Very soon we will be witnessing a restructuring of political forces in the Supreme Rada. Yushchenko, Lytvyn and Yanukovych are likely to become major focal points in the process. If on 26 December everything goes as the logic of the latest developments suggests, pro-Yushchenko forces will come to power, Yanukovych’s supporte s will form the opposition, while Lytvyn and his allies will position themselves as a cautious, yet steadfast, third force.

The next Parliament will be entitled to form the government. This, aligned with the expanded mandate of the next Supreme Rada per se adds all the more point and pungency to the struggle for parliamentary majority.

The Razumkov Centre, aiming to ascertain the electorate’s attitude to the present party brands, surveyed over two thousand respondents in 118 settlements throughout Ukraine. The survey conducted on 6-9 December was also meant to remind the voters that, apart from presidential candidates, they will soon have to choose among a host of parties striving to get to Parliament in a year from now. A week later, on 14-19 December, the respondents were also asked to range top-twenty political parties (blocs of parties were not mentioned either in the first or in the second poll), but this time the names of their leaders were provided, which affected the survey outcome in a number of cases. The data obtained enables sociologists to assess the potential performance of Ukraine’s major political parties and alliances in the run-up to the new election race.

Viktor Yushchenko badly needs a majority in the next Rada. If his followers win this majority, the new president will be able to implement his election platform in full and to extend his influence even after the constitutional amendments enter into force. A sympathetic parliamentary majority will enable Viktor Yushchenko remain the leading figure in state hierarchy, like Polish president Alexander Kwasniewsky who has a majority in the Seym. For the Yushchenko allies, be it parties or blocs, to win the 2006 parliamentary elections, at least three key conditions should be in place.

First, the government formed by Yushchenko should, within a year, develop and implement a policy that will yield tangible results for most citizens in Ukraine. It is a grinding task to undertake even in a “peaceful” situation. Yet given the fierce resistance likely to be put up by the mighty opposition, Russia’s possible reluctance to show understanding in matters of mutual interest, and the government’s probable staffing with the people who actively supported the campaign winner (as a token of appreciation of their contribution), it may prove an insurmountable difficulty for the new authorities. Now, at the height of the presidential campaign, 29 per cent of our compatriots are ready to back up the “Our Ukraine” Party. However, should they get disappointed in this force, which is almost inevitable in view of the current, overly high social expectations, the pro-Yushchenko political force could lose part of its rating to Volodymyr Lytvyn’s supporters (likely to absorb a more conservative electorate) or to Yuliya Tymoshenko’s enthusiasts (who will attract a more radical cohort). Olexander Moroz could also take over some points. The three above politicians are well aware of the fact and, obviously, count on it.

Second, Viktor Yushchenko has no political structure behind him. In the heat of the campaign, Viktor Pynzenyk’s “Reforms and Order” Party appropriated, to put it mildly, the brand “Our Ukraine”, realizing that under the circumstances their fellow-bloc-members would hardly stir up a public dispute. The “Reforms and Order” voted for renaming the party, while their colleagues within the bloc, taken aback by the impertinence and guile of it, decided Pynzenyk and Co would not go beyond declarations and the scandal will die away in the wake of the elections. However, the leaders of the newly formed “Our Ukraine” Party re-registered it with the Ministry of Justice, thus securing their right to the brand of Viktor Yushchenko’s “Our Ukraine” bloc. Moreover, they claim orange has always been their party’s colour. Since only political analysts followed these developments, the overwhelming majority of voters will, no doubt, be very surprised to learn that the OU leader’s name is Viktor Pynzenyk, rather than Viktor Yushchenko. It will take some time for the news to seep in, yet today already the “Our Ukraine” (former “Reforms and Order”) Party led by Pynzenyk gets 17 (as opposed to 29) per cent of votes that can be put down to a colossal inertia of public perception, which will disappear, slowly but steadily, as the people apprehend the substitution.

Therefore, Yushchenko has three options as to his feasible modus agendi. The first is to try and reach an agreement with the “Reforms and Order” leaders on restoring the previous status quo. In the meantime he could beef up the “Our Ukraine” bloc with other minor parties and boost it up with his presidential credibility. The second option is to become a formal leader of the new “Our Ukraine” Party and then to beef and boost it up as above. However, it will jeopardize his relations with other parties within the bloc. The third option is to sue Pynzenyk and, should he succeed, to organize a new party under a popular OU brand. Alternatively, he may choose to stay above party allegiances as an outside observer of the parties’ fight for parliamentary clout.

