authorities will exhaust their limited reserves of legitimate and illegitimate repressive tools.

The authorities can not hear well - both the citizens of this country and justified questions from abroad. They try to give answers not to those who put them. Ukraine is asked about “Kolchuga” [radar systems allegedly sold by Ukraine to Iraq in violation of UN sanctions] by its strategic partner, but the authorities rush to the United Nations for clarifications and answer a different question - not the one it is asked. Do they really believe that if they can play deaf and dumb inside this country, any other countries will buy this stuff? The authorities are at the limit, beyond which the international community’s opinion loses its sense and meaning…

It is really necessary to negotiate. At least in order to do one thing for the future - do everything possible so that the next elections are at least up to the 1994 standards of access to information, democracy and transparency. The people will name the winner - the government or the opposition. The people have demonstrated that this is where the politicians can trust them.