The fight is going to be tough, since most of the OU bloc-forming parties have been outshined by the bloc leader. Thus, Yuriy Kostenko’s party is supported by as few as 0.4-0.9 per cent of voters. The once powerful political brand “Popular Movement of Ukraine” (Rukh) is almost a nonentity to the public at large: it has 0.6 per cent of the vote without a reference to its leader Tarasiuk and 1.0 per cent when Tarasiuk’s name is mentioned. The Rukh is unlikely to mobilize a greater support even if Tarasiuk gets appointed as foreign minister. Russia is not going to welcome him too heartily; therefore he will have to curtsey to Moscow, of which he seems fully aware judging by his article in the “Observer” Internet outlet. This will hardly win him brownie points with the Rukh’s electorate in Western Ukraine, which is the only electorate available to the Rukh. Petro Poroshenko’s “Solidarity” Party has long been forgotten. Despite its leader’s popularity, it won’t get more than 1.0 per cent of the vote. Should Poroshenko outrun his contenders in the race for prime ministerial post, he could muster the necessary 3 per cent for overcoming the entry barrier. Yet with whom Poroshenko will ally himself at the next elections - with Viktor Yushchenko or with Volodymyr Lytvyn - is still an open question.

Thus, Yushchenko is yet to find a political force to represent him in the future Rada. He is also to decide whether this political force will be a bloc, a unified party formed from those presently constituting “Our Ukraine”, or a new structure under the old brand. The membership of this structure will hinge on whether “parliamentary immunity” will be abolished or preserved. In the former case, the core of a new political force will be made up of lawyers, economists and other relevant professionals whose full-time engagement will ensure the Supreme Rada’s top efficiency. In the latter case, the next parliament will yet again be composed of businessmen and notorious politicians seeking protection. Put differently, the MP corps will not be noticeably transformed, which threatens to thwart all hopes for totally different rules of the game.

Third, Yushchenko should be concerned over the number of future MPs loyal to him and his policies. You will remember that the latest amendments to the law on parliamentary elections in Ukraine have lowered the qualifying barrier to 3 per cent, thus opening access to many political entities capable of mobilizing sufficient effort. Assuming that Yushchenko has secured his brand and his government has been successful enough to retain the existing electoral backing of “Our Ukraine”, there will, nevertheless, be no unanimously pro-Yushchenko majority in the Rada; there may be no single political force with a controlling “bloc of shares” there at all. Hence, a number of factions and groups may have a vested interest in amending the parliamentary election law again, this time to raise the entry barrier. Amongst them are Yushchenko’s outright opponents, including the Communists and “Regions of Ukraine”. Besides, Volodymyr Lytvyn’s Popular Agrarian Party, whose present rating is low but has a good potential for growing thanks to the Speaker’s improving reputation and to the respective faction’s recent enlargement to almost 40 MPs, may second the motion for the barrier raise. Olexander Moroz may feel confident enough to join the club. The Turkish model of 10 per cent will hardly work, but the cut-off screen can be set up at 5-7 per cent. Anyway, 226 votes required for approving the amendment could be collected in today’s Parliament. Should this happen, the next Supreme Rada will consist of five to six factions, which would streamline and stabilize its work.

At this juncture, Viktor Yushchenko’s partners in the “Force of People” coalition should be discussed. The “Fatherland” Party without Yuliya Tymoshenko enjoys support of 1.0 per cent of the voters. The mentioning of “lady revolution” enhances this support to 6.7 per cent, and that can be improved dramatically. Tymoshenko can expect some attractive avenues to open to her. She will be offered some position of consequence, there is no doubt of that. It will hardly be that of prime minister, but one can rest assured that even if appointed minister of labour Yuliya Tymoshenko will turn the agency into the hub of Ukrainian politics. If she decides to join the new team at the helm, she will try to distance herself from the mainstream, to demonstrate progress in whatever area she is responsible for, and utilize, to the utmost capacity, the human resources of her party in the central and local governments. It is clear that Tymoshenko will get to the next Rada. What is not quite clear yet is who she will join forces with when in Parliament and who she will have on her party list. Anatoliy Matviyenko and his “Sobor” Party are unlikely to be there. Naturally, she will be number one on the list, Turchinov - number two, but what about number three, four, five?.. Two years ago voters did not seem to care about the whole list. Now the situation is different. So Yuliya Tymoshenko will have to think what crew to bring to the Rada and how to manage it ever after. Some experts say she may choose to invite on board leaders of the “Pora” Civil Campaign, a movement that mobilized the youth for political activity. Yet for one thing, “Pora” activists are close to some of “Our Ukraine” members, and for another, the organization itself may want to establish a political party, with fair parliamentary chances.

A youth political party, albeit leftist, has long been a brainchild of Yuriy Lutsenko, a fondling of Maidan and many “orange revolution” sympathizers. What held Lustenko and a handful of other progressively-minded Socialists back from organizing a new party was the lack of clarity with its potential sponsors, as well as filial piety and love of Olexander Moroz. Whereas there will be no shortage of sponsors in view of the upcoming parliamentary, regional and local elections, the moral aspects of relations with Moroz are much more complicated. Therefore Lutsenko may contend himself with a post in the new government and give plans to build a leftist youth party.

The idea to appoint Moroz as prime minister has not been abandoned irretrievably. Yet even if it were, the Socialists would, nonetheless, get their share of portfolios in the new government pursuant to their pre-election contract with Yushchenko. Not only does it apply to ministerial positions, but to governor ones as well. It is not that the SPU can boast a crowd of good managers, but the contract should be honoured. Thus, the Socialists will get a significant resource of authority, but they will also have to share with Yushchenko’s team the responsibility for the efficacy of jointly pursued economic, social and human policy. At this stage, it is hard to predict how it is going to affect the party’s rating and how faithful will the Socialists prove to be as the future president’s allies in Parliament. Today this chronically oppositional party is attached to Yushchenko solely due to the prospects of collaborating in the new government, whose lifetime is reduced to sixteen months, after which the new Rada will form a new Cabinet. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the Socialists will get an offer to form the majority from the “Regions of Ukraine”, Lytvyn’s political force or the Social-Democrats. Besides, the SPU leader must be hoping to gain over a part of leftist electorate disillusioned in the Communist leader Petro Symonenko. If he manages to do so, he will lead a strong force to be reckoned with.

2006 is going to be a crunch year for Viktor Yanukovych and the forces associated with him. If these forces win the parliamentary elections and form an anti-Yushchenko majority, the single candidate’s team will create the government and return to power. The nucleus of the anti-Yushchenko coalition is, of course, the “Regions of Ukraine” Party and its leader viewed as representing the interests of voters in South-Eastern Ukraine. Unless the Yushchenko team manages to get rid of the dividing lines, the “Regions” will keep their present electorate amounting to 14 per cent. If Yanukovych continues to lead the party, its rating will rise even higher, to 20 per cent, which is the best result, given that “Our Ukraine” headed by Pynzenyk has 17 per cent.

Russia will, certainly, be closely following the 2006 elections. For the Kremlin, it is also a chance of revanche, and Putin’s clout should not be underrated. The Russian strategists have already got a preliminary plan: acting through a proxy Ukrainian company, Moscow buys the controlling block of shares in the national Inter TV Channel, a private Russian business structure purchases the New Channel, and, coupled with Prutnik’s NTN Channel, Akhmetov’s Ukraine TV and Radio Company and a K Channel (being currently incorporated, reportedly, with the EUROTRANSGAS sponsorship) they form a powerful pool of electronic media supportive of the pro-Russian forces in Ukraine. I will not even comment on the print media, where the Russian “fifth column” is already at work. Thus the new government will face a very strong opposition with potent electoral, media and financial resources. A lot will depend on how effectively the state, headed by Yushchenko, will be withstanding the foreign intervention, what policy it will be carrying out in southern and eastern regions, what it will accomplish there in the short time it has, and how successful it will prove in breaking through the information blockade. It is also crucial how the new government is going to establish and cultivate contacts with the influential tycoons in those regions. The Yanukovych team is a decisive factor in and of itself. It has lost players between the run-off and the re-run: Serhiy Liovochkin is no longer with them; Anatoliy Tolstoukhov has replaced Andriy Kliuyev as a shadow HQ head, the Donbass Industrial Union leaders have made an attempt to behave in a civilized manner. With Kyiv’s wise treatment, the Donbass kingdom, full of contradictions as it is, could break up into isolated political-financial principalities. Otherwise, it could consolidate for the sake of survival. Yanukovych’s future is equally vague: he is nothing without Akhmetov’s money and Moscow’s backing. Under certain circumstances his partners may go for a worthier object to investing their technological, financial and other resources.

“Regions of Ukraine” have problems with satellite-parties. The single candidate’s campaign and the collapse of “For a United Ukraine!” bloc have undermined the formerly pro-governmental parties. Thus, the rating of “Labour Ukraine”, which Serhiy Tyhypko promises to transfer into a leftist one, is 0.9 per cent when assessed without the leader, and 1.5 per cent with him. The Agrarian Party has recruited Volodymyr Lytvyn, and [Minister of Transport] Heorhiy Kyrpa is, purportedly, eager to fund it. Lytvyn has buttressed his faction with the MPs that left Valeriy Pustovoitenko’s People’s Democratic Party. The remaining members of Olexander Yaroslavsky’s faction, commonly known as “Democratic Initiatives”, may also seek haven in the Speaker’s faction. The unified Social-Democrats will not add popularity to the “Regions”: only 1.9 per cent of voters are ready to support the SDPU(o), this rating drops to 1.2 per cent as soon as Viktor Medvedchuk’s name in mentioned. Unless the Social-Democrats take urgent steps to remedy the situation, the party runs the risk of turning into a business club, similar to the one created some time ago by Volodymyr Matviyenko from the Prominvestbank personnel. And unless the SDPU(o) replaces the leader, it runs the risk of shrinking from a national-scale party into that of the Kyiv septet (which, in fact, ceased to be a septet with Yuriy Liakh’s death). Alternatively, the incumbent party leader could unite with the leftists or snatch the Russian flag from the “Regions” leader’s hands.

In any case, if the entry battier is raised, none of the presently pro-governmental parties, except for the “Regions of Ukraine”, will get to Parliament. For an effective partnership, the “Regions” should look towards the Communists. As the survey outcome shows, the potential pro-Communist electorate does not attach any significant value to the party leader Petro Symonenko. By joining effort with the “Regions”, the Communists could maintain, or slightly improve, their rating. At the same time, the principal Communist electorate comes from the areas where Yanukovych’s party is most active. The “Regions” have adopted all Communist slogans, thus it can take over the CPU voters as well. The Communists could replace the leader and revise their party list to incorporate a younger generation politicians, but I doubt they will dare to do so.

So the “Regions of Ukraine” may perform well at the parliamentary elections, but they are bound to have difficulty finding partners for a coalition needed to form the majority. They will hardly entice Lytvyn; their grouping with the Communists is achievable but insufficient; a conglomerate with tiny parties is also possible, in spite of all past recriminations and betrayals, but clashing ambitions of the Social-Democrats, “Labour Ukraine” and other party leaders who suffered great losses during the presidential campaign can be a major stumbling block. There is no time for rearing new leaders, or parties, for that matter. For instance, the party that [ex-governor of Kharkiv Oblast] Kushnariov claims to be building to advocate the interests of voters from Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia could, in theory, overcome the 3 per cent entry barrier. Yet why should the “Regions” share seats in Parliament with a new organization headed by a crotchety leader if they can have those votes for themselves, which is if special importance in the event of the barrier rise to 5-7 per cent.

The intra- and inter-party arrangements seem complex. The struggle for the future Supreme Rada is not going to be easy, either. It will start on the next day after the new president’s inauguration. We hope it does not engulf all politicians and they will have enough wisdom, responsibility and good judgment to find the time and stamina for responding to the challenges that face our awakening society. The “orange revolution” has imbued people with new expectations. These expectations are so great that no government will be able to live up to them, or fully meet them, but the government can and must bring new life to the nation and implement practical reforms that would change it for the better. It is the matter of honour for the new president, new government, and existing, increasingly adequate, Parliament.

Otherwise, what have we all fought for